On 04/22/2016 05:21 PM, Mauro Carvalho Chehab wrote:
> Em Fri, 22 Apr 2016 16:56:00 +0200
> Hans Verkuil escreveu:
>
>> On 04/22/2016 04:48 PM, Mauro Carvalho Chehab wrote:
>>> Em Fri, 22 Apr 2016 16:31:28 +0200
>>> Hans Verkuil escreveu:
>>>
On
On 04/22/2016 05:21 PM, Mauro Carvalho Chehab wrote:
> Em Fri, 22 Apr 2016 16:56:00 +0200
> Hans Verkuil escreveu:
>
>> On 04/22/2016 04:48 PM, Mauro Carvalho Chehab wrote:
>>> Em Fri, 22 Apr 2016 16:31:28 +0200
>>> Hans Verkuil escreveu:
>>>
On 04/22/2016 04:21 PM, Mauro Carvalho
Add tblck to the pwm nodes. This insures that the ehrpwm driver has access
to the time-based clk.
Do not remove similar entries for ehrpwm node. Later patches will switch
from using ehrpwm node name to pwm. But to maintain ABI compatibility we
shouldn't remove the old entries.
Signed-off-by:
Add tblck to the pwm nodes. This insures that the ehrpwm driver has access
to the time-based clk.
Do not remove similar entries for ehrpwm node. Later patches will switch
from using ehrpwm node name to pwm. But to maintain ABI compatibility we
shouldn't remove the old entries.
Signed-off-by:
Switch to a new ECAP and EPWM bindings that doesn't depend on hwmod to
provide the various required clocks.
For AM437 and AM335x, add the required clocks explicitly to DT. The
hwmod entries for ECAP and EPWM will be removed and this will prevent
anything from breaking.
Signed-off-by: Franklin S
Switch to a new ECAP and EPWM bindings that doesn't depend on hwmod to
provide the various required clocks.
For AM437 and AM335x, add the required clocks explicitly to DT. The
hwmod entries for ECAP and EPWM will be removed and this will prevent
anything from breaking.
Signed-off-by: Franklin S
From: Vignesh R
Add PWMSS device tree nodes for DRA7 SoC family and add documentation
for dt bindings.
Signed-off-by: Vignesh R
[fcoo...@ti.com: Add eCAP and use updated bindings for PWMSS and ePWM]
Signed-off-by: Franklin S Cooper Jr
---
Previous patches switched the ECAP and EPWM to use the new bindings.
These bindings explicitly adds the various required clocks via DT rather
than depending on hwmod.
Therefore, it is safe to remove the hwmod entries since they are no longer
needed.
Signed-off-by: Franklin S Cooper Jr
From: Vignesh R
Add PWMSS device tree nodes for DRA7 SoC family and add documentation
for dt bindings.
Signed-off-by: Vignesh R
[fcoo...@ti.com: Add eCAP and use updated bindings for PWMSS and ePWM]
Signed-off-by: Franklin S Cooper Jr
---
.../devicetree/bindings/pwm/pwm-tiecap.txt |
Previous patches switched the ECAP and EPWM to use the new bindings.
These bindings explicitly adds the various required clocks via DT rather
than depending on hwmod.
Therefore, it is safe to remove the hwmod entries since they are no longer
needed.
Signed-off-by: Franklin S Cooper Jr
---
Now that the node name has been changed from ehrpwm to pwm the document
should show this proper usage. Also change the unit address in the example
from 0 to the proper physical address value that should be used.
Signed-off-by: Franklin S Cooper Jr
Acked-by: Rob Herring
Now that the node name has been changed from ehrpwm to pwm the document
should show this proper usage. Also change the unit address in the example
from 0 to the proper physical address value that should be used.
Signed-off-by: Franklin S Cooper Jr
Acked-by: Rob Herring
---
When using the old eCAP and ePWM bindings for AM335x and AM437x the clock
can be retrieved from the PWMSS parent. Newer bindings will insure that
this clock is provided via device tree.
