From: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Allow bind mounts to unprivileged users if the following conditions
are met:
- user mounts are permitted in the current mount namespace
- mountpoint is not a symlink or special file
- mountpoint is not a sticky directory or is owned by the current user
- mountpoint is writable by user
- the number of user mounts is below the maximum
Unprivileged mounts imply MS_SETUSER, and will also have the "nosuid"
and "nodev" mount flags set.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Index: linux/fs/namespace.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/fs/namespace.c 2007-04-12 14:04:25.000000000 +0200
+++ linux/fs/namespace.c 2007-04-12 14:04:27.000000000 +0200
@@ -237,11 +237,30 @@ static void dec_nr_user_mounts(void)
spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
}
-static void set_mnt_user(struct vfsmount *mnt)
+static int reserve_user_mount(void)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+ spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
+ if (nr_user_mounts >= max_user_mounts && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ err = -EPERM;
+ else
+ nr_user_mounts++;
+ spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void __set_mnt_user(struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
BUG_ON(mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_USER);
mnt->mnt_uid = current->uid;
mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_USER;
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_NOSUID | MNT_NODEV;
+}
+
+static void set_mnt_user(struct vfsmount *mnt)
+{
+ __set_mnt_user(mnt);
spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
nr_user_mounts++;
spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
@@ -260,9 +279,16 @@ static struct vfsmount *clone_mnt(struct
int flag)
{
struct super_block *sb = old->mnt_sb;
- struct vfsmount *mnt = alloc_vfsmnt(old->mnt_devname);
+ struct vfsmount *mnt;
+
+ if (flag & CL_SETUSER) {
+ int err = reserve_user_mount();
+ if (err)
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+ }
+ mnt = alloc_vfsmnt(old->mnt_devname);
if (!mnt)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ goto alloc_failed;
mnt->mnt_flags = old->mnt_flags;
atomic_inc(&sb->s_active);
@@ -274,7 +300,7 @@ static struct vfsmount *clone_mnt(struct
/* don't copy the MNT_USER flag */
mnt->mnt_flags &= ~MNT_USER;
if (flag & CL_SETUSER)
- set_mnt_user(mnt);
+ __set_mnt_user(mnt);
if (flag & CL_SLAVE) {
list_add(&mnt->mnt_slave, &old->mnt_slave_list);
@@ -299,6 +325,11 @@ static struct vfsmount *clone_mnt(struct
spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
}
return mnt;
+
+ alloc_failed:
+ if (flag & CL_SETUSER)
+ dec_nr_user_mounts();
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
static inline void __mntput(struct vfsmount *mnt)
@@ -745,22 +776,35 @@ asmlinkage long sys_oldumount(char __use
#endif
-static int mount_is_safe(struct nameidata *nd)
+/*
+ * Conditions for unprivileged mounts are:
+ * - user mounts are permitted in the current mount namespace
+ * - mountpoint is not a symlink or special file
+ * - mountpoint is "absolutely" writable by user
+ * o if it's a sticky directory, it must be owned by the user
+ * o it must not be an append-only file/directory
+ */
+static int mount_is_safe(struct nameidata *nd, int *flags)
{
+ struct inode *inode = nd->dentry->d_inode;
+
if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return 0;
- return -EPERM;
-#ifdef notyet
- if (S_ISLNK(nd->dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
+
+ if (!(current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->flags & MNT_NS_PERMIT_USERMOUNTS))
return -EPERM;
- if (nd->dentry->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) {
- if (current->uid != nd->dentry->d_inode->i_uid)
- return -EPERM;
- }
- if (vfs_permission(nd, MAY_WRITE))
+
+ if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if ((inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) && current->fsuid != inode->i_uid)
return -EPERM;
+
+ if (vfs_permission(nd, MAY_WRITE) || IS_APPEND(inode))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ *flags |= MS_SETUSER;
return 0;
-#endif
}
static int lives_below_in_same_fs(struct dentry *d, struct dentry *dentry)
@@ -981,7 +1025,7 @@ static int do_loopback(struct nameidata
int clone_flags;
struct nameidata old_nd;
struct vfsmount *mnt = NULL;
- int err = mount_is_safe(nd);
+ int err = mount_is_safe(nd, &flags);
if (err)
return err;
if (!old_name || !*old_name)
--
-
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