Re: random(4) and VMs

On Tue, Sep 18, 2018 at 7:03 PM John Denker wrote: > > Is a fix that only deals with a subset of the problem worth > > considering? Just patch the VM support code so that any time a VM is > > either booted or re-started after a save, the host system drops in > > some entropy, ... > > Good

random(4) and VMs

Getting the random driver well initialised early enough is a hard problem, at least on some machines. Solutions have been proposed by various people. If I understand them right, Ted Ts'o suggests modifying the boot loader to provide some entropy & John Denker suggests that every machine should be

Re: Fostering linux community collaboration on hardware accelerators

I shortened the cc list radically. If the discussion continues, it may be a good idea to add people back. I added John Gilmore since I cite one of his posts below. Jonathan Cameron wrote: > On behalf of Huawei, I am looking into options to foster a wider community >

Re: Re: [PATCH 0/6] Add support for ECDSA algorithm

On Tue, Aug 22, 2017 at 12:14 PM, Tudor Ambarus wrote: > Hi, Herbert, > > On 02/02/2017 03:57 PM, Herbert Xu wrote: >> >> Yes but RSA had an in-kernel user in the form of module signature >> verification. We don't add algorithms to the kernel without >> actual users.

Re: [Freedombox-discuss] Hardware Crypto

Showing only the key parts of the message: > From: John Gilmore An exceedingly knowledgeable guy, one we should probably take seriously. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Gilmore_(activist) > Most hardware crypto accelerators are useless, ... > ... you might as well have > just

Re: [Freedombox-discuss] Hardware Crypto

To me it seems obvious that if the hardware provides a real RNG, that should be used to feed random(4). This solves a genuine problem and, even if calls to the hardware are expensive, overall overhead will not be high because random(4) does not need huge amounts of input. I'm much less certain

Re: [RFC PATCH v12 3/4] Linux Random Number Generator

Sandy Harris <sandyinch...@gmail.com> wrote: > The biggest problem with random(4) is that you cannot generate good > output without a good seed & just after boot, ... > > The only really good solution I know of is to find a way to provide a > chunk of randomness early

Re: [RFC PATCH v12 3/4] Linux Random Number Generator

On Tue, Jul 18, 2017 at 5:08 PM, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > I've been trying to take the best features and suggestions from your > proposal and integrating them into /dev/random already. A good approach. > Things that I've chosen not take is basically because I disbelieve > that the

Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race

On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 5:49 AM, Jeffrey Walton wrote: > On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 5:36 AM, Theodore Ts'o wrote: >> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 10:53:35AM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: >>> > Suppressing all messages for all configurations cast a wider net than

Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete

at https://github.com/sandy-harris/maxwell The only kernel-space code I know of is Stephan's. If the claim that such calls give entropy is accepted (which I think it should be) then if we get one bit per call, need 100 or so bits & space the calls 100 ns apart, loading up a decent chunk of startup entropy

Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete

The only sensible & general solution for the initialisation problem that I have seen is John Denker's. http://www.av8n.com/computer/htm/secure-random.htm#sec-boot-image If I read that right, it would require only minor kernel changes & none to the API Ted & others are worrying about. It would be

Re: [PATCH] crypto: Allow ecb(cipher_null) in FIPS mode

On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 3:54 PM, Sandy Harris <sandyinch...@gmail.com> wrote: > In the FreeS/WAN project, back around the turn of the century, > we refused to implement several things required by the RFCs Link to documentation: http://www.freeswan.org/freeswan_trees/freeswan-2.06/doc

Re: [PATCH] crypto: Allow ecb(cipher_null) in FIPS mode

On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 2:56 AM, Stephan Müller wrote: > Am Freitag, 21. April 2017, 17:25:41 CEST schrieb Stephan Müller: > Just for the records: for FIPS 140-2 rules, cipher_null is to be interpreted > as a memcpy on SGLs. Thus it is no cipher even though it sounds like