Therefore, update this driver to support the newer and older bindings. In
the case of the older binding being
This patch series adds support for PWM for DRA7. The IP is the same as the
one present in AM33XX and AM437XX.
However, before doing so remove unnecessary hwmod entries for eCAP, ePWM
and eQEP.
The following are the biggest changes from v5 to v6:
* Created two new bindings to allow ECAP and PWM
When using the old eCAP and ePWM bindings for AM335x and AM437x the clock
can be retrieved from the PWMSS parent. Newer bindings will insure that
this clock is provided via device tree.
Therefore, update this driver to support the newer and older bindings. In
the case of the older binding being
This patch series adds support for PWM for DRA7. The IP is the same as the
one present in AM33XX and AM437XX.
However, before doing so remove unnecessary hwmod entries for eCAP, ePWM
and eQEP.
The following are the biggest changes from v5 to v6:
* Created two new bindings to allow ECAP and PWM
Devices that utilize the OCP registers and/or PRCM registers and
register bit fields should be modeled using hwmod. Since eQEP, ePWM and
eCAP don't fall under this category, remove their hwmod entries.
Instead these clocks simply use the clock that is passed through by its
parent PWMSS.
Devices that utilize the OCP registers and/or PRCM registers and
register bit fields should be modeled using hwmod. Since eQEP, ePWM and
eCAP don't fall under this category, remove their hwmod entries.
Instead these clocks simply use the clock that is passed through by its
parent PWMSS.
On Fri, 22 Apr 2016, Lianwei Wang wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 3:50 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 09:56:07PM -0700, Lianwei Wang wrote:
> >> Currently it just print a warning message but did not
> >> reset cpu_hotplug_disabled when the
On Fri, 22 Apr 2016, Lianwei Wang wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 3:50 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 09:56:07PM -0700, Lianwei Wang wrote:
> >> Currently it just print a warning message but did not
> >> reset cpu_hotplug_disabled when the enable/disable is
> >>
On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 11:04:31AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> Implement FETCH-OP atomic primitives, these are very similar to the
> existing OP-RETURN primitives we already have, except they return the
> value of the atomic variable _before_ modification.
>
> This is especially useful for
On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 11:04:31AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> Implement FETCH-OP atomic primitives, these are very similar to the
> existing OP-RETURN primitives we already have, except they return the
> value of the atomic variable _before_ modification.
>
> This is especially useful for
On 22/04/16 16:04, Mark Brown wrote:
On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 02:43:28PM +0100, Richard Fitzgerald wrote:
The driver was hardcoding REGULATOR_CHANGE_STATUS on the regulator
which made the regulator core assume that it can be powered off.
The power state of the regulator is controlled by the
On 22/04/16 16:04, Mark Brown wrote:
On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 02:43:28PM +0100, Richard Fitzgerald wrote:
The driver was hardcoding REGULATOR_CHANGE_STATUS on the regulator
which made the regulator core assume that it can be powered off.
The power state of the regulator is controlled by the
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 3:50 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 09:56:07PM -0700, Lianwei Wang wrote:
>> Currently it just print a warning message but did not
>> reset cpu_hotplug_disabled when the enable/disable is
>> unbalanced. The unbalanced
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 3:50 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 09:56:07PM -0700, Lianwei Wang wrote:
>> Currently it just print a warning message but did not
>> reset cpu_hotplug_disabled when the enable/disable is
>> unbalanced. The unbalanced enable/disable will lead
>> the
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 12:20 PM, Bjorn Andersson
wrote:
> From: Bjorn Andersson
>
> The document defines the binding for a component that loads firmware for
> and boots the Qualcomm WCNSS core.
>
> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 12:20 PM, Bjorn Andersson
wrote:
> From: Bjorn Andersson
>
> The document defines the binding for a component that loads firmware for
> and boots the Qualcomm WCNSS core.
