Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] powerpc: Add support to initialize ima policy rules
On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 04:33:57PM -0400, Nayna Jain wrote:
> PowerNV secure boot relies on the kernel IMA security subsystem to
> perform the OS kernel image signature verification. Since each secure
> boot mode has different IMA policy requirements, dynamic definition of
> the policy rules based on the runtime secure boot mode of the system is
> required. On systems that support secure boot, but have it disabled,
> only measurement policy rules of the kernel image and modules are
> defined.
>
> This patch defines the arch-specific implementation to retrieve the
> secure boot mode of the system and accordingly configures the IMA policy
> rules.
>
> This patch provides arch-specific IMA policies if PPC_SECURE_BOOT
> config is enabled.
>
> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain
> ---
> arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 14 +
> arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 1 +
> arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 54 ++
> include/linux/ima.h| 3 +-
> 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
Hi,
This series failed to build against linuxppc/merge tree with
`ppc64le_defconfig`,
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.c:14:6: error: redefinition of
'get_powerpc_sb_mode'
14 | bool get_powerpc_sb_mode(void)
| ^~~
In file included from arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.c:11:
./arch/powerpc/include/asm/secboot.h:15:20: note: previous definition of
'get_powerpc_sb_mode' was here
15 | static inline bool get_powerpc_sb_mode(void)
|^~~
make[3]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:278:
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.o] Error 1
make[3]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs
make[2]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:489: arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv] Error
2
make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:489: arch/powerpc/platforms] Error 2
make: *** [Makefile:1071: arch/powerpc] Error 2
make: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs
Regards,
-Satheesh
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> index 8c1c636308c8..9de77bb14f54 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> @@ -902,6 +902,20 @@ config PPC_MEM_KEYS
>
> If unsure, say y.
>
> +config PPC_SECURE_BOOT
> + prompt "Enable PowerPC Secure Boot"
> + bool
> + default n
> + depends on PPC64
> + depends on OPAL_SECVAR
> + depends on IMA
> + depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY
> + help
> + Linux on POWER with firmware secure boot enabled needs to define
> + security policies to extend secure boot to the OS.This config
> + allows user to enable OS Secure Boot on PowerPC systems that
> + have firmware secure boot support.
> +
> endmenu
>
> config ISA_DMA_API
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
> index 0ea6c4aa3a20..75c929b41341 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
> @@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_IMA
> obj-y+= ima_kexec.o
> endif
> endif
> +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT)+= ima_arch.o
>
> obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o
> obj64-$(CONFIG_AUDIT)+= compat_audit.o
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
> new file mode 100644
> index ..1767bf6e6550
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
> + * Author: Nayna Jain
> + *
> + * ima_arch.c
> + * - initialize ima policies for PowerPC Secure Boot
> + */
> +
> +#include
> +#include
> +
> +bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
> +{
> + bool sb_mode;
> +
> + sb_mode = get_powerpc_sb_mode();
> + if (sb_mode)
> + return true;
> + else
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * File signature verification is not needed, include only measurements
> + */
> +static const char *const default_arch_rules[] = {
> + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
> + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
> + NULL
> +};
> +
> +/* Both file signature verification and measurements are needed */
> +static const char *const sb_arch_rules[] = {
> + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
> + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
> + "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig
> template=ima-modsig",
> +#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)
> + "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig
> template=ima-modsig",
> +#endif
> + NULL
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * On PowerPC, file measurements are to be added to the IMA measurement list
> + * irrespective of the secure boot state of the system. Signature
> verification
> + * is conditionally enabled based on the secure boot state.
> + */
> +const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
> +{
> +
Re: [PATCH] efi/memreserve: deal with memreserve entries in unmapped memory
On 06/10/2019 08:05 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Ensure that the EFI memreserve entries can be accessed, even if they
> are located in memory that the kernel (e.g., a crashkernel) omits from
> the linear map.
