Em Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 12:16:47PM -0400, Daniel Micay escreveu:
> On Fri, 2016-06-17 at 08:54 +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > This Changelog is completely devoid of information. _WHY_ are you
> > doing this?
> Attack surface reduction. It's possible to use seccomp-bpf for some
> limited cases,
On Fri, 2016-06-17 at 08:54 +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 16, 2016 at 03:27:55PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > Hi guys,
> >
> > This patch wasn't originally CCed to you (I'm fixing that now).
> > Would
> > you consider taking this into the perf tree?
>
> No.
>
> > It's been in
> As a debian user, is this a good place to complain? Because it does
> get
> it the way.
It would be relevant to whether or not it should be set to 3 by default
in the kernel without explicit configuration, but there's no proposal to
do that. Debian has to pick a trade-off beyond security and a
On Thu, Jun 16, 2016 at 03:27:55PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Hi guys,
>
> This patch wasn't originally CCed to you (I'm fixing that now). Would
> you consider taking this into the perf tree?
No.
> It's been in active use
> in both Debian and Android for a while now.
Very nice of you all to
Ben Hutchings writes:
> When kernel.perf_event_open is set to 3 (or greater), disallow all
> access to performance events by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> Add a Kconfig symbol CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT that
> makes this value the default.
So this patch does two
Hi guys,
This patch wasn't originally CCed to you (I'm fixing that now). Would
you consider taking this into the perf tree? It's been in active use
in both Debian and Android for a while now.
(If need be, I can resend it.)
Thanks!
-Kees
On Sat, Jun 4, 2016 at 1:49 PM, Jeffrey Vander Stoep