Re: [PATCH] crypto: sun4i-ss: support the Security System PRNG

Add Ted T'so to cc list. Shouldn't he be included on anything affecting the random(4) driver? On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 8:34 AM, Corentin Labbe wrote: > From: LABBE Corentin > > The Security System have a PRNG. > This patch add support for it

Re: [PATCH] poly1305: generic C can be faster on chips with slow unaligned access

On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 4:09 PM, Herbert Xu wrote: > On Wed, Nov 02, 2016 at 06:58:10PM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: >> On MIPS chips commonly found in inexpensive routers, this makes a big >> difference in performance. >> >> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld

Re: Entropy sources (was: /dev/random - a new approach)

-hpa One possible solution is at: https://github.com/sandy-harris/maxwell A small (< 700 lines) daemon that gets entropy from timer imprecision and variations in time for arithmetic (cache misses, interrupts, etc.) and pumps it into /dev/random. Make it the first userspace program started a

Fwd: maxwell RNG

Version 2 of my maxwell(8) rng is now at: https://github.com/sandy-harris/maxwell It is a fairly simple program to gather entropy from timer fluctuations & feed results into the Linux random(4) device. Small --only 600 lines so reasonably easy to audit -- cheap & effective. It has not

Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] crypto: add template handling for RNGs

On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 3:14 AM, Herbert Xu wrote: > Stephan Mueller wrote: >> This patch adds the ability to register templates for RNGs. RNGs are >> "meta" mechanisms using raw cipher primitives. Thus, RNGs can now be >> implemented as

Re: [PATCH v5 0/7] /dev/random - a new approach

On Sun, Jun 19, 2016 at 3:36 PM, Pavel Machek wrote: >> The following patch set provides a different approach to /dev/random ... > > Dunno. It is very similar to existing rng, AFAICT. I do not think so. A lot of the basic principles are the same of course, but Stephan is

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

David Jaša wrote: > > BTW when looking at an old BSI's issue with Linux urandom that Jarod > Wilson tried to solve with this series: > https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg06113.html > I was thinking: > 1) wouldn't it help for large urandom consumers if kernel created

Could this be applied to random(4)?

A theoretical paper on getting provably excellent randomness from two relatively weak input sources. https://www.sciencenews.org/article/new-technique-produces-real-randomness -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to

Re: AES-NI: slower than aes-generic?

On Thu, May 26, 2016 at 2:49 PM, Stephan Mueller wrote: > Then, the use of the DRBG offers users to choose between a Hash/HMAC and CTR > implementation to suit their needs. The DRBG code is agnostic of the > underlying cipher. So, you could even use Blowfish instead of AES

Re: AES-NI: slower than aes-generic?

Stephan Mueller wrote: > for the DRBG and the LRNG work I am doing, I also test the speed of the DRBG. > The DRBG can be considered as a form of block chaining mode on top of a raw > cipher. > > What I am wondering is that when encrypting 256 16 byte blocks, I get a

Re: better patch for linux/bitops.h

On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 11:50 PM, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > Instead of arguing over who's "sane" or "insane", can we come up with > a agreed upon set of tests, and a set of compiler and compiler > versions ... I completely fail to see why tests or compiler versions should be part of

Re: random(4) changes

On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 12:06 PM, Andi Kleen <a...@firstfloor.org> wrote: > Sandy Harris <sandyinch...@gmail.com> writes: > > There is also the third problem of horrible scalability of /dev/random > output on larger systems, for which patches are getting ignored. I did

random(4) changes

Stephan has recently proposed some extensive changes to this driver, and I proposed a quite different set earlier. My set can be found at: https://github.com/sandy-harris This post tries to find the bits of both proposals that seem clearly worth doing and entail neither large implementation

Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/6] /dev/random - a new approach

> - Ted Jitter, havege and my maxwell(8) all claim to get entropy from variations in timing of simple calculations, and the docs for all three give arguments that there really is some entropy there. Some of those arguments are quite strong. Mine are in the P