>
> Reported-by: Jonathan Richardson
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel
> ---
> drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 12 ++--
> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> index 16b2137d117c..4b7cf7bc0ded 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> @@ -1009,14 +1009,16 @@ int __ref efi_mem_reserve_persistent(phys_addr_t
> addr, u64 size)
>
> /* first try to find a slot in an existing linked list entry */
> for (prsv = efi_memreserve_root->next; prsv; prsv = rsv->next) {
> - rsv = __va(prsv);
> + rsv = memremap(prsv, sizeof(*rsv), MEMREMAP_WB);
> index = atomic_fetch_add_unless(&rsv->count, 1, rsv->size);
> if (index < rsv->size) {
> rsv->entry[index].base = addr;
> rsv->entry[index].size = size;
>
> + memunmap(rsv);
> return 0;
> }
> + memunmap(rsv);
> }
>
> /* no slot found - allocate a new linked list entry */
> @@ -1024,7 +1026,13 @@ int __ref efi_mem_reserve_persistent(phys_addr_t addr,
> u64 size)
> if (!rsv)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> - rsv->size = EFI_MEMRESERVE_COUNT(PAGE_SIZE);
> + /*
> + * The memremap() call above assumes that a linux_efi_memreserve entry
> + * never crosses a page boundary, so let's ensure that this remains true
> + * even when kexec'ing a 4k pages kernel from a >4k pages kernel, by
> + * using SZ_4K explicitly in the size calculation below.
> + */
> + rsv->size = EFI_MEMRESERVE_COUNT(SZ_4K);
> atomic_set(&rsv->count, 1);
> rsv->entry[0].base = addr;
> rsv->entry[0].size = size;
>
Thanks for the fix. Tested and reviewed.
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Richardson
[PATCH v3 0/3] powerpc: Enabling IMA arch specific secure boot policies
This patch set, previously named "powerpc: Enabling secure boot on powernv systems - Part 1", is part of a series that implements secure boot on PowerNV systems. In order to verify the OS kernel on PowerNV, secure boot requires X.509 certificates trusted by the platform, the secure boot modes, and several other pieces of information. These are stored in secure variables controlled by OPAL, also known as OPAL secure variables. The IMA architecture specific policy support on POWER is dependent on OPAL runtime services to access secure variables. OPAL APIs in skiboot are modified to define generic interface compatible to any backend. This patchset is consequently updated to be compatible with new OPAL API interface. This has cleaned up any EFIsms in the arch specific code. Further, the ima arch specific policies are updated to be able to support appended signatures. They also now use per policy template. Exposing the OPAL secure variables to userspace will be posted as a separate patch set, allowing the IMA architecture specific policy on POWER to be upstreamed independently. This patch set adds the following features: 1. Add support for OPAL Runtime API to access secure variables controlled by OPAL. 2. Define IMA arch-specific policies based on the secure boot state and mode of the system. On secure boot enabled PowerNV systems, the OS kernel signature will be verified by IMA appraisal. Pre-requisites for this patchset are: 1. OPAL APIs in Skiboot[1] 2. Appended signature support in IMA [2] 3. Per policy template support in IMA [3] [1] https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/skiboot/list/?series=112868 [2] https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/cover/1087361/. Updated version will be posted soon [3] Repo: https://kernel.googlesource.com/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Branch: next-queued-testing. Commit: f241bb1f42aa95 -- Original Cover Letter: This patch set is part of a series that implements secure boot on PowerNV systems. In order to verify the OS kernel on PowerNV, secure boot requires X.509 certificates trusted by the platform, the secure boot modes, and several other pieces of information. These are stored in secure variables controlled by OPAL, also known as OPAL secure variables. The IMA architecture specific policy support on Power is dependent on OPAL runtime services to access secure variables. Instead of directly accessing the OPAL runtime services, version 3 of this patch set relied upon the EFI hooks. This version drops that dependency and calls the OPAL runtime services directly. Skiboot OPAL APIs are due to be posted soon. Exposing the OPAL secure variables to userspace will be posted as a separate patch set, allowing the IMA architecture specific policy on Power to be upstreamed independently. This patch set adds the following features: 1. Add support for OPAL Runtime API to access secure variables controlled by OPAL. 2. Define IMA arch-specific policies based on the secure boot state and mode of the system. On secure boot enabled powernv systems, the OS kernel signature will be verified by IMA appraisal. [1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/10882149/ Changelog: v3: * OPAL APIs in Patch 1 are updated to provide generic interface based on key/keylen. This patchset updates kernel OPAL APIs to be compatible with generic interface. * Patch 2 is cleaned up to use new OPAL APIs. * Since OPAL can support different types of backend which can vary in the variable interpretation, the Patch 2 