Good morning Rene,
The attack is possible but requires the combination of the below:
1. A large 51% miner.
2. Many channels share-owned by the miner.
3. Large capacities in each channel share-owned by the miner.
Individual nodes can protect against these as below:
1. Contributing hashpower
Good example, even if rather hard to setup :-)
What I meant with the attack being identical is that we can replay the
entire attack on-chain, without needing Lightning in the first place,
i.e., the attacker needed to own the funds he is going to steal at some
time, whether that is as part of a
On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 06:07:48PM +0100, René Pickhardt via Lightning-dev
wrote:
> Hey Christian,
> I agree with you on almost anything you said. however I disagree that in the
> lightning case it produces just another double spending. I wish to to
> emphasize
> on my statement that the in the
Hey Christian,
I agree with you on almost anything you said. however I disagree that in
the lightning case it produces just another double spending. I wish to to
emphasize on my statement that the in the case with lightning such a 51%
attack can steal way more BTC than double spending my own
Hi René,
very good question. I think the simple answer is that this is exactly
the reason why not having a participant in the network that can 51%
attack over a prolonged period is one of the base assumptions in
Lightning. These attacks are deadly to all blockchains, and we are
certainly no