Re: [PATCH] crypto: implement DH primitives under akcipher API

Salvatore Benedetto wrote: >> > > > +static int dh_check_params_length(unsigned int p_len) >> > > > +{ >> > > > + switch (p_len) { >> > > > + case 768: >> > > > + case 1024: >> > > > + case 1536: >> > > > + case 2048: >> > > > +

Re: [PATCH 1/7] A couple of generated files

This set of patches, plus some later ones that simplify the code and get rid of one major bug are now at: https://github.com/sandy-harris Directory for these changes is random.gcm An out-of-kernel test program for an older version is in random.test On Sat, Nov 7, 2015 at 1:50 PM, Sandy Harris

Re: ipsec impact on performance

This article is old (turn of the century) but it may have numbers worth comparing to http://www.freeswan.org/freeswan_trees/CURRENT-TREE/doc/performance.html -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More

Re: A new, fast and "unbreakable" encryption algorithm

On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 12:10 AM, Ismail Kizir wrote: > I've developed a new encryption algorithm, which dynamically changes > the key according to plaintext and practically impossible to break. There is a very long history of crypto whose author considers is secure being

[PATCH 3/7] Initialise pools randomly if CONFIG_RANDOM_INIT=y

Signed-off-by: Sandy Harris <sandyinch...@gmail.com> --- drivers/char/random.c | 50 ++ 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index d0da5d8..e222e0f 100644 --- a/driver

[PATCH 6/7] Produces generated/random_init.h for random driver

Signed-off-by: Sandy Harris <sandyinch...@gmail.com> --- scripts/gen_random.c | 260 +++ 1 file changed, 260 insertions(+) create mode 100644 scripts/gen_random.c diff --git a/scripts/gen_random.c b/scripts/gen_random.c new file mode 100644

[PATCH 5/7] Conditionals for CONFIG_RANDOM_INIT and CONFIG_RANDOM_GCM

Signed-off-by: Sandy Harris <sandyinch...@gmail.com> --- drivers/char/Makefile | 25 - 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/Makefile b/drivers/char/Makefile index d8a7579..7d095e5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/Makefile +++ b/driver

[PATCH 7/7] Create generated/random_init.h, used by random driver

Signed-off-by: Sandy Harris <sandyinch...@gmail.com> --- Kbuild | 21 + scripts/Makefile | 1 + 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/Kbuild b/Kbuild index f55cefd..494c665 100644 --- a/Kbuild +++ b/Kbuild @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ # 2) Generate timeconst.

[PATCH 1/7] A couple of generated files

Signed-off-by: Sandy Harris <sandyinch...@gmail.com> --- .gitignore | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index fd3a355..dd80bfd 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -112,3 +112,6 @@ all.config # Kdevelop4 *.kdev4 + +certs/x509_certificat

Re: [PATCH 1/7] A couple of generated files

On Sat, Nov 7, 2015 at 12:01 PM, Jason Cooper <ja...@lakedaemon.net> wrote: > On Sat, Nov 07, 2015 at 09:30:36AM -0500, Sandy Harris wrote: >> Signed-off-by: Sandy Harris <sandyinch...@gmail.com> >> --- >> .gitignore | 3 +++ >> 1 file changed, 3 insert

Re: [PATCH 1/7] A couple of generated files

e kernel. Test program is at: https://github.com/sandy-harris/random.test I just dropped a large chunk of that code into a copy of random.c, made modifications to make the style match better & to get it to compile in the kernel context, then deleted a few chunks of existing driver code a

Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] Crypto: Crypto driver support aes/des/des3 for rk3288

On Thu, Nov 5, 2015 at 8:17 PM, Zain Wang wrote: > The names registered are: > ecb(aes) cbc(aes) ecb(des) cbc(des) ecb(des3_ede) cbc(des3_ede) > You can alloc tags above in your case. Why on Earth are you allowing DES? Here's a reference from around the turn of the

