Hi,
As I have said in my email that it will be used by IMA/EVM subsystem.
See security/integrity subdirectory in Linux kernel...
Indeed, use of HW accelerator is also on of the targets...
- Dmitry
On 21/03/11 16:06, ext Herbert Xu wrote:
On Mon, Mar 21, 2011 at 04:04:41PM +0200, Dmitry
To elaborate a bit.
Signing of some has is usually done instead of signing some input data
directly.
For that reason signature verification is basically a combination of
hash calculation with signature verification...
The issue here is that different padding schemes can be applied to the
has
On Tue, Mar 22, 2011 at 08:59:56AM +0200, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
As I have said in my email that it will be used by IMA/EVM subsystem.
See security/integrity subdirectory in Linux kernel...
Has the use of software asymmetric crypto in the kernel been
accepted for that purpose?
Thanks,
--
Hi,
Accepted by whom?
We extend functionality of Integrity subsystem in order to support
flashable images which can be verified with public keys...
- Dmitry
On 22/03/11 09:34, ext Herbert Xu wrote:
On Tue, Mar 22, 2011 at 08:59:56AM +0200, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
As I have said in my email
On Tue, Mar 22, 2011 at 10:57:55AM +0200, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
Hi,
Accepted by whom?
We extend functionality of Integrity subsystem in order to support
flashable images which can be verified with public keys...
Whoever that's going to merge the use-case for this :)
I'm not adding a whole
On Mon, Mar 21, 2011 at 04:04:41PM +0200, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
Do you think it make sense to have it as a crypto algo
What kind of API you would have in mind?
So the obvious question is who will use this functionality in
the kernel? If the only use is going to be in user-space, then
the next
