On 2014-03-16 18:56, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
On 03/03/2014 03:51 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
When bringing a new RNG source online, it seems like it would make sense
to use some of its bytes to make the system entropy pool more random,
as done with all sorts of other devices that contain per-device or
On 03/03/2014 03:51 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
When bringing a new RNG source online, it seems like it would make sense
to use some of its bytes to make the system entropy pool more random,
as done with all sorts of other devices that contain per-device or
per-boot differences.
Signed-off-by:
On 03/04/2014 02:39 PM, Matt Mackall wrote:
[temporarily coming out of retirement to provide a clue]
The pool mixing function is intentionally _reversible_. This is a
crucial security property.
That means, if I have an initial secret pool state X, and hostile
attacker controlled data Y,
On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 07:55:33AM -0500, Jason Cooper wrote:
On Mon, Mar 03, 2014 at 03:51:48PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
When bringing a new RNG source online, it seems like it would make sense
to use some of its bytes to make the system entropy pool more random,
as done with all sorts of
On Wed, Mar 05, 2014 at 06:52:27PM -0600, Matt Mackall wrote:
On Wed, 2014-03-05 at 16:11 -0500, Jason Cooper wrote:
In other words, if there are 4096 bits of unknownness in X to start
with, and I can get those same 4096 bits of unknownness back by
unmixing X' and Y, then there must
On Mon, Mar 03, 2014 at 03:51:48PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
When bringing a new RNG source online, it seems like it would make sense
to use some of its bytes to make the system entropy pool more random,
as done with all sorts of other devices that contain per-device or
per-boot differences.
Matt, Kees,
On Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 04:39:57PM -0600, Matt Mackall wrote:
On Tue, 2014-03-04 at 11:59 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 11:53 AM, Jason Cooper ja...@lakedaemon.net wrote:
On Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 11:01:49AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 7:38
On Wed, Mar 5, 2014 at 1:11 PM, Jason Cooper ja...@lakedaemon.net wrote:
Matt, Kees,
On Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 04:39:57PM -0600, Matt Mackall wrote:
On Tue, 2014-03-04 at 11:59 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 11:53 AM, Jason Cooper ja...@lakedaemon.net wrote:
On Tue, Mar 04,
On Wed, 2014-03-05 at 16:11 -0500, Jason Cooper wrote:
In other words, if there are 4096 bits of unknownness in X to start
with, and I can get those same 4096 bits of unknownness back by
unmixing X' and Y, then there must still be 4096 bits of unknownness
in X'. If X' is 4096 bits long,
On Wed, Mar 5, 2014 at 4:52 PM, Matt Mackall m...@selenic.com wrote:
On Wed, 2014-03-05 at 16:11 -0500, Jason Cooper wrote:
In other words, if there are 4096 bits of unknownness in X to start
with, and I can get those same 4096 bits of unknownness back by
unmixing X' and Y, then there must
Kees, Ted,
On Mon, Mar 03, 2014 at 03:51:48PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
When bringing a new RNG source online, it seems like it would make sense
to use some of its bytes to make the system entropy pool more random,
as done with all sorts of other devices that contain per-device or
per-boot
On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 7:38 AM, Jason Cooper ja...@lakedaemon.net wrote:
Kees, Ted,
On Mon, Mar 03, 2014 at 03:51:48PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
When bringing a new RNG source online, it seems like it would make sense
to use some of its bytes to make the system entropy pool more random,
as
On Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 11:01:49AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 7:38 AM, Jason Cooper ja...@lakedaemon.net wrote:
Kees, Ted,
On Mon, Mar 03, 2014 at 03:51:48PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
When bringing a new RNG source online, it seems like it would make sense
to use some
On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 11:53 AM, Jason Cooper ja...@lakedaemon.net wrote:
On Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 11:01:49AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 7:38 AM, Jason Cooper ja...@lakedaemon.net wrote:
Kees, Ted,
On Mon, Mar 03, 2014 at 03:51:48PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
When
On Tue, 2014-03-04 at 11:59 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 11:53 AM, Jason Cooper ja...@lakedaemon.net wrote:
On Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 11:01:49AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 7:38 AM, Jason Cooper ja...@lakedaemon.net wrote:
Kees, Ted,
On Mon, Mar 03,
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