is updated to add a check for the backend version * OPAL API now expects consumer to first check the supported backend version before calling other secvar OPAL APIs. This check is now added in patch 2. * IMA policies in Patch 3 is updated to specify appended signature and per policy template. * The patches now are free of any EFIisms. v2: * Removed Patch 1: powerpc/include: Override unneeded early ioremap functions * Updated Subject line and patch description of the Patch 1 of this series * Removed dependency of OPAL_SECVAR on EFI, CPU_BIG_ENDIAN and UCS2_STRING * Changed OPAL APIs from static to non-static. Added opal-secvar.h for the same * Removed EFI hooks from opal_secvar.c * Removed opal_secvar_get_next(), opal_secvar_enqueue() and opal_query_variable_info() function * get_powerpc_sb_mode() in secboot.c now directly calls OPAL Runtime API rather than via EFI hooks. * Fixed log messages in get_powerpc_sb_mode() function. * Added dependency for PPC_SECURE_BOOT on configs PPC64 and OPAL_SECVAR * Replaced obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) with obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) in arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile Claudio Carvalho (1): powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to get secureboot state Nayna Jain (2): powerpc/powernv: detect the secure boot mode of the system powerpc: Add support to initialize ima policy rules arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 14 arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h
[PATCH v3 1/3] powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to get secureboot state
From: Claudio Carvalho
The X.509 certificates trusted by the platform and other information
required to secure boot the OS kernel are wrapped in secure variables,
which are controlled by OPAL.
This patch adds support to read OPAL secure variables through
OPAL_SECVAR_GET call. It returns the metadata and data for a given secure
variable based on the unique key.
Since OPAL can support different types of backend which can vary in the
variable interpretation, a new OPAL API call named OPAL_SECVAR_BACKEND, is
added to retrieve the supported backend version. This helps the consumer
to know how to interpret the variable.
This support can be enabled using CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR
Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain
---
This patch depends on a new OPAL call that is being added to skiboot.
The patch set that implements the new call has been posted to
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/skiboot/list/?series=112868
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h | 4 +-
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-secvar.h | 23 ++
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h | 6 ++
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig | 6 ++
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile | 1 +
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c | 2 +
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c | 85
7 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-secvar.h
create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h
b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h
index e1577cfa7186..a505e669b4b6 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h
@@ -212,7 +212,9 @@
#define OPAL_HANDLE_HMI2 166
#defineOPAL_NX_COPROC_INIT 167
#define OPAL_XIVE_GET_VP_STATE 170
-#define OPAL_LAST 170
+#define OPAL_SECVAR_GET 173
+#define OPAL_SECVAR_BACKEND 177
+#define OPAL_LAST 177
#define QUIESCE_HOLD 1 /* Spin all calls at entry */
#define QUIESCE_REJECT 2 /* Fail all calls with OPAL_BUSY */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-secvar.h
b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-secvar.h
new file mode 100644
index ..b677171a0368
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-secvar.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * PowerNV definitions for secure variables OPAL API.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Claudio Carvalho
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef OPAL_SECVAR_H
+#define OPAL_SECVAR_H
+
+enum {
+ BACKEND_NONE = 0,
+ BACKEND_TC_COMPAT_V1,
+};
+
+extern int opal_get_variable(u8 *key, unsigned long ksize,
+u8 *metadata, unsigned long *mdsize,
+u8 *data, unsigned long *dsize);
+
+extern int opal_variable_version(unsigned long *backend);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h
index 4cc37e708bc7..57d2c2356eda 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h
@@ -394,6 +394,12 @@ void opal_powercap_init(void);
void opal_psr_init(void);
void opal_sensor_groups_init(void);
+extern int opal_secvar_get(uint64_t k_key, uint64_t k_key_len,
+ uint64_t k_metadata, uint64_t k_metadata_size,
+ uint64_t k_data, uint64_t k_data_size);
+
+extern int opal_secvar_backend(uint64_t k_backend);
+
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_OPAL_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig
b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig
index 850eee860cf2..65b060539b5c 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig
@@ -47,3 +47,9 @@ config PPC_VAS
VAS adapters are found in POWER9 based systems.
