Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown

2017-10-05 Thread Florian Weimer
On 10/05/2017 01:00 PM, David Howells wrote: Lockdown is typically enabled during boot and may be terminated, if configured, by typing a special key combination on a directly attached physical keyboard. Does this include a Bluetooth keyboard (which might not actually exist and might in

Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown

2014-03-19 Thread Florian Weimer
* Theodore Ts'o: Right now, even though Lenovo laptops are shipping with Windows 8. UEFI secure boot is not made mandatory (although it is on enough to brick the laptop when it runs into bugs wwith the UEFI BIOS code, sigh). But sooner or later, UEFI secure boot will be on by default, and

Re: [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot

2013-09-01 Thread Florian Weimer
* Matthew Garrett: On Sun, Sep 01, 2013 at 12:41:22PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote: But if you don't generate fresh keys on every boot, the persistent keys are mor exposed to other UEFI applications. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't think UEFI variables are segregated between different

Re: [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot

2013-08-28 Thread Florian Weimer
* Chun-Yi Lee: + EFI bootloader must generate RSA key-pair when system boot: - Bootloader store the public key to EFI boottime variable by itself - Bootloader put The private key to S4SignKey EFI variable for forward to kernel. Is the UEFI NVRAM really suited for such regular

Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

2012-11-05 Thread Florian Weimer
* James Bottomley: Right, but what I'm telling you is that by deciding to allow automatic first boot, you're causing the windows attack vector problem. You could easily do a present user test only on first boot which would eliminate it. Apparently, the warning will look like this: