On Tue, Jul 18, 2017 at 08:57:28AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>
> So if you care about security and/or the cache/memory footprint more
> than about speed, you can disable the table based implementations that
> exist for i586, x86, ARM and arm64 (all of which have faster and time
> invariant
On Tue, Jul 18, 2017 at 09:57:55AM +0200, Stephan Müller wrote:
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/crypto/jitterentropy.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2017, Stephan Mueller
> + *
> + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
> + *
On Tue, Jul 18, 2017 at 9:58 AM, Stephan Müller wrote:
> When selecting the LRNG for compilation, disable add_disk_randomness and
> its supporting function.
>
> CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman
> CC: Arnd Bergmann
> CC: Jason A. Donenfeld
Add LRNG compilation support.
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman
CC: Arnd Bergmann
CC: Jason A. Donenfeld
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller
---
drivers/char/Kconfig | 10 ++
drivers/char/Makefile | 10 +-
2
When selecting the LRNG for compilation, disable add_disk_randomness and
its supporting function.
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman
CC: Arnd Bergmann
CC: Jason A. Donenfeld
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller
---
Hi,
after distributing patches for the Linux-RNG - a new approach for the last
half year, I would like to submit this RFC for inclusion into the kernel.
The following patch set provides a different approach to /dev/random which
I call Linux Random Number Generator (LRNG) to collect entropy
The LRNG with the following properties:
* noise source: interrupts timing with fast boot time seeding
* lockless LFSR to collect raw entropy
* use of standalone ChaCha20 based RNG with the option to use a
different DRNG selectable at compile time
* "atomic" seeding of secondary DRBG to
To support the LRNG operation which allocates the Jitter RNG separately
from the kernel crypto API, extract the relevant information into a
separate header file.
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman
CC: Arnd Bergmann
CC: Jason A. Donenfeld
On 18 July 2017 at 08:18, Herbert Xu wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 18, 2017 at 07:32:41AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>>
>> Because it is slower, and how much slower is architecture dependent
>> (if your arch has slow multiplication, aes-ti decryption will be dog
>> slow
On Tue, Jul 18, 2017 at 07:32:41AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>
> Because it is slower, and how much slower is architecture dependent
> (if your arch has slow multiplication, aes-ti decryption will be dog
> slow compared to aes-generic)
Right, but does anybody actually care? My guess is that on
On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 04:50:38PM -0700, Haren Myneni wrote:
>
> This patch adds P9 NX support for 842 compression engine. Virtual
> Accelerator Switchboard (VAS) is used to access 842 engine on P9.
>
> For each NX engine per chip, setup receive window using
> vas_rx_win_open() which configures
On 18 July 2017 at 06:25, Herbert Xu wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 11:28:53AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> The generic AES driver uses 16 lookup tables of 1 KB each, and has
>> encryption and decryption routines that are fully unrolled. Given how
>> the
Am Montag, 17. Juli 2017, 22:08:27 CEST schrieb Gary R Hook:
Hi Gary,
> Version 5 CCPs have differing requirements for XTS-AES: key components
> are stored in a 512-bit vector. The context must be little-endian
> justified. AES-256 is supported now, so propagate the cipher size to
> the command
On Mon, 17 Jul 2017 16:43:19 -0700
Haren Myneni wrote:
> [PATCH V2 0/6] Enable NX 842 compression engine on Power9
>
> P9 introduces Virtual Accelerator Switchboard (VAS) to communicate
> with NX 842 engine. icswx function is used to access NX before.
> On powerNV
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