Randomness for crypto, github repositories

I've just created github repositories for two projects: https://github.com/sandy-harris/random.test Test program for things I want to add to the Linux random(4) driver. I am proposing a fairly radical rewrite. This gives an executable test program for my new code, not a driver. https

Re: [Cryptography] Randomness for crypto, github repositories

On Wed, Oct 21, 2015 at 1:06 PM, wrote: > I've only looked at it briefly, but I have a question.. Are you trying to > use the GCM Galois multiply as an entropy extractor? Yes, the basic idea is to use a series of GCM multiplies over the pool data to replace the hashing of

Re: [PATCH 2/2] ath9k: export HW random number generator

On Mon, Jul 27, 2015 at 7:01 AM, Stephan Mueller smuel...@chronox.de wrote: This one does not look good for a claim that the RNG produces white noise. An RNG that is wired up to /dev/hwrng should produce white noise. Either by having an appropriate noise source or by conditioning the output of

Re: [PATCH v5 06/14] crypto: marvell/CESA: add DES support

On Tue, Jun 16, 2015 at 5:59 AM, Boris Brezillon boris.brezil...@free-electrons.com wrote: Add support for DES operations. Why on Earth should we do that? DES is demonstrably insecure. The only possible excuse for allowing it anywhere in a modern code base is that you need it to implement

Re: [PATCH] random: add random_initialized command line param

On Mon, May 18, 2015 at 6:58 PM, Herbert Xu herb...@gondor.apana.org.au wrote: Stephan Mueller smuel...@chronox.de wrote: I hear more and more discussions about recommendations to use AES 256 and not AES 128. Or perhaps other ciphers with 256-bit keys. Salsa, ChaCha and several of the Caesar

Re: Counter Size in CTR mode for AES Driver

sri sowj srisowj4li...@gmail.com wrote: I have seen multiple open source drivers for AES(CTR) mode for different Crypto Hardware Engines, I was not really sure on countersize,nonce etc. Please can any one provide some info on the following Not what you asked for, but in case it is useful

Re: crypto: zeroization of sensitive data in af_alg

On Sun, Nov 9, 2014 at 5:33 PM, Stephan Mueller smuel...@chronox.de wrote: while working on the AF_ALG interface, I saw no active zeroizations of memory that may hold sensitive data that is maintained outside the kernel crypto API cipher handles. ... I think I found the location for the

Re: memset() in crypto code?

I have started a thread about this on the gcc help mailing list https://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc-help/2014-10/msg00047.html We might consider replacinging memzero_explicit with memset_s() since that is in the C!! standard, albeit I think as optional. IBM, Apple, NetBSD, ... have that.

Re: memset() in crypto code?

On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 1:44 PM, Jason Cooper ja...@lakedaemon.net wrote: On Sat, Oct 04, 2014 at 11:09:40PM -0400, Sandy Harris wrote: There was recently a patch to the random driver to replace memset() because, according to the submitter, gcc sometimes optimises memset() away which might

Re: memset() in crypto code?

On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 1:44 PM, Jason Cooper ja...@lakedaemon.net wrote: On Sat, Oct 04, 2014 at 11:09:40PM -0400, Sandy Harris wrote: There was recently a patch to the random driver to replace memset() because, according to the submitter, gcc sometimes optimises memset() away

memset() in crypto code?

There was recently a patch to the random driver to replace memset() because, according to the submitter, gcc sometimes optimises memset() away which might leave data unnecessarily exposed. The solution suggested was a function called memzero_explicit(). There was a fair bit of discussion and the

RFC possible changes for Linux random device

I have started a thread with the above title on Perry's crypto list. Archive at: http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2014-September/022795.html First message was: I have some experimental code to replace parts of random.c It is not finished but far enough along to seek comment. It

Re: Testing the PRNG driver of the Allwinner Security System A20

On Tue, Jul 1, 2014 at 7:14 AM, Corentin LABBE clabbe.montj...@gmail.com wrote: I am writing the PRNG driver for the Allwinner Security System SoC A20. The datasheet my search turned up (v1, Feb. 2013) just says: 160-bit hardware PRNG with 192-bit seed and gives no other details. Do you have

