node to wait for the delay before having access to their reserve balance is
disincentive enough to not perform the attack.
On Apr 15, 2018, 11:37 AM, at 11:37 AM, Jim Posen <jim.po...@gmail.com> wrote:
>I believe that anyone attempting a DOS b
s would not work. Or
they would depend on asking for an invoice under the hood.
It feels to me that at some point, someone with complete knowledge of
the network needs to be employed.
On Mar 28, 2019, 9:51 PM, at 9:51 PM, ZmnSCPxj wrote:
>Good morning Ariel,
g up to date network information.
On Mar 22, 2019, 4:44 AM, at 4:44 AM, ZmnSCPxj via Lightning-dev
>Good morning list,
>I have been thinking of JIT-Routing in the context of unidirectional
>channels, as for example in Eclair Mobile.
some other mitigation for the spoofed-payment attack.
On Mar 14, 2019, 7:45 AM, at 7:45 AM, ZmnSCPxj via Lightning-dev
>Good morning Rene and list,
>Let us consider then the rule *when* a rebalancing would be beneficial
>to the node.
are common, the node with data loss can hide in that anonymity set.
And if human kind resolves all machine failures then by definition there
shouldn't be lightning channel data loss.
On Dec 13, 2020, 10:12 AM, at 10:12 AM, "David A. Harding"