>
> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson
> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson
> ---
>
> Rob,
>
> I got your
lsvmbus keeps its own copy of all VMBus UUIDs, add PCIe pass-through
device there to not report 'Unknown' for such devices.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov
---
tools/hv/lsvmbus | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/tools/hv/lsvmbus b/tools/hv/lsvmbus
index
lsvmbus keeps its own copy of all VMBus UUIDs, add PCIe pass-through
device there to not report 'Unknown' for such devices.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov
---
tools/hv/lsvmbus | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/tools/hv/lsvmbus b/tools/hv/lsvmbus
index 162a378..e223284 100644
On 15.04.16 19:06:35, Tomasz Nowicki wrote:
> From the functionality point of view this series might be split into the
> following logic parts:
> 1. Necessary fixes as the preparation for using driver on ARM64.
> 2. New ECAM API and update for users of the pci-host-common API
> 3. Use new MCFG
On 15.04.16 19:06:35, Tomasz Nowicki wrote:
> From the functionality point of view this series might be split into the
> following logic parts:
> 1. Necessary fixes as the preparation for using driver on ARM64.
> 2. New ECAM API and update for users of the pci-host-common API
> 3. Use new MCFG
Peter Zijlstra writes:
> On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 06:17:02PM +0300, Alexander Shishkin wrote:
>> +/* otherwise, fall through to the cross-call */
>> +}
>> +
>> +/* matches smp_wmb() in event_sched_in() */
>> +smp_rmb();
Peter Zijlstra writes:
> On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 06:17:02PM +0300, Alexander Shishkin wrote:
>> +/* otherwise, fall through to the cross-call */
>> +}
>> +
>> +/* matches smp_wmb() in event_sched_in() */
>> +smp_rmb();
>> +
>> +
On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 12:36 AM, Appana Durga Kedareswara Rao
wrote:
> Hi Rob,
>
> Thanks for the review...
>
>> -Original Message-
>> From: Rob Herring [mailto:r...@kernel.org]
>> Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2016 7:12 PM
>> To: Appana Durga Kedareswara
On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 12:36 AM, Appana Durga Kedareswara Rao
wrote:
> Hi Rob,
>
> Thanks for the review...
>
>> -Original Message-
>> From: Rob Herring [mailto:r...@kernel.org]
>> Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2016 7:12 PM
>> To: Appana Durga Kedareswara Rao
>> Cc:
On Thu, 21 Apr 2016, Paul Burton wrote:
> Fix this by broadcasting an IPI if other CPUs may have live FP context
> for an affected thread, with a handler causing those CPUs to relinquish
> their FPU ownership. Threads will then be allowed to continue running
> but will stall on the
On Thu, 21 Apr 2016, Paul Burton wrote:
> Fix this by broadcasting an IPI if other CPUs may have live FP context
> for an affected thread, with a handler causing those CPUs to relinquish
> their FPU ownership. Threads will then be allowed to continue running
> but will stall on the
Hello Pavel and Mike,
On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 12:44:48PM +0300, Pavel Emelyanov wrote:
> On 03/20/2016 03:42 PM, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > This set is to address the issues that appear in userfaultfd usage
> > scenarios when the task monitoring the uffd and the mm-owner do not
> >
Hello Pavel and Mike,
On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 12:44:48PM +0300, Pavel Emelyanov wrote:
> On 03/20/2016 03:42 PM, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > This set is to address the issues that appear in userfaultfd usage
> > scenarios when the task monitoring the uffd and the mm-owner do not
> >
On Tue, Apr 12, 2016 at 05:59:41PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
[...]
> > +static inline void __cmpwait(volatile void *ptr, unsigned long val, int
> > size)
> > +{
> > + switch (size) {
> > + case 1: return __cmpwait_case_1(ptr, val);
> > + case 2: return __cmpwait_case_2(ptr, val);
> > +
On Tue, Apr 12, 2016 at 05:59:41PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
[...]