Re: Freescale SEC1 and AEAD / IPSEC

On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 9:34 AM, leroy christophe christophe.le...@c-s.fr wrote: I'm progressing well on the SEC1 implementation. I now have HASH (non HMAC) , DES and AES working properly. Why DES? More than a decade ago, the first Linux IPsec implementation refused to do single DES because it

Re: [PATCH] CPU Jitter RNG: inclusion into kernel crypto API and /dev/random

Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu wrote: Fundamentally, what worries me about this scheme (actually, causes the hair on the back of my neck to rise up on end) is this statement in your documentation[1]: When looking at the sequence of time deltas gathered during testing [D] , no pattern can

Fwd: [PATCH] CPU Jitter RNG: inclusion into kernel crypto API and /dev/random

Stephan Mueller smuel...@chronox.de wrote: Paper has: the time delta is partitioned into chunks of 1 bit starting at the lowest bit The 64 1 bit chunks of the time value are XORed with each other to form a 1 bit value. As I read that, you are just taking the parity. Why not use that

Re: [PATCH] CPU Jitter RNG: inclusion into kernel crypto API and /dev/random

On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 9:38 AM, Sandy Harris sandyinch...@gmail.com wrote: Stephan Mueller smuel...@chronox.de wrote: Can you please help me understand why you think that a whitening function (cryptographic or not) is needed in the case of the CPU Jitter RNG, provided that I can show

Re: [PATCH] CPU Jitter RNG: inclusion into kernel crypto API and /dev/random

On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 10:40 AM, Stephan Mueller smuel...@chronox.de wrote: Another thing: when you start adding whitening functions, other people are starting (and did -- thus I added section 4.3 to my documentation) to complain that you hide your weaknesses behind the whiteners. I simply

Re: [PATCH] CPU Jitter RNG: inclusion into kernel crypto API and /dev/random

On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 11:26 AM, Stephan Mueller smuel...@chronox.de wrote: Why not declare some 64-bit constant C with a significant Which constant would you take? The CRC twist values? The SHA-1 initial values? Or the first few from SHA-256? The only essential requirement is that it not be

Re: [PATCH] CPU Jitter RNG: inclusion into kernel crypto API and /dev/random

Stephan Mueller smuel...@chronox.de wrote: [quoting me] ...your code is basically, with 64-bit x: for( i=0, x = 0 ; i 64; i++, x =rotl(x) ) x |= bit() Why not declare some 64-bit constant C with a significant number of bits set and do this: for( i=0, x = 0 ; i 64; i++, x

Re: [PATCH] CPU Jitter RNG: inclusion into kernel crypto API and /dev/random

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 2:38 PM, Stephan Mueller smuel...@chronox.de wrote: I like the basic idea. Here I'm alternately reading the email and the page you link to commenting on both. A nitpick in the paper is that you cite RFC 1750. That was superceded some years back by RFC 4086

Re: [PATCH][RFC] CPU Jitter random number generator (resent)

Stephan Mueller smuel...@chronox.de wrote: Ted is right that the non-deterministic behavior is caused by the OS due to its complexity. ... For VM's, it means we should definitely use paravirtualization to get randomness from the host OS. ... That is already in place at least with KVM

Re: [PATCH][RFC] CPU Jitter random number generator (resent)

I very much like the basic notion here. The existing random(4) driver may not get enough entropy in a VM or on a device like a Linux router and I think work such as yours or HAVEGE (http://www.irisa.fr/caps/projects/hipsor/) are important research. The paper by McGuire et al of Analysis of

Re: [PATCH][RFC] CPU Jitter random number generator (resent)

On Tue, May 21, 2013 at 3:01 PM, Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu wrote: I continue to be suspicious about claims that userspace timing measurements are measuring anything other than OS behaviour. Yes, but they do seem to contain some entropy. See links in the original post of this thread, the

