Hi Eric and Jaegeuk,
On 2018/4/19 1:18, Eric Biggers via Linux-f2fs-devel wrote:
> Hi Chao,
>
> On Wed, Apr 18, 2018 at 02:27:32PM +0800, Chao Yu wrote:
>> Hi Eric,
>>
>> On 2018/4/18 1:42, Eric Biggers wrote:
>>> Hi Chao,
>>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 17, 2018 at 05:13:12PM +0800, Chao Yu wrote:
> +
On 04/18, Eric Biggers wrote:
> Hi Chao,
>
> On Wed, Apr 18, 2018 at 02:27:32PM +0800, Chao Yu wrote:
> > Hi Eric,
> >
> > On 2018/4/18 1:42, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > > Hi Chao,
> > >
> > > On Tue, Apr 17, 2018 at 05:13:12PM +0800, Chao Yu wrote:
> > >>> +
> > >>> +static void
Hi Chao,
On Wed, Apr 18, 2018 at 02:27:32PM +0800, Chao Yu wrote:
> Hi Eric,
>
> On 2018/4/18 1:42, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > Hi Chao,
> >
> > On Tue, Apr 17, 2018 at 05:13:12PM +0800, Chao Yu wrote:
> >>> +
> >>> +static void bio_post_read_processing(struct bio_post_read_ctx *ctx);
> >>> +
> >>>
Hi Eric,
On 2018/4/18 1:42, Eric Biggers wrote:
> Hi Chao,
>
> On Tue, Apr 17, 2018 at 05:13:12PM +0800, Chao Yu wrote:
>>> +
>>> +static void bio_post_read_processing(struct bio_post_read_ctx *ctx);
>>> +
>>> +static void decrypt_work(struct work_struct *work)
>>> +{
>>> + struct
Hi Chao,
On Tue, Apr 17, 2018 at 05:13:12PM +0800, Chao Yu wrote:
> > +
> > +static void bio_post_read_processing(struct bio_post_read_ctx *ctx);
> > +
> > +static void decrypt_work(struct work_struct *work)
> > +{
> > + struct bio_post_read_ctx *ctx =
> > + container_of(work, struct
Hi Michael,
On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 03:15:42PM -0700, Michael Halcrow wrote:
> Given recent talk I've seen on potentially applying file-based
> protections in NFS, I think it's worth making some cautionary
> observations at this stage.
>
> Moxie's Cryptographic Doom Principle is an approachable
On 2018/4/17 3:31, Eric Biggers via Linux-f2fs-devel wrote:
> Currently f2fs's ->readpage() and ->readpages() assume that either the
> data undergoes no postprocessing, or decryption only. But with
> fs-verity, there will be an additional authenticity verification step,
> and it may be needed
Given recent talk I've seen on potentially applying file-based
protections in NFS, I think it's worth making some cautionary
observations at this stage.
Moxie's Cryptographic Doom Principle is an approachable take on the
argument that one should verify before performing any other
cryptographic
Currently f2fs's ->readpage() and ->readpages() assume that either the
data undergoes no postprocessing, or decryption only. But with
fs-verity, there will be an additional authenticity verification step,
and it may be needed either by itself, or combined with decryption.
To support this, store