On 03/04/2014 02:39 PM, Matt Mackall wrote:
>
> [temporarily coming out of retirement to provide a clue]
>
> The pool mixing function is intentionally _reversible_. This is a
> crucial security property.
>
> That means, if I have an initial secret pool state X, and hostile
> attacker controlled
On 03/03/2014 03:51 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> When bringing a new RNG source online, it seems like it would make sense
> to use some of its bytes to make the system entropy pool more random,
> as done with all sorts of other devices that contain per-device or
> per-boot differences.
>
> Signed-off-by
Здравсmвуйте! Вac uнmepесyюm клиенmсkuе базы данных?
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