On Sat, Jun 18, 2011 at 03:40:50PM -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
On 06/17/2011 01:28 PM, Matt Mackall wrote:
The one use case that it is cryptographically insufficient for is to
seed a new PRNG, which probably means it is unsuitable for being fed
as-is into /dev/random.
The thing to
On Sun, Jun 19, 2011 at 09:38:43AM -0400, Neil Horman wrote:
It sounds to me like, if its desireous to bypass the entropy pool, then we
should bypass the /dev/random path altogether. Why not write a hwrng driver
that can export access to the rdrand instruction via a misc device.
I presume
On 06/19/2011 08:07 AM, Herbert Xu wrote:
On Sun, Jun 19, 2011 at 09:38:43AM -0400, Neil Horman wrote:
It sounds to me like, if its desireous to bypass the entropy pool, then we
should bypass the /dev/random path altogether. Why not write a hwrng driver
that can export access to the rdrand