Re: [f2fs-dev] [RFC PATCH v2 4/4] f2fs: move fault injection to sysfs

2016-05-12 Thread Jaegeuk Kim 
Hello,

Could you send one patch which has 2, 3, and 4 together?
And also, we don't need drop the mount option.
Instead, we can turn on all the fault types with default values, once we get
the option. Then, we can turn off any specific types dynamically.

Thanks,

On Thu, May 12, 2016 at 11:45:29AM +0800, Sheng Yong wrote:
> Replace mount option "f2fs_injection" by injection attributes in sysfs.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong 
> ---
>  fs/f2fs/f2fs.h  | 24 ++--
>  fs/f2fs/super.c | 18 --
>  2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
> index e18390b..81e3fad 100644
> --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
> +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
> @@ -60,15 +60,28 @@ struct f2fs_fault_info {
>  };
> 
>  extern struct f2fs_fault_info f2fs_fault;
> -extern u32 f2fs_fault_rate;
> -extern atomic_t f2fs_ops;
>  extern char *fault_name[FAULT_MAX];
> 
>  static inline bool time_to_inject(int type)
>  {
> - atomic_inc(_ops);
> - if (f2fs_fault_rate && (atomic_read(_ops) >= f2fs_fault_rate)) {
> - atomic_set(_ops, 0);
> + if (!f2fs_fault.inject_rate)
> + return false;
> + if (type == FAULT_KMALLOC && !f2fs_fault.inject_kmalloc)
> + return false;
> + else if (type == FAULT_PAGE_ALLOC && !f2fs_fault.inject_page_alloc)
> + return false;
> + else if (type == FAULT_ALLOC_NID && !f2fs_fault.inject_nid_alloc)
> + return false;
> + else if (type == FAULT_ORPHAN && !f2fs_fault.inject_orphan)
> + return false;
> + else if (type == FAULT_BLOCK && !f2fs_fault.inject_block)
> + return false;
> + else if (type == FAULT_DIR_DEPTH && !f2fs_fault.inject_dir_depth)
> + return false;
> +
> + atomic_inc(_fault.inject_ops);
> + if (atomic_read(_fault.inject_ops) >= f2fs_fault.inject_rate) {
> + atomic_set(_fault.inject_ops, 0);
>   printk("%sF2FS-fs : inject %s in %pF\n",
>   KERN_INFO,
>   fault_name[type],
> @@ -98,7 +111,6 @@ static inline bool time_to_inject(int type)
>  #define F2FS_MOUNT_EXTENT_CACHE  0x2000
>  #define F2FS_MOUNT_FORCE_FG_GC   0x4000
>  #define F2FS_MOUNT_DATA_FLUSH0x8000
> -#define F2FS_MOUNT_FAULT_INJECTION   0x0001
> 
>  #define clear_opt(sbi, option)   (sbi->mount_opt.opt &= 
> ~F2FS_MOUNT_##option)
>  #define set_opt(sbi, option) (sbi->mount_opt.opt |= F2FS_MOUNT_##option)
> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c
> index a9066e4..df36152 100644
> --- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
> +++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
> @@ -41,8 +41,6 @@ static struct kset *f2fs_kset;
> 
>  #ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
>  struct f2fs_fault_info f2fs_fault;
> -u32 f2fs_fault_rate = 0;
> -atomic_t f2fs_ops;
> 
>  char *fault_name[FAULT_MAX] = {
>   [FAULT_KMALLOC] = "kmalloc",
> @@ -89,7 +87,6 @@ enum {
>   Opt_noextent_cache,
>   Opt_noinline_data,
>   Opt_data_flush,
> - Opt_fault_injection,
>   Opt_err,
>  };
> 
> @@ -115,7 +112,6 @@ static match_table_t f2fs_tokens = {
>   {Opt_noextent_cache, "noextent_cache"},
>   {Opt_noinline_data, "noinline_data"},
>   {Opt_data_flush, "data_flush"},
> - {Opt_fault_injection, "fault_injection=%u"},
>   {Opt_err, NULL},
>  };
> 
> @@ -365,9 +361,6 @@ static int parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char 
> *options)
>   char *p, *name;
>   int arg = 0;
> 
> -#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
> - f2fs_fault_rate = 0;
> -#endif
>   if (!options)
>   return 0;
> 
> @@ -501,17 +494,6 @@ static int parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char 
> *options)
>   case Opt_data_flush:
>   set_opt(sbi, DATA_FLUSH);
>   break;
> - case Opt_fault_injection:
> - if (args->from && match_int(args, ))
> - return -EINVAL;
> -#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
> - f2fs_fault_rate = arg;
> - atomic_set(_ops, 0);
> -#else
> - f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
> - "FAULT_INJECTION was not selected");
> -#endif
> - break;
>   default:
>   f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
>   "Unrecognized mount option \"%s\" or missing 
> value",
> -- 
> 2.7.1

--
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___
Linux-f2fs-devel

[f2fs-dev] [RFC PATCH v2 4/4] f2fs: move fault injection to sysfs

2016-05-11 Thread Sheng Yong 
Replace mount option "f2fs_injection" by injection attributes in sysfs.

Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong 
---
 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h  | 24 ++--
 fs/f2fs/super.c | 18 --
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
index e18390b..81e3fad 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -60,15 +60,28 @@ struct f2fs_fault_info {
 };

 extern struct f2fs_fault_info f2fs_fault;
-extern u32 f2fs_fault_rate;
-extern atomic_t f2fs_ops;
 extern char *fault_name[FAULT_MAX];

 static inline bool time_to_inject(int type)
 {
-   atomic_inc(_ops);
-   if (f2fs_fault_rate && (atomic_read(_ops) >= f2fs_fault_rate)) {
-   atomic_set(_ops, 0);
+   if (!f2fs_fault.inject_rate)
+   return false;
+   if (type == FAULT_KMALLOC && !f2fs_fault.inject_kmalloc)
+   return false;
+   else if (type == FAULT_PAGE_ALLOC && !f2fs_fault.inject_page_alloc)
+   return false;
+   else if (type == FAULT_ALLOC_NID && !f2fs_fault.inject_nid_alloc)
+   return false;
+   else if (type == FAULT_ORPHAN && !f2fs_fault.inject_orphan)
+   return false;
+   else if (type == FAULT_BLOCK && !f2fs_fault.inject_block)
+   return false;
+   else if (type == FAULT_DIR_DEPTH && !f2fs_fault.inject_dir_depth)
+   return false;
+
+   atomic_inc(_fault.inject_ops);
+   if (atomic_read(_fault.inject_ops) >= f2fs_fault.inject_rate) {
+   atomic_set(_fault.inject_ops, 0);
printk("%sF2FS-fs : inject %s in %pF\n",
KERN_INFO,
fault_name[type],
@@ -98,7 +111,6 @@ static inline bool time_to_inject(int type)
 #define F2FS_MOUNT_EXTENT_CACHE0x2000
 #define F2FS_MOUNT_FORCE_FG_GC 0x4000
 #define F2FS_MOUNT_DATA_FLUSH  0x8000
-#define F2FS_MOUNT_FAULT_INJECTION 0x0001

 #define clear_opt(sbi, option) (sbi->mount_opt.opt &= ~F2FS_MOUNT_##option)
 #define set_opt(sbi, option)   (sbi->mount_opt.opt |= F2FS_MOUNT_##option)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c
index a9066e4..df36152 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -41,8 +41,6 @@ static struct kset *f2fs_kset;

 #ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
 struct f2fs_fault_info f2fs_fault;
-u32 f2fs_fault_rate = 0;
-atomic_t f2fs_ops;

 char *fault_name[FAULT_MAX] = {
[FAULT_KMALLOC] = "kmalloc",
@@ -89,7 +87,6 @@ enum {
Opt_noextent_cache,
Opt_noinline_data,
Opt_data_flush,
-   Opt_fault_injection,
Opt_err,
 };

@@ -115,7 +112,6 @@ static match_table_t f2fs_tokens = {
{Opt_noextent_cache, "noextent_cache"},
{Opt_noinline_data, "noinline_data"},
{Opt_data_flush, "data_flush"},
-   {Opt_fault_injection, "fault_injection=%u"},
{Opt_err, NULL},
 };

@@ -365,9 +361,6 @@ static int parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char 
*options)
char *p, *name;
int arg = 0;

-#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
-   f2fs_fault_rate = 0;
-#endif
if (!options)
return 0;

@@ -501,17 +494,6 @@ static int parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char 
*options)
case Opt_data_flush:
set_opt(sbi, DATA_FLUSH);
break;
-   case Opt_fault_injection:
-   if (args->from && match_int(args, ))
-   return -EINVAL;
-#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
-   f2fs_fault_rate = arg;
-   atomic_set(_ops, 0);
-#else
-   f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
-   "FAULT_INJECTION was not selected");
-#endif
-   break;
default:
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Unrecognized mount option \"%s\" or missing 
value",
-- 
2.7.1


--
Mobile security can be enabling, not merely restricting. Employees who
bring their own devices (BYOD) to work are irked by the imposition of MDM
restrictions. Mobile Device Manager Plus allows you to control only the
apps on BYO-devices by containerizing them, leaving personal data untouched!
https://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/304595813;131938128;j
___
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