If unsure, say N.
+
+config OPAL_SECVAR
+ bool "OPAL Secure Variables"
+ depends on PPC_POWERNV
+ help
+ This enables the kernel to access OPAL secure variables.
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile
b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile
index da2e99efbd04..6651c742e530 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile
@@ -16,3 +16,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += opal-imc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_MEMTRACE) += memtrace.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_VAS) += vas.o vas-window.o vas-debug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_OCXL_BASE)+= ocxl.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR) += opal-secvar.o
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c
b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c
index 36c8fa3647a2..0445980f294f 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c
@@ -288,3 +288,5 @@ OPAL_CALL(opal_pci_set_pbcq_tunnel_bar,
[PATCH v3 2/3] powerpc/powernv: detect the secure boot mode of the system
PowerNV secure boot defines different IMA policies based on the secure
boot state of the system.
This patch defines a function to detect the secure boot state of the
system.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/secboot.h | 21
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile | 3 +-
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.c | 61
3 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/secboot.h
create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.c
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secboot.h
b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secboot.h
new file mode 100644
index ..1904fb4a3352
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secboot.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * PowerPC secure boot definitions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Nayna Jain
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef POWERPC_SECBOOT_H
+#define POWERPC_SECBOOT_H
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR)
+extern bool get_powerpc_sb_mode(void);
+#else
+static inline bool get_powerpc_sb_mode(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile
b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile
index 6651c742e530..74705a3fc474 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ obj-y += idle.o opal-rtc.o opal-nvram.o
opal-lpc.o opal-flash.o
obj-y += rng.o opal-elog.o opal-dump.o opal-sysparam.o
opal-sensor.o
obj-y += opal-msglog.o opal-hmi.o opal-power.o opal-irqchip.o
obj-y += opal-kmsg.o opal-powercap.o opal-psr.o
opal-sensor-groups.o
+obj-y += secboot.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SMP) += smp.o subcore.o subcore-asm.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PCI) += pci.o pci-ioda.o npu-dma.o pci-ioda-tce.o
@@ -16,4 +17,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += opal-imc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_MEMTRACE) += memtrace.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_VAS) += vas.o vas-window.o vas-debug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_OCXL_BASE)+= ocxl.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR) += opal-secvar.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR) += opal-secvar.o secboot.o
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.c
b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.c
new file mode 100644
index ..9199e520ebed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Nayna Jain
+ *
+ * secboot.c
+ * - util function to get powerpc secboot state
+ */
+#include
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+bool get_powerpc_sb_mode(void)
+{
+ u8 secure_boot_name[] = "SecureBoot";
+ u8 setup_mode_name[] = "SetupMode";
+ u8 secboot, setupmode;
+ unsigned long size = sizeof(secboot);
+ int status;
+ unsigned long version;
+
+ status = opal_variable_version(&version);
+ if ((status != OPAL_SUCCESS) || (version != BACKEND_TC_COMPAT_V1)) {
+ pr_info("secboot: error retrieving compatible backend\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ status = opal_get_variable(secure_boot_name, sizeof(secure_boot_name),
+ NULL, NULL, &secboot, &size);
+
+ /*
+* For now assume all failures reading the SecureBoot variable implies
+* secure boot is not enabled. Later differentiate failure types.
+*/
+ if (status != OPAL_SUCCESS) {
+ secboot = 0;
+ setupmode = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ size = sizeof(setupmode);
+ status = opal_get_variable(setup_mode_name, sizeof(setup_mode_name),
+ NULL, NULL, &setupmode, &size);
+
+ /*
+* Failure to read the SetupMode variable does not prevent
+* secure boot mode
+*/
+ if (status != OPAL_SUCCESS)
+ setupmode = 0;
+
+out:
+ if ((secboot == 0) || (setupmode == 1)) {
+ pr_info("secboot: secureboot mode disabled\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("secboot: secureboot mode enabled\n");
+ return true;
+}
--
2.20.1
[PATCH v3 3/3] powerpc: Add support to initialize ima policy rules
PowerNV secure boot relies on the kernel IMA security subsystem to
perform the OS kernel image signature verification. Since each secure
boot mode has different IMA policy requirements, dynamic definition of
the policy rules based on the runtime secure boot mode of the system is
required. On systems that support secure boot, but have it disabled,
only measurement policy rules of the kernel image and modules are
defined.
This patch defines the arch-specific implementation to retrieve the
secure boot mode of the system and accordingly configures the IMA policy
rules.
This patch provides arch-specific IMA policies if PPC_SECURE_BOOT
config is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain
---
arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 14 +
arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 1 +
arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 54 ++
include/linux/ima.h| 3 +-
4 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index 8c1c636308c8..9de77bb14f54 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -902,6 +902,20 @@ config PPC_MEM_KEYS
If unsure, say y.
+config PPC_SECURE_BOOT
+ prompt "Enable PowerPC Secure Boot"
+ bool
+ default n
+ depends on PPC64
+ depends on OPAL_SECVAR
+ depends on IMA
+ depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY
+ help
+ Linux on POWER with firmware secure boot enabled needs to define
+ security policies to extend secure boot to the OS.This config
+ allows user to enable OS Secure Boot on PowerPC systems that
+ have firmware secure boot support.
+
endmenu
config ISA_DMA_API
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
index 0ea6c4aa3a20..75c929b41341 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_IMA
obj-y += ima_kexec.o
endif
endif
+obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += ima_arch.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT)+= audit.o
obj64-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += compat_audit.o
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
new file mode 100644
index ..1767bf6e6550
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Nayna Jain
+ *
+ * ima_arch.c
+ * - initialize ima policies for PowerPC Secure Boot
+ */
+
+#include
+#include
+
+bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+ bool sb_mode;
+
+ sb_mode = get_powerpc_sb_mode();
+ if (sb_mode)
+ return true;
+ else
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * File signature verification is not needed, include only measurements
+ */
+static const char *const default_arch_rules[] = {
+ "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
+ "measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
+ NULL
+};
+
+/* Both file signature verification and measurements are needed */
+static const char *const sb_arch_rules[] = {
+ "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
+ "measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
+ "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig
template=ima-modsig",
+#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)
+ "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig
template=ima-modsig",
+#endif
+ NULL
+};
+
+/*
+ * On PowerPC, file measurements are to be added to the IMA measurement list
+ * irrespective of the secure boot state of the system. Signature verification
+ * is conditionally enabled based on the secure boot state.
