On Sun, Jun 26, 2016 at 08:47:43PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> Ok, so lets say I'm writing some TLS server, and I know that traffic
> is currently heavy because it was heavy in last 5 minutes. Would it
> make sense for me to request 128M of randomness from /dev/urandom, and
> then use that interna
Am Sonntag, 26. Juni 2016, 20:47:43 schrieb Pavel Machek:
Hi Pavel,
> Hi!
>
> > Yes, I understand the argument that the networking stack is now
> > requiring the crypto layer --- but not all IOT devices may necessarily
> > require the IP stack (they might be using some alternate wireless
> > com
Hi!
> Yes, I understand the argument that the networking stack is now
> requiring the crypto layer --- but not all IOT devices may necessarily
> require the IP stack (they might be using some alternate wireless
> communications stack) and I'd much rather not make things worse.
>
>
> The final th
On Mon, Jun 20, 2016 at 05:49:17PM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
>
> Is speed everything we should care about? What about:
>
> - offloading of crypto operation from the CPU
In practice CPU offland is not helpful, and in fact, in most cases is
harmful, when one is only encrypting a tiny amount of
On 06/20/16 08:49, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Montag, 20. Juni 2016, 11:01:47 schrieb Theodore Ts'o:
>
> Hi Theodore,
>
>>
>> So simply doing chacha20 encryption in a tight loop in the kernel
>> might not be a good proxy for what would actually happen in real life
>> when someone calls getrandom
Am Montag, 20. Juni 2016, 11:01:47 schrieb Theodore Ts'o:
Hi Theodore,
>
> So simply doing chacha20 encryption in a tight loop in the kernel
> might not be a good proxy for what would actually happen in real life
> when someone calls getrandom(2). (Another good question to ask is
> when someone
On Mon, Jun 20, 2016 at 01:19:17PM +0800, Herbert Xu wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 20, 2016 at 01:02:03AM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> >
> > It's work that I'm not convinced is worth the gain? Perhaps I
> > shouldn't have buried the lede, but repeating a paragraph from later
> > in the message:
> >
> >
On Mon, Jun 20, 2016 at 01:02:03AM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
>
> It's work that I'm not convinced is worth the gain? Perhaps I
> shouldn't have buried the lede, but repeating a paragraph from later
> in the message:
>
>So even if the AVX optimized is 100% faster than the generic version,
>
On Mon, Jun 20, 2016 at 09:25:28AM +0800, Herbert Xu wrote:
> > Yes, I understand the argument that the networking stack is now
> > requiring the crypto layer --- but not all IOT devices may necessarily
> > require the IP stack (they might be using some alternate wireless
> > communications stack)
On Sun, Jun 19, 2016 at 07:18:28PM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
>
> C) Simply compiling in the Crypto layer and the ChaCha20 generic
> handling (all of which is doing extra work which we would then be
> undoing in the random layer --- and I haven't included the extra code
> in the random driver need
On Wed, Jun 15, 2016 at 10:59:08PM +0800, Herbert Xu wrote:
> I think you should be accessing this through the crypto API rather
> than going direct. We already have at least one accelerated
> implementation of chacha20 and there may well be more of them
> in future. Going through the crypto API
On Mon, Jun 13, 2016 at 11:48:37AM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> The CRNG is faster, and we don't pretend to track entropy usage in the
> CRNG any more.
>
> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o
> ---
> crypto/chacha20_generic.c | 61
> drivers/char/random.c | 374
> +++
On Mon, Jun 13, 2016 at 08:00:33PM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
>
> 1. The ChaCha20 is seeded with 256 bits (let us assume it is full entropy)
>
> 2. The ChaCha20 block operation shuffles the 256 bits of entropy over the 512
> bit state -- already here we see that after shuffling, the entropy t
Am Montag, 13. Juni 2016, 11:48:37 schrieb Theodore Ts'o:
Hi Theodore,
> /*
> @@ -1254,15 +1423,26 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct
> entropy_store *r, void __user *buf, */
> void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
> {
> + __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
> +
> #if DEBUG_R
The CRNG is faster, and we don't pretend to track entropy usage in the
CRNG any more.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o
---
crypto/chacha20_generic.c | 61
drivers/char/random.c | 374 +-
include/crypto/chacha20.h | 1 +
lib/Makefile
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