Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown

2014-02-27 Thread Alon Ziv
One Thousand Gnomes gnomes@... writes: Trusted is rather misleading. It's not trusted, it's *measured*. It's the same bits you had when you made it, and when you booted it before. Whether you trust them is a different and quite unrelated question. You may have reasons to do either. I

Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown

2014-02-27 Thread Josh Boyer
On Wed, Feb 26, 2014 at 3:11 PM, Matthew Garrett matthew.garr...@nebula.com wrote: The conclusion we came to at Plumbers was that this patchset was basically fine but that Linus hated the name securelevel more than I hate pickled herring, so after thinking about this for a few months I've come

Re: [PATCH 12/12] Add option to automatically set trusted_kernel when in Secure Boot mode

2014-02-27 Thread Kees Cook
On Wed, Feb 26, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Matthew Garrett matthew.garr...@nebula.com wrote: On Wed, 2014-02-26 at 22:41 +, One Thousand Gnomes wrote: Another issue that needs addressing is firmware. Quite a few of our request_firmware cases load device firmware which is not signed into DMA capable

Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown

2014-02-27 Thread Greg KH
On Thu, Feb 27, 2014 at 01:04:34PM -0500, Josh Boyer wrote: On Wed, Feb 26, 2014 at 3:11 PM, Matthew Garrett matthew.garr...@nebula.com wrote: The conclusion we came to at Plumbers was that this patchset was basically fine but that Linus hated the name securelevel more than I hate pickled

Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown

2014-02-27 Thread Josh Boyer
On Thu, Feb 27, 2014 at 2:07 PM, Greg KH gre...@linuxfoundation.org wrote: On Thu, Feb 27, 2014 at 01:04:34PM -0500, Josh Boyer wrote: On Wed, Feb 26, 2014 at 3:11 PM, Matthew Garrett matthew.garr...@nebula.com wrote: The conclusion we came to at Plumbers was that this patchset was basically

[PATCH 02/13] x86, tools: Consolidate #ifdef code

2014-02-27 Thread Matt Fleming
From: Matt Fleming matt.flem...@intel.com Instead of littering main() with #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB, move the logic into separate functions that do nothing if the config option isn't set. This makes main() much easier to read. Acked-by: Borislav Petkov b...@suse.de Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming

[PATCH 02/13] x86, tools: Consolidate #ifdef code

2014-02-27 Thread Matt Fleming
From: Matt Fleming matt.flem...@intel.com Instead of littering main() with #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB, move the logic into separate functions that do nothing if the config option isn't set. This makes main() much easier to read. Acked-by: Borislav Petkov b...@suse.de Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming

[PATCH 06/13] x86/efi: Build our own EFI services pointer table

2014-02-27 Thread Matt Fleming
From: Matt Fleming matt.flem...@intel.com It's not possible to dereference the EFI System table directly when booting a 64-bit kernel on a 32-bit EFI firmware because the size of pointers don't match. In preparation for supporting the above use case, build a list of function pointers on boot so

[PATCH 03/13] x86/mm/pageattr: Always dump the right page table in an oops

2014-02-27 Thread Matt Fleming
From: Matt Fleming matt.flem...@intel.com Now that we have EFI-specific page tables we need to lookup the pgd when dumping those page tables, rather than assuming that swapper_pgdir is the current pgdir. Remove the double underscore prefix, which is usually reserved for static functions.

[PATCH 12/13] x86/boot: Don't overwrite cr4 when enabling PAE

2014-02-27 Thread Matt Fleming
From: Matt Fleming matt.flem...@intel.com Some EFI firmware makes use of the FPU during boottime services and clearing X86_CR4_OSFXSR by overwriting %cr4 causes the firmware to crash. Add the PAE bit explicitly instead of trashing the existing contents, leaving the rest of the bits as the

[PATCH 09/13] x86/efi: Firmware agnostic handover entry points

2014-02-27 Thread Matt Fleming
From: Matt Fleming matt.flem...@intel.com The EFI handover code only works if the bitness of the firmware and the kernel match, i.e. 64-bit firmware and 64-bit kernel - it is not possible to mix the two. This goes against the tradition that a 32-bit kernel can be loaded on a 64-bit BIOS platform

Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown

2014-02-27 Thread Matthew Garrett
On Fri, 2014-02-28 at 14:03 +1100, James Morris wrote: Ok, which tree should take this? I'm happy to, although most of it is outside security/ . Security might make the most sense - I don't think any of the additional restrictions (beyond kexec, and I think we've hashed that argument out