Re: LS Self in the MOQ

1999-07-27 Thread Robert Stillwell

Rob quickly responds to Bo and David before month's end...

Bodvar,

I'm glad we're buds again! *smile*.  Your last post helped. But, one
clarification could help momentously!  You said that "A non-dualistic SOM
makes no sense."  It appears, however, the Pirsig mainly defends the MOQ
against such a non-dualistic SOM.  Pirsig said that it is ridiculous to
distance oneself from experience or try to reduce experience to physics.
But that is only the quest of a materialist.  If one accepts dualism, where
experience is separate from physics/structure, where is the redicularity?
What's the big problem?  I repeat my original question:

Does Pirsig discuss duality?

Please understand this is very important to me and -- if resolved -- I would
be forever indebted!!

And if you have time, another slant...  Yes, only the intellect creates a
notion of self.  One will never find a self missing under a rock, or hear a
self clinking around in the brain.   But, by intellectually conceding there
is an external reality, one can then concede also that there must be a self
apart from -- but attending to -- external reality.  Since you applauded
John for bringing back the self, can you think of a way to do this without
some type of dualism?   Does the experience vs. materialism duality debate
now escalate to self vs. value?  And by doing this, don't we lose
time/space/structure.

RJS
---

David,

I am very curious how you define your terms and ask for some
clarifications...

You say that

1.  "... we exist as a kind of unique culture made of the four levels."
2. "... the social level is the link between the mind and the body."
3. "... to get a whole picture of the MOQ self we have to look at the social
level [the bridge]."

I'm pretty sure I follow you in (1) and (3).  In (1) the four levels
comprise the entire spectrum of experience.  And we are our experiences.  I
find it impossible to imagine there being a "me" if I did not experience
anything.  In (3) I think you are saying basically the same thing as (1)
with emphasis that we tend to forget the social level which is needed to put
everything together.

The very interesting part is (2).  What exactly do you mean by "mind"?  The
intellectual level/aspect of experience or the stream of consciousness (all
experience)?  And what do you mean by body?  Do you mean the body things we
experience or -- with your notion of time/space -- are you conceding it is a
physical *object*  that maintains its structure despite experience?

I have not thought through the four possibilities, but I sense some good
debate coming.  Its a shame this month is ending so quickly...

Regards,
RJS




MOQ.org - http://www.moq.org



Re: LS Self in the MOQ

1999-07-26 Thread B. Skutvik

To all Lila Squad 
Time is running out for this month's topic, allow me a commentary 
to some of the participants.

JOHN BEASLEY.
I was greatly encouraged by your message of 25 July. Joel Kovel's idea 
of self as a continuum from ego to soul seems to be compatible with 
the MOQ view as it has crystallized from this session.

The lonely self (as you understood the MoQ before) is now 
brought into the fold again. I wish that Pirsig hadn't uttered 
remarks like the "mirror" one, it's a lapse to SOM from which the 
master should have refrained. If the SOLAQI idea is to become 
"canonized", the ego/self of Intellect is no more - or less - 
illusory than the rest of the static hierarchy.

The SOLAQI implies that the Q-idea is a tentative groping for 
foothold beyond intellect and that fits your "healthy" self idea. A 
movement beyond intellect will necessarily build on its (lone) self 
(dualist) nature, but transcend it into a self who sees the 
underlaying dynamic quality common to all levels (soul).

> In summary, Pirsig loses the opportunity to respond to the emptiness 
> and lonelines of modern lives, by throwing out the self as just a 
> collection of patterns of rather vague outworkings of Quality. 
> The self is actually the 'baby' which needed rescuing from the
> 'bathwater', and Robert's pithy summary of Krishnamurti, and 
> his application of the dynamic/static understanding to the self, 
> produces the integrating concept needed to build a much more 
> satisfactory (and satisfying) metaphysics. I feel a sense of elation 
> at how this is coming together.

Well Phdrus (of LILA) did perhaps not get everything absolutely 
right in his first effort, but let's distinguish him from Robert M 
Pirsig who recently said (in a letter to the squad) that we are 
exploring the territory that he opened up. Your allegory of the 
self as a baby who needs rescuing from the bathwater was splendid. 
This is perhaps what this month's effort has resulted in?

ROBERT STILLWELL
Thanks for accepting my criticism so positively. I hope 
you'll be as magnanimous this time too, because, even if I appreciate 
the time and effort put into your post of 24 July (LS Cartesian 
- not SOM dualism) you keep reinventing the gunpowder.

Glassness as different from the physical thing! This is Aristoteles' 
horseness vs the actual animal: Essence and substance two thousand 
years thereafter.

This Aristotelian notion (not yet fully SOM, but more so than Platons 
idea vs the shadows of appearance) hibernated through the Middle Ages 
and re-emerged with the Renaissance and went through many phases  - 
first - Spinoza's God/attributes of God, later Descartes' less 
theological and more epistemological doubt if there was an I (self) 
at all. Then empiricism which found that there is no self only 
experience, and finally Kant who tried to save the self by pointing 
to its innate "a priori" (before experience)  space/time/causality 
qualities. After Kant nothing of interest has been said (until 
Pirsig), everything seesawed between these two extremes: the world 
our creation/we the creations of the world.

A non-dualistic SOM makes no sense. "Matter only" is materialism and 
"mind only" is idealism. But - notice - no sooner has the two parties 
made their claim before they are forced to invoke the counterpoint. 
This is elemental, we cannot get hung up into these worn-out 
positions lest the MOQ  falls prey to a first grade philosophy 
student.

The MOQ puts an end to all this, not by solving it inside the SOM
context (the paradoxes of Greek physics simply vanished in the light 
of the new physics), but by jettisoning the subject-object notion - 
as a primary reality (in whatever disguise it tries to sneak back 
under) and adopting a new metaphysics: the MOQ.   

However, the EXPERIENCE of old Greece didn't disappear: 
spears flew, tortoises crawled and Achilles ran. Likewise, the 
phenomena of SOM don't disappear: only their paradoxical 
quality, we experience a SELF different from other (external world), 
only now it can be seen as the natural outcome of the new 
meta-PHYSICS. What we are discussing is how the SOM can be 
incorporated in the MOQ. My claim is that the self/not self-dualism 
IS the intellectual level itself. Other have forwarded less radical 
suggestions. So has the master himself.

DAVID L THOMAS 
You bring Pirsig's words to our attention (from a letter to Ant 
McWatt I think) :

> "...the intellectual pattern that says there is an external world of
> things out there which are independent of intellectual patterns.
> That is one of the highest quality intellectual patterns there is. 
> And in this highest quality intellectual pattern, external objects
> appear historically before intellectual patterns, not after, as is
> commonly presumed by the materialists." [RMP]

Pirsig doesn't exactly endorse the SOLAQI here, rather says that 
Subject-Objectivism is ONE intellectual pattern. Yet, as this 
definitely is its most