Re: [RFC][PATCH] Entropy generator with 100 kB/s throughput

On Sun, Feb 10, 2013 at 1:50 PM, Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu wrote: On Sun, Feb 10, 2013 at 01:46:18PM +0100, Stephan Mueller wrote: However, the CPU has timing jitter in the execution of instruction. And I try to harvest that jitter. The good thing is that this jitter is always present and

Re: [RFC][PATCH] Entropy generator with 100 kB/s throughput

On Sun, Feb 10, 2013 at 2:32 PM, Stephan Mueller smuel...@chronox.de wrote: On 10.02.2013 19:50:02, +0100, Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu wrote: Given all your doubts on the high-precision timer, how can you reasonably state that the Linux kernel RNG is good then? The data from

Re: [PATCH] crypto/arc4: now arc needs blockcipher support

On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 at 12:13 AM, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior sebast...@breakpoint.cc wrote: Since commit ce6dd368 (crypto: arc4 - improve performance by adding ecb(arc4)) we need to pull in a blkcipher. |ERROR: crypto_blkcipher_type [crypto/arc4.ko] undefined! |ERROR: blkcipher_walk_done

Re: RFC: redesigning random(4)

On Thu, Sep 29, 2011 at 2:46 PM, Sandy Harris sandyinch...@gmail.com wrote: I have been thinking about how random(4) might be redesigned ... ... make the input pool use Skein (or another SHA-3 candidate) and the output pools a modified counter-mode AES. I now actually have most of the code

A fiddle for /dev/random

The program below gives somewhat random initialisers for the three pools in the random(4) driver. It is sort of a compile time equivalent of dumping /var/run/random-seed in. If /dev/urandom is present on the development machine (as it should be in nearly all cases), data from it is used. If not,

RFC: redesigning random(4)

I have been thinking about how random(4) might be redesigned and I now have enough thoughts to put them on electrons and send them out. This is all first-cut stuff, though I have thought about it some. It needs comment, criticism and revision. A few things I think we absolutely want to keep. At

random(4) overheads question

I'm working on a demon that collects timer randomness, distills it some, and pushes the results into /dev/random. My code produces the random material in 32-bit chunks. The current version sends it to /dev/random 32 bits at a time, doing a write() and an entropy-update ioctl() for each chunk.

Re: [PATCH] random: add blocking facility to urandom

On Thu, Sep 8, 2011 at 9:11 PM, Steve Grubb sgr...@redhat.com wrote: The system being low on entropy is another problem that should be addressed. For our purposes, we cannot say take it from TPM or RDRND or any plugin board. We have to have the mathematical analysis that goes with it, we

Re: [PATCH] random: add blocking facility to urandom

Jarod Wilson ja...@redhat.com wrote: Ted Ts'o wrote: Yeah, but there are userspace programs that depend on urandom not blocking... so your proposed change would break them. ... But only if you've set the sysctl to a non-zero value, ... But again, I want to stress that out of the box,

Re: IPsec performance (in)dependent on ingress rate?

On Thu, Sep 1, 2011 at 10:24 PM, Adam Tisovsky tisov...@gmail.com wrote: I’m doing some benchmarks of IPsec performance on Cisco router and I have experienced the situation described below. My question is whether anybody has performed similar tests on Linux (StrongSWAN, OpenSWAN,…) or any

Re: [PATCH] random: add blocking facility to urandom

On Fri, Sep 2, 2011 at 10:37 PM, Jarod Wilson ja...@redhat.com wrote: Certain security-related certifications and their respective review bodies have said that they find use of /dev/urandom for certain functions, such as setting up ssh connections, is acceptable, but if and only if

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto, x86: SSSE3 based SHA1 implementation for x86-64

On Mon, Aug 8, 2011 at 1:48 PM, Locktyukhin, Maxim maxim.locktyuk...@intel.com wrote: 20 (and more) cycles per byte shown below are not reasonable numbers for SHA-1 - ~6 c/b (as can be seen in some of the results for Core2) is the expected results ... Ten years ago, on Pentium II, one