+ */
+const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot())
+ return sb_arch_rules;
+ return default_arch_rules;
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index fd9f7cf4cdf5..a01df076ecae 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
#endif
-#if (defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)) || defined(CONFIG_S390)
+#if (defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)) || defined(CONFIG_S390) \
+ || defined(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT)
extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void);
extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void);
#else
--
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH V2 1/2] Abstract out support for locating an EFI config table
On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 9:58 AM Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Fri, Jun 07, 2019 at 01:51:46PM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > We want to grab a pointer to the TPM final events table, so abstract out > > the existing code for finding an FDT table and make it generic. > > > > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett > > Just to clarify are these extensions to what you did before and not > something that needs be squashed your commits pipelined for v5.3? Correct - they handle a corner case. Ideally they'd hit 5.3 as well, but if you'd prefer I'm ok waiting.
Re: [PATCH V2 1/2] Abstract out support for locating an EFI config table
On Fri, Jun 07, 2019 at 01:51:46PM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote: > We want to grab a pointer to the TPM final events table, so abstract out > the existing code for finding an FDT table and make it generic. > > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Just to clarify are these extensions to what you did before and not something that needs be squashed your commits pipelined for v5.3? /Jarkko
Re: [PATCH] efi/memreserve: deal with memreserve entries in unmapped memory
Hi Ard,
On 6/10/2019 8:05 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Ensure that the EFI memreserve entries can be accessed, even if they
> are located in memory that the kernel (e.g., a crashkernel) omits from
> the linear map.
>
> Reported-by: Jonathan Richardson
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel
Does it make sense to add a Fixes tag?
> ---
> drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 12 ++--
> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> index 16b2137d117c..4b7cf7bc0ded 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> @@ -1009,14 +1009,16 @@ int __ref efi_mem_reserve_persistent(phys_addr_t
> addr, u64 size)
>
> /* first try to find a slot in an existing linked list entry */
> for (prsv = efi_memreserve_root->next; prsv; prsv = rsv->next) {
> - rsv = __va(prsv);
> + rsv = memremap(prsv, sizeof(*rsv), MEMREMAP_WB);
> index = atomic_fetch_add_unless(&rsv->count, 1, rsv->size);
> if (index < rsv->size) {
> rsv->entry[index].base = addr;
> rsv->entry[index].size = size;
>
> + memunmap(rsv);
> return 0;
> }
> + memunmap(rsv);
> }
>
> /* no slot found - allocate a new linked list entry */
> @@ -1024,7 +1026,13 @@ int __ref efi_mem_reserve_persistent(phys_addr_t addr,
> u64 size)
> if (!rsv)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> - rsv->size = EFI_MEMRESERVE_COUNT(PAGE_SIZE);
> + /*
> + * The memremap() call above assumes that a linux_efi_memreserve entry
> + * never crosses a page boundary, so let's ensure that this remains true
> + * even when kexec'ing a 4k pages kernel from a >4k pages kernel, by
> + * using SZ_4K explicitly in the size calculation below.
> + */
> + rsv->size = EFI_MEMRESERVE_COUNT(SZ_4K);
> atomic_set(&rsv->count, 1);
> rsv->entry[0].base = addr;
> rsv->entry[0].size = size;
>
Re: [PATCH] efi/bgrt: Drop BGRT status field reserved bits check
On Wed, 29 May 2019 at 15:28, Hans de Goede wrote:
>
> Starting with ACPI 6.2 bits 1 and 2 of the BGRT status field are no longer
> reserved. These bits are now used to indicate if the image needs to be
> rotated before being displayed.
>
> The first device using these bits has now shown up (the GPD MicroPC) and
> the reserved bits check causes us to reject the valid BGRT table on this
> device.
>
> Rather then changing the reserved bits check, allowing only the 2 new bits,
> instead just completely remove it so that we do not end up with a similar
> problem when more bits are added in the future.
>
> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede
Thanks, Hans. I'll take this as a fix.
