On Wed, Mar 05, 2014 at 06:52:27PM -0600, Matt Mackall wrote:
On Wed, 2014-03-05 at 16:11 -0500, Jason Cooper wrote:
In other words, if there are 4096 bits of unknownness in X to start
with, and I can get those same 4096 bits of unknownness back by
unmixing X' and Y, then there must
On Mon, Mar 03, 2014 at 03:51:48PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
When bringing a new RNG source online, it seems like it would make sense
to use some of its bytes to make the system entropy pool more random,
as done with all sorts of other devices that contain per-device or
per-boot differences.
This patch allocates memory from DMAable region to the caam_rng_ctx object,
earlier it had been statically allocated which resulted in errorneous
behaviour on inserting the caamrng module at the runtime.
Signed-off-by: Nitesh Lal niteshnarayan...@freescale.com
---
drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c |
Acked-by: Ruchika Gupta ruchika.gu...@freescale.com
-Original Message-
From: Nitesh Lal [mailto:niteshnarayan...@freescale.com]
Sent: Friday, March 07, 2014 4:06 PM
To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org; Gupta Ruchika-R66431; Dutta Yashpal-
B05456; herb...@gondor.apana.org
Cc: Lal
