Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

Am Mittwoch, 22. Juni 2016, 08:54:16 schrieb Austin S. Hemmelgarn: Hi Austin, > You're not demonstrating it's inherently present in the architecture, I am not demonstrating it, interesting statement. I take different arches from different vendors which were developed independently from each

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

On 2016-06-22 01:16, Stephan Mueller wrote: Am Dienstag, 21. Juni 2016, 15:31:07 schrieb Austin S. Hemmelgarn: Hi Austin, Little data, interesting statement for results on 200+ systems including all major CPU arches all showing information leading in the same directions. Let me try

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

Am Dienstag, 21. Juni 2016, 15:31:07 schrieb Austin S. Hemmelgarn: Hi Austin, > > Little data, interesting statement for results on 200+ systems including > > all major CPU arches all showing information leading in the same > > directions. > Let me try rephrasing this to make it a bit clearer: >

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

On 2016-06-21 14:04, Stephan Mueller wrote: Am Dienstag, 21. Juni 2016, 13:51:15 schrieb Austin S. Hemmelgarn: 6. You have a significant lack of data regarding embedded systems, which is one of the two biggest segments of Linux's market share. You list no results for any pre-ARMv6 systems

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

Am Dienstag, 21. Juni 2016, 13:51:15 schrieb Austin S. Hemmelgarn: Hi Austin, > > >> 2. Quite a few systems have a rather distressingly low lower bound and > >> still get accepted by your algorithm (a number of the S/390 systems, and > >> a handful of the AMD processors in particular). > > > >

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

Am Dienstag, 21. Juni 2016, 13:54:13 schrieb Austin S. Hemmelgarn: Hi Austin, > On 2016-06-21 13:23, Stephan Mueller wrote: > > Am Dienstag, 21. Juni 2016, 13:18:33 schrieb Austin S. Hemmelgarn: > > > > Hi Austin, > > > >>> You have to trust the host for anything, not just for the entropy in >

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

On 2016-06-21 13:23, Stephan Mueller wrote: Am Dienstag, 21. Juni 2016, 13:18:33 schrieb Austin S. Hemmelgarn: Hi Austin, You have to trust the host for anything, not just for the entropy in timings. This is completely invalid argument unless you can present a method that one guest can

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

On 2016-06-21 09:20, Stephan Mueller wrote: Am Dienstag, 21. Juni 2016, 09:05:55 schrieb Austin S. Hemmelgarn: Hi Austin, On 2016-06-20 14:32, Stephan Mueller wrote: Am Montag, 20. Juni 2016, 13:07:32 schrieb Austin S. Hemmelgarn: Hi Austin, On 2016-06-18 12:31, Stephan Mueller wrote: Am

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

Am Dienstag, 21. Juni 2016, 13:18:33 schrieb Austin S. Hemmelgarn: Hi Austin, > > You have to trust the host for anything, not just for the entropy in > > timings. This is completely invalid argument unless you can present a > > method that one guest can manipulate timings in other guest in such

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

On 2016-06-21 09:42, Pavel Machek wrote: Hi! 6. You have a significant lack of data regarding embedded systems, which is one of the two biggest segments of Linux's market share. You list no results for any pre-ARMv6 systems (Linux still runs on and is regularly used on ARMv4 CPU's, and it's

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

On Út, 2016-06-21 at 09:05 -0400, Austin S. Hemmelgarn wrote: > On 2016-06-20 14:32, Stephan Mueller wrote: > >  > > [1] http://www.chronox.de/jent/doc/CPU-Jitter-NPTRNG.pdf > Specific things I notice about this: > 1. QEMU systems are reporting higher values than almost anything > else  > with the

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

Am Dienstag, 21. Juni 2016, 09:05:55 schrieb Austin S. Hemmelgarn: Hi Austin, > On 2016-06-20 14:32, Stephan Mueller wrote: > > Am Montag, 20. Juni 2016, 13:07:32 schrieb Austin S. Hemmelgarn: > > > > Hi Austin, > > > >> On 2016-06-18 12:31, Stephan Mueller wrote: > >>> Am Samstag, 18. Juni