> ---
> drivers/firmware/efi/efi-bgrt.c | 5 -
> 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-bgrt.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-bgrt.c
> index a2384184a7de..b07c17643210 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-bgrt.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-bgrt.c
> @@ -47,11 +47,6 @@ void __init efi_bgrt_init(struct acpi_table_header *table)
>bgrt->version);
> goto out;
> }
> - if (bgrt->status & 0xfe) {
> - pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: reserved status bits are non-zero
> %u\n",
> - bgrt->status);
> - goto out;
> - }
> if (bgrt->image_type != 0) {
> pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: invalid image type %u (expected
> 0)\n",
>bgrt->image_type);
> --
> 2.21.0
>
[PATCH] efi/memreserve: deal with memreserve entries in unmapped memory
Ensure that the EFI memreserve entries can be accessed, even if they
are located in memory that the kernel (e.g., a crashkernel) omits from
the linear map.
Reported-by: Jonathan Richardson
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel
---
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 12 ++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
index 16b2137d117c..4b7cf7bc0ded 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
@@ -1009,14 +1009,16 @@ int __ref efi_mem_reserve_persistent(phys_addr_t addr,
u64 size)
/* first try to find a slot in an existing linked list entry */
for (prsv = efi_memreserve_root->next; prsv; prsv = rsv->next) {
- rsv = __va(prsv);
+ rsv = memremap(prsv, sizeof(*rsv), MEMREMAP_WB);
index = atomic_fetch_add_unless(&rsv->count, 1, rsv->size);
if (index < rsv->size) {
rsv->entry[index].base = addr;
rsv->entry[index].size = size;
+ memunmap(rsv);
return 0;
}
+ memunmap(rsv);
}
/* no slot found - allocate a new linked list entry */
@@ -1024,7 +1026,13 @@ int __ref efi_mem_reserve_persistent(phys_addr_t addr,
u64 size)
if (!rsv)
return -ENOMEM;
- rsv->size = EFI_MEMRESERVE_COUNT(PAGE_SIZE);
+ /*
+* The memremap() call above assumes that a linux_efi_memreserve entry
+* never crosses a page boundary, so let's ensure that this remains true
+* even when kexec'ing a 4k pages kernel from a >4k pages kernel, by
+* using SZ_4K explicitly in the size calculation below.
+*/
+ rsv->size = EFI_MEMRESERVE_COUNT(SZ_4K);
atomic_set(&rsv->count, 1);
rsv->entry[0].base = addr;
rsv->entry[0].size = size;
--
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v3 01/10] acpi/numa: Establish a new drivers/acpi/numa/ directory
On Friday, June 7, 2019 9:27:18 PM CEST Dan Williams wrote:
> Currently hmat.c lives under an "hmat" directory which does not enhance
> the description of the file. The initial motivation for giving hmat.c
> its own directory was to delineate it as mm functionality in contrast to
> ACPI device driver functionality.
>
> As ACPI continues to play an increasing role in conveying
> memory location and performance topology information to the OS take the
> opportunity to co-locate these NUMA relevant tables in a combined
> directory.
>
> numa.c is renamed to srat.c and moved to drivers/acpi/numa/ along with
> hmat.c.
>
> Cc: Len Brown
> Cc: Keith Busch
> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki"
> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams
A CC to linux-acpi is missing from this series.
> ---
> drivers/acpi/Kconfig |9 +
> drivers/acpi/Makefile |3 +--
> drivers/acpi/hmat/Makefile |2 --
> drivers/acpi/numa/Kconfig |7 ++-
> drivers/acpi/numa/Makefile |3 +++
> drivers/acpi/numa/hmat.c |0
> drivers/acpi/numa/srat.c |0
> 7 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
> delete mode 100644 drivers/acpi/hmat/Makefile
> rename drivers/acpi/{hmat/Kconfig => numa/Kconfig} (72%)
> create mode 100644 drivers/acpi/numa/Makefile
> rename drivers/acpi/{hmat/hmat.c => numa/hmat.c} (100%)
> rename drivers/acpi/{numa.c => numa/srat.c} (100%)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/acpi/Kconfig b/drivers/acpi/Kconfig
> index 283ee94224c6..82c4a31c8701 100644
> --- a/drivers/acpi/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/acpi/Kconfig
> @@ -321,12 +321,6 @@ config ACPI_THERMAL
> To compile this driver as a module, choose M here:
> the module will be called thermal.