> > +static inline void __cmpwait(volatile void *ptr, unsigned long val, int
> > size)
> > +{
> > + switch (size) {
> > + case 1: return __cmpwait_case_1(ptr, val);
> > + case 2: return __cmpwait_case_2(ptr, val);
> > +
On 04/22/2016 07:30 AM, Jon Masters wrote:
On 04/21/2016 06:08 AM, Tomasz Nowicki wrote:
On 21.04.2016 11:36, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
On Thursday 21 April 2016 11:28:15 Tomasz Nowicki wrote:
On 19.04.2016 15:06, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
On Monday 18 April 2016 21:31:54 Tomasz Nowicki wrote:
On 04/22/2016 07:30 AM, Jon Masters wrote:
On 04/21/2016 06:08 AM, Tomasz Nowicki wrote:
On 21.04.2016 11:36, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
On Thursday 21 April 2016 11:28:15 Tomasz Nowicki wrote:
On 19.04.2016 15:06, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
On Monday 18 April 2016 21:31:54 Tomasz Nowicki wrote:
On Thu, 21 Apr 2016, Paul Burton wrote:
> Whilst a PR_SET_FP_MODE prctl is performed there are decisions made
> based upon whether the task is executing on the current CPU. This may
> change if we're preempted, so disable preemption to avoid such changes
> for the lifetime of the mode switch.
On Thu, 21 Apr 2016, Paul Burton wrote:
> Whilst a PR_SET_FP_MODE prctl is performed there are decisions made
> based upon whether the task is executing on the current CPU. This may
> change if we're preempted, so disable preemption to avoid such changes
> for the lifetime of the mode switch.
On Wed, Apr 06, 2016 at 01:08:34AM +0300, Yury Norov wrote:
> From: Bamvor Jian Zhang
>
> With the patches of ILP32, COMPAT is not equivalent to AARCH32 in EL0.
> This patch fix this by updating the dependency from COMPAT to
> AARCH32_EL0 for ARMV8_DEPRECATED and
On Wed, Apr 06, 2016 at 01:08:34AM +0300, Yury Norov wrote:
> From: Bamvor Jian Zhang
>
> With the patches of ILP32, COMPAT is not equivalent to AARCH32 in EL0.
> This patch fix this by updating the dependency from COMPAT to
> AARCH32_EL0 for ARMV8_DEPRECATED and ARM64_ERRATUM_845719.
>
>
On Fri, 22 Apr 2016, Paul Burton wrote:
> It turns out that some toolchains which support MIPS R6 don't support
> the -mcompact-branches flag to specify compact branch behaviour. Default
> to not providing the -mcompact-branch option to the compiler such that
> we can build with such toolchains.
On Fri, 22 Apr 2016, Paul Burton wrote:
> It turns out that some toolchains which support MIPS R6 don't support
> the -mcompact-branches flag to specify compact branch behaviour. Default
> to not providing the -mcompact-branch option to the compiler such that
> we can build with such toolchains.
Hi Eric,
Sorry that it's taken a while to get this update sent out. In part
that's because of a few problems I found, which resulted in some new
patches.
I wanted to point out one problem in particular because I'm not fully
settled on the solution. It turns out that for the sysfs and cgroup
fs_fully_visible() ignores MNT_LOCK_NODEV when FS_USERS_DEV_MOUNT
is not set for the filesystem, but there is a bug in the logic
that may cause mounting to fail. It is doing this only when the
existing mount is not in init_user_ns but should check the new
mount instead. But the new mount is always
fs_fully_visible() ignores MNT_LOCK_NODEV when FS_USERS_DEV_MOUNT
is not set for the filesystem, but there is a bug in the logic
that may cause mounting to fail. It is doing this only when the
existing mount is not in init_user_ns but should check the new
mount instead. But the new mount is always
Hi Eric,
Sorry that it's taken a while to get this update sent out. In part
that's because of a few problems I found, which resulted in some new
patches.
I wanted to point out one problem in particular because I'm not fully
settled on the solution. It turns out that for the sysfs and cgroup
From: Andy Lutomirski
If a process gets access to a mount from a different user
namespace, that process should not be able to take advantage of
setuid files or selinux entrypoints from that filesystem. Prevent
this by treating mounts from other mount namespaces and those
Unprivileged users should not be able to mount block devices when
they lack sufficient privileges towards the block device inode.
