Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using

On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 2:41 AM, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > The use in keys/big_key is _being_ removed, so this commit is > dependent on that commit landing, correct? (Order matters, because > otherwise we don't want to potentially screw up doing a kernel bisect > and causing their

Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using

On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 07:47:56PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > Otherwise, we might be seeding the RNG using bad randomness, which is > dangerous. The one use of this function from within the kernel -- not > from userspace -- is being removed (keys/big_key), so that call site > isn't

[PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using

Otherwise, we might be seeding the RNG using bad randomness, which is dangerous. The one use of this function from within the kernel -- not from userspace -- is being removed (keys/big_key), so that call site isn't relevant in assessing this. Cc: Herbert Xu