>
> -config ACPI_NUMA
> - bool "NUMA support"
> - depends on NUMA
> - depends on (X86 || IA64 || ARM64)
> - default y if IA64_GENERIC || IA64_SGI_SN2 || ARM64
> -
> config ACPI_CUSTOM_DSDT_FILE
> string "Custom DSDT Table file to include"
> default ""
> @@ -475,8 +469,7 @@ config ACPI_REDUCED_HARDWARE_ONLY
> If you are unsure what to do, do not enable this option.
>
> source "drivers/acpi/nfit/Kconfig"
> -source "drivers/acpi/hmat/Kconfig"
> -
> +source "drivers/acpi/numa/Kconfig"
> source "drivers/acpi/apei/Kconfig"
> source "drivers/acpi/dptf/Kconfig"
>
> diff --git a/drivers/acpi/Makefile b/drivers/acpi/Makefile
> index 5d361e4e3405..f08a661274e8 100644
> --- a/drivers/acpi/Makefile
> +++ b/drivers/acpi/Makefile
> @@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ acpi-$(CONFIG_X86) += acpi_cmos_rtc.o
> acpi-$(CONFIG_X86) += x86/apple.o
> acpi-$(CONFIG_X86) += x86/utils.o
> acpi-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_FS) += debugfs.o
> -acpi-$(CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA) += numa.o
> acpi-$(CONFIG_ACPI_PROCFS_POWER) += cm_sbs.o
> acpi-y += acpi_lpat.o
> acpi-$(CONFIG_ACPI_LPIT) += acpi_lpit.o
> @@ -80,7 +79,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_PROCESSOR)+= processor.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += container.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_THERMAL) += thermal.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_NFIT) += nfit/
> -obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_HMAT) += hmat/
> +obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA) += numa/
> obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += acpi_memhotplug.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_HOTPLUG_IOAPIC) += ioapic.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_BATTERY) += battery.o
> diff --git a/drivers/acpi/hmat/Makefile b/drivers/acpi/hmat/Makefile
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 1c20ef36a385..
> --- a/drivers/acpi/hmat/Makefile
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
> -# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> -obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_HMAT) := hmat.o
> diff --git a/drivers/acpi/hmat/Kconfig b/drivers/acpi/numa/Kconfig
> similarity index 72%
> rename from drivers/acpi/hmat/Kconfig
> rename to drivers/acpi/numa/Kconfig
> index 95a29964dbea..d14582387ed0 100644
> --- a/drivers/acpi/hmat/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/acpi/numa/Kconfig
> @@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
> -# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +config ACPI_NUMA
> + bool "NUMA support"
> + depends on NUMA
> + depends on (X86 || IA64 || ARM64)
> + default y if IA64_GENERIC || IA64_SGI_SN2 || ARM64
> +
> config ACPI_HMAT
> bool "ACPI Heterogeneous Memory Attribute Table Support"
> depends on ACPI_NUMA
> diff --git a/drivers/acpi/numa/Makefile b/drivers/acpi/numa/Makefile
> new file mode 100644
> index ..517a6c689a94
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/acpi/numa/Makefile
> @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
> +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA) += srat.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_HMAT) += hmat.o
> diff --git a/drivers/acpi/hmat/hmat.c b/drivers/acpi/numa/hmat.c
> similarity index 100%
> rename from drivers/acpi/hmat/hmat.c
> rename to drivers/acpi/numa/hmat.c
> diff --git a/drivers/acpi/numa.c b/drivers/acpi/numa/srat.c
> similarity index 100%
> rename from drivers/acpi/numa.c
> rename to drivers/acpi/numa/srat.c
>
>