Update blkdev_get_by_path() to validate that the user has the
required access to the inode at the specified path. The check
will be skipped for CAP_SYS_ADMIN, so
When looking up a block device by path no permission check is
done to verify that the user has access to the block device inode
at the specified path. In some cases it may be necessary to
check permissions towards the inode, such as allowing
unprivileged users to mount block devices in user
The SMACK64, SMACK64EXEC, and SMACK64MMAP labels are all handled
differently in untrusted mounts. This is confusing and
potentically problematic. Change this to handle them all the same
way that SMACK64 is currently handled; that is, read the label
from disk and check it at use time. For SMACK64
Both of these filesystems already have use cases for mounting the
same super block from multiple user namespaces. For sysfs this
happens when using criu for snapshotting a container, where sysfs
is mounted in the containers network ns but the hosts user ns.
The cgroup filesystem shares the same
On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 05:35:46PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Fri, 22 Apr 2016, Matt Redfearn wrote:
>
> > Make these functions return appropriate error codes when something goes
> > wrong.
>
> And the reason for this change is?
Hi Thomas,
Mainly for irq_destroy_ipi, where the first
From: Andy Lutomirski
If a process gets access to a mount from a different user
namespace, that process should not be able to take advantage of
setuid files or selinux entrypoints from that filesystem. Prevent
this by treating mounts from other mount namespaces and those not
owned by
Unprivileged users should not be able to mount block devices when
they lack sufficient privileges towards the block device inode.
Update blkdev_get_by_path() to validate that the user has the
required access to the inode at the specified path. The check
will be skipped for CAP_SYS_ADMIN, so
When looking up a block device by path no permission check is
done to verify that the user has access to the block device inode
at the specified path. In some cases it may be necessary to
check permissions towards the inode, such as allowing
unprivileged users to mount block devices in user
The SMACK64, SMACK64EXEC, and SMACK64MMAP labels are all handled
differently in untrusted mounts. This is confusing and
potentically problematic. Change this to handle them all the same
way that SMACK64 is currently handled; that is, read the label
from disk and check it at use time. For SMACK64
Both of these filesystems already have use cases for mounting the
same super block from multiple user namespaces. For sysfs this
happens when using criu for snapshotting a container, where sysfs
is mounted in the containers network ns but the hosts user ns.
The cgroup filesystem shares the same
On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 05:35:46PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Fri, 22 Apr 2016, Matt Redfearn wrote:
>
> > Make these functions return appropriate error codes when something goes
> > wrong.
>
> And the reason for this change is?
Hi Thomas,
Mainly for irq_destroy_ipi, where the first
Security labels from unprivileged mounts in user namespaces must
be ignored. Force superblocks from user namespaces whose labeling
behavior is to use xattrs to use mountpoint labeling instead.
For the mountpoint label, default to converting the current task
context into a form suitable for file
Superblock level remounts are currently restricted to global
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, as is the path for changing the root mount to
read only on umount. Loosen both of these permission checks to
also allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in any namespace which is privileged
towards the userns which originally mounted the
Security labels from unprivileged mounts in user namespaces must
be ignored. Force superblocks from user namespaces whose labeling
behavior is to use xattrs to use mountpoint labeling instead.
For the mountpoint label, default to converting the current task
context into a form suitable for file
Superblock level remounts are currently restricted to global
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, as is the path for changing the root mount to
read only on umount. Loosen both of these permission checks to
also allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in any namespace which is privileged
towards the userns which originally mounted the
On Fri, 22 Apr 2016, Paul Burton wrote:
> > In that case however it looks to me like these `-mcompact-branches='
> > options (all the three we support) need to be wrapped into `$(call
> > cc-option,...)'.
