Re: [PATCH V3 02/11] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is enabled

2013-09-04 Thread David Woodhouse
and then writing to PCI config to map that BAR to an address that we can get executed by kernel code? -- David WoodhouseOpen Source Technology Centre david.woodho...@intel.com Intel Corporation smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic

Re: [PATCH V3 02/11] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is enabled

2013-09-04 Thread David Woodhouse
writing some fun stuff to a memory BAR and then writing to PCI config to map that BAR to an address that we can get executed by kernel code? Yes, that's why config space is locked down for now. OK. -- David WoodhouseOpen Source Technology Centre david.woodho

Re: [PATCH V3 02/11] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is enabled

2013-09-04 Thread David Woodhouse
On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 19:01 +, Matthew Garrett wrote: But presumably the guest's view of RAM is what gets written to the BARs? You're talking about the MMIO BARs of the devices which are given to the guest, right? The register into which we write the 'ring buffer address', and for that

Re: UEFI Plugfest 2013 -- New Orleans

2013-08-19 Thread David Woodhouse
On Fri, 2013-08-16 at 11:20 -0400, John W. Linville wrote: All, The Linux Foundation and The UEFI Forum are hosting a UEFI Plugfest event in New Orleans on September 19-20, 2013. This event will run concurrent with Linux Plumbers Conference, just after LinuxCon at the Hyatt Regency New

Re: UEFI Plugfest 2013 -- New Orleans

2013-08-19 Thread David Woodhouse
On Mon, 2013-08-19 at 10:38 -0700, James Bottomley wrote: It's not about us removing the code, it's about us having an accurate compliance test. There are two reasons for having a fully correct compliance test 1. Our work arounds have unintended consequences which have knock

Re: UEFI Plugfest 2013 -- New Orleans

2013-08-19 Thread David Woodhouse
On Mon, 2013-08-19 at 21:39 +0100, Matthew Garrett wrote: The plugfests have, from our perspective, always been useful in identifying new implementation interpretations before hardware ships. But even then, it's usually too late to modify the firmware. Vendors who care about Linux

Re: Corrupted EFI region

2013-07-31 Thread David Woodhouse
On Wed, 2013-07-31 at 22:54 +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote: so I'm seeing this funny thing where an EFI region changes when we enter efi_enter_virtual_mode when booting with edk2 on kvm. Here's the diff: Perhaps the edk2-de...@lists.sourceforge.net list should be in Cc? -- dwmw2 smime.p7s

Re: EFI: Stash ROMs if they're not in the PCI BAR

2013-03-20 Thread David Woodhouse
On Mon, 2013-03-18 at 16:02 +, Matthew Garrett wrote: On Mon, 2013-03-18 at 11:36 +, Matt Fleming wrote: On Fri, 2013-03-15 at 08:57 +, David Woodhouse wrote: True. It probably doesn't *matter* because the size is zero so the firmware is just going to ignore the pointer anyway

Re: Curious crash with secure variables

2013-03-18 Thread David Woodhouse
On Mon, 2013-03-18 at 15:02 +, Matt Fleming wrote: On 03/18/2013 02:23 PM, James Bottomley wrote: Yes, it's a phenomenally complicated operation from looking at the TianoCore source ... might we not be better off not bothering to relocate and just using a private physical mapping for

Re: Curious crash with secure variables

2013-03-18 Thread David Woodhouse
On Mon, 2013-03-18 at 15:16 +, Matt Fleming wrote: See, commit 53b87cf0 (x86, mm: Include the entire kernel memory map in trampoline_pgd), commit 185034e7 (x86, efi: 1:1 pagetable mapping for virtual EFI calls), commit da5a108d05b4 (x86/kernel: remove tboot 1:1 page table

Re: EFI runtime and kexec

2013-03-01 Thread David Woodhouse
On Fri, 2013-03-01 at 23:30 +, David Woodhouse wrote: On Sat, 2013-03-02 at 00:07 +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote: Hmm, yeah, that's nasty. This also means option #2 can go too because of the fixed addresses. Option #1 is also kinda polluting user address space User address space

Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes for v3.8

2013-01-18 Thread David Woodhouse
On Fri, 2013-01-18 at 10:29 +, Matt Fleming wrote: Hi Peter, The following changes since commit 7d1f9aeff1ee4a20b1aeb377dd0f579fe9647619: Linux 3.8-rc4 (2013-01-17 19:25:45 -0800) are available in the git repository at:

Re: [PATCH] Fix efifb initialisation when the only GOP device implements ConOut.

2013-01-07 Thread David Woodhouse
On Mon, 2013-01-07 at 17:15 +, Matt Fleming wrote: On Mon, 2013-01-07 at 02:04 +, David Woodhouse wrote: On Sun, 2013-01-06 at 00:13 +, David Woodhouse wrote: When booting under OVMF we have precisely one GOP device, and it implements the ConOut protocol. We break out

Re: [PATCH] Fix efifb initialisation when the only GOP device implements ConOut.

2013-01-07 Thread David Woodhouse
On Mon, 2013-01-07 at 17:58 +, Matthew Garrett wrote: Ignore this case? You can't run 32-bit kernels on 64-bit EFI, or vice-versa. You'll die on the first call to UEFI services. The kernel has code to avoid calling UEFI services in that case. Even if we don't want to support that (any

Re: [PATCH] Fix efifb initialisation when the only GOP device implements ConOut.

2013-01-07 Thread David Woodhouse
On Mon, 2013-01-07 at 18:43 +, Matthew Garrett wrote: The kernel does, the EFI boot stub doesn't. There's probably an argument for having it fail in that case, but it wouldn't even be able to print an error message without some gymnastics. Printing an error message is simple enough from

Re: Use PCI ROMs from EFI boot services

2012-12-05 Thread David Woodhouse
in qemu locally which will let you call SetVirtualAddressMap more than once, which is a step towards fixing it sanely. It got preempted, but I'll take another look at it shortly. -- David WoodhouseOpen Source Technology Centre david.woodho...@intel.com