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

On 2016-06-20 14:32, Stephan Mueller wrote: Am Montag, 20. Juni 2016, 13:07:32 schrieb Austin S. Hemmelgarn: Hi Austin, On 2016-06-18 12:31, Stephan Mueller wrote: Am Samstag, 18. Juni 2016, 10:44:08 schrieb Theodore Ts'o: Hi Theodore, At the end of the day, with these devices you really

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

Hi, On So, 2016-06-18 at 10:44 -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 03:56:13PM +0200, David Jaša wrote: > > I was thinking along the lines that "almost every important package > > supports FreeBSD as well where they have to handle the condition so > > option to switch to Rather

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

Am Montag, 20. Juni 2016, 13:07:32 schrieb Austin S. Hemmelgarn: Hi Austin, > On 2016-06-18 12:31, Stephan Mueller wrote: > > Am Samstag, 18. Juni 2016, 10:44:08 schrieb Theodore Ts'o: > > > > Hi Theodore, > > > >> At the end of the day, with these devices you really badly need a > >> hardware

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

On 2016-06-18 12:31, Stephan Mueller wrote: Am Samstag, 18. Juni 2016, 10:44:08 schrieb Theodore Ts'o: Hi Theodore, At the end of the day, with these devices you really badly need a hardware RNG. We can't generate randomness out of thin air. The only thing you really can do requires user

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

Am Samstag, 18. Juni 2016, 10:44:08 schrieb Theodore Ts'o: Hi Theodore, > > At the end of the day, with these devices you really badly need a > hardware RNG. We can't generate randomness out of thin air. The only > thing you really can do requires user space help, which is to generate > keys

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 03:56:13PM +0200, David Jaša wrote: > I was thinking along the lines that "almost every important package > supports FreeBSD as well where they have to handle the condition so > option to switch to Rather Break Than Generate Weak Keys would be nice" > - but I didn't expect

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

Am Freitag, 17. Juni 2016, 11:26:23 schrieb Sandy Harris: Hi Sandy, > David Jaša wrote: > > BTW when looking at an old BSI's issue with Linux urandom that Jarod > > Wilson tried to solve with this series: > > https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg06113.html > > I was

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

Am Freitag, 17. Juni 2016, 15:56:13 schrieb David Jaša: Hi David, > Hi Stephan, > > thank you for your thorough reply, > > On St, 2016-06-15 at 18:58 +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote: > > Am Mittwoch, 15. Juni 2016, 18:17:43 schrieb David Jaša: > > > > Hi David, > > > > > Hello Stephan, > > > >

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

David Jaša wrote: > > BTW when looking at an old BSI's issue with Linux urandom that Jarod > Wilson tried to solve with this series: > https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg06113.html > I was thinking: > 1) wouldn't it help for large urandom consumers if kernel created

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

Hi Stephan, thank you for your thorough reply, On St, 2016-06-15 at 18:58 +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote: > Am Mittwoch, 15. Juni 2016, 18:17:43 schrieb David Jaša: > > Hi David, > > > Hello Stephan, > > > > Did you consider blocking urandom output or returning error until > > initialized?

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

Am Mittwoch, 15. Juni 2016, 18:17:43 schrieb David Jaša: Hi David, > Hello Stephan, > > Did you consider blocking urandom output or returning error until > initialized? Given the speed of initialization you report, it shouldn't > break any userspace apps while making sure that nobody uses

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

Hello Stephan, Did you consider blocking urandom output or returning error until initialized? Given the speed of initialization you report, it shouldn't break any userspace apps while making sure that nobody uses predictable pseudoranom numbers. I was considering asking for patch (or even trying

Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

I'll be a while going through this. I was thinking about our earlier discussion where I was hammering on the point that compressing entropy too early is a mistake, and just now realized that I should have given you credit for my recent 4.7-rc1 patch 2a18da7a. The hash function ("good, fast AND

[PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach

Hi Herbert, Ted, The following patch set provides a different approach to /dev/random which I call Linux Random Number Generator (LRNG) to collect entropy within the Linux kernel. The main improvements compared to the legacy /dev/random is to provide sufficient entropy during boot time as well as