Re: attacking btrfs filesystems via UUID collisions? (was: Subvolume UUID, data corruption?)

2015-12-09 Thread Duncan
Christoph Anton Mitterer posted on Wed, 09 Dec 2015 06:07:38 +0100 as excerpted: > Well as I've said, getting that in via USB may be only one way. > We're already so far that GNOME automount devices when plugged... Ugh. ... And many know that's the sort of thing that made MS so much of a

Re: attacking btrfs filesystems via UUID collisions? (was: Subvolume UUID, data corruption?)

2015-12-08 Thread Christoph Anton Mitterer
On Sun, 2015-12-06 at 04:06 +, Duncan wrote: > There's actually a number of USB-based hardware and software vulns > out > there, from the under $10 common-component-capacitor-based charge- > and-zap > (charges off the 5V USB line, zaps the port with several hundred > volts > reverse-polarity,

Re: attacking btrfs filesystems via UUID collisions? (was: Subvolume UUID, data corruption?)

2015-12-05 Thread Christoph Anton Mitterer
On Sat, 2015-12-05 at 13:19 +, Duncan wrote: > The problem with btrfs is that because (unlike traditional > filesystems) > it's multi-device, it needs some way to identify what devices belong > to a > particular filesystem. Sure, but that applies to lvm, or MD as well... and I wouldn't know

Re: attacking btrfs filesystems via UUID collisions? (was: Subvolume UUID, data corruption?)

2015-12-05 Thread Christoph Anton Mitterer
On Sat, 2015-12-05 at 12:01 +, Hugo Mills wrote: > On Sat, Dec 05, 2015 at 04:28:24AM +0100, Christoph Anton Mitterer > wrote: > > On Fri, 2015-12-04 at 13:07 +, Hugo Mills wrote: > > > I don't think it'll cause problems. > > Is there any guaranteed behaviour when btrfs encounters two > >

Re: attacking btrfs filesystems via UUID collisions? (was: Subvolume UUID, data corruption?)

2015-12-05 Thread Duncan
Christoph Anton Mitterer posted on Sun, 06 Dec 2015 02:51:20 +0100 as excerpted: > You have things like ATMs, which are physically usually quite well > secured, but which do have rather easily accessible maintenance ports. > All of us have seen such embedded devices rebooting themselves, where >

Re: attacking btrfs filesystems via UUID collisions? (was: Subvolume UUID, data corruption?)

2015-12-04 Thread Christoph Anton Mitterer
Thinking a bit more I that, I came to the conclusion that it's actually security relevant that btrfs deals gracefully with filesystems having the same UUID: Getting to know someone else's filesystem's UUID may be more easily possible than one may think. It's usually not considered secret and