>
> An alternative that it could be argued better fits the principle of
> least surprise
Filesystem uids which don't map into a user namespace may result
in inode->i_uid being INVALID_UID. A symlink and its parent
could have different owners in the filesystem can both get
mapped to INVALID_UID, which may result in following a symlink
when this would not have otherwise been permitted
Using INVALID_[UG]ID for the LSM file creation context doesn't
make sense, so return an error if the inode passed to
set_create_file_as() has an invalid id.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
---
kernel/cred.c | 2 ++
1
Filesystem uids which don't map into a user namespace may result
in inode->i_uid being INVALID_UID. A symlink and its parent
could have different owners in the filesystem can both get
mapped to INVALID_UID, which may result in following a symlink
when this would not have otherwise been permitted
Using INVALID_[UG]ID for the LSM file creation context doesn't
make sense, so return an error if the inode passed to
set_create_file_as() has an invalid id.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
---
kernel/cred.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c
On Fri, 22 Apr 2016, Paul Burton wrote:
> > In that case however it looks to me like these `-mcompact-branches='
> > options (all the three we support) need to be wrapped into `$(call
> > cc-option,...)'.
>
> An alternative that it could be argued better fits the principle of
> least surprise
Em Fri, 22 Apr 2016 17:18:24 +0200
Hans Verkuil escreveu:
> On 04/22/2016 05:07 PM, Nick Dyer wrote:
> > On 22/04/2016 15:45, Mauro Carvalho Chehab wrote:
> >> Em Fri, 22 Apr 2016 10:26:37 +0200
> >> Hans Verkuil escreveu:
> >>> On 04/21/2016 11:31
On Fri, 22 Apr 2016 16:03:34 +0300
Grygorii Strashko wrote:
> On 04/21/2016 09:26 PM, David Rivshin (Allworx) wrote:
> > From: David Rivshin
> >
> > The phy-handle, phy_id, and fixed-link properties are mutually exclusive,
> > and only one need
In a userns mount some on-disk inodes may have ids which do not
map into s_user_ns, in which case the in-kernel inodes are owned
by invalid users. The superblock owner should be able to change
attributes of these inodes but cannot. However it is unsafe to
grant the superblock owner privileged
When the userspace process servicing fuse requests is running in
a pid namespace then pids passed via the fuse fd are not being
translated into that process' namespace. Translation is necessary
for the pid to be useful to that process.
Since no use case currently exists for changing namespaces
Em Fri, 22 Apr 2016 17:18:24 +0200
Hans Verkuil escreveu:
> On 04/22/2016 05:07 PM, Nick Dyer wrote:
> > On 22/04/2016 15:45, Mauro Carvalho Chehab wrote:
> >> Em Fri, 22 Apr 2016 10:26:37 +0200
> >> Hans Verkuil escreveu:
> >>> On 04/21/2016 11:31 AM, Nick Dyer wrote:
> This is a
On Fri, 22 Apr 2016 16:03:34 +0300
Grygorii Strashko wrote:
> On 04/21/2016 09:26 PM, David Rivshin (Allworx) wrote:
> > From: David Rivshin
> >
> > The phy-handle, phy_id, and fixed-link properties are mutually exclusive,
> > and only one need be specified. However if phy-handle was
In a userns mount some on-disk inodes may have ids which do not
map into s_user_ns, in which case the in-kernel inodes are owned
by invalid users. The superblock owner should be able to change
attributes of these inodes but cannot. However it is unsafe to
grant the superblock owner privileged
When the userspace process servicing fuse requests is running in
a pid namespace then pids passed via the fuse fd are not being
translated into that process' namespace. Translation is necessary
for the pid to be useful to that process.
Since no use case currently exists for changing namespaces
On April 22, 2016 3:09:35 PM CEST, Rob Herring wrote:
>On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 7:38 AM, Olliver Schinagl
>wrote:
>> Hey Rob,
>>
>> On 21-04-16 17:07, Rob Herring wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 19, 2016 at 09:40:49AM +0200, Olliver Schinagl wrote:
When
On April 22, 2016 3:09:35 PM CEST, Rob Herring wrote:
>On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 7:38 AM, Olliver Schinagl
>wrote:
>> Hey Rob,
>>
>> On 21-04-16 17:07, Rob Herring wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 19, 2016 at 09:40:49AM +0200, Olliver Schinagl wrote:
When leds are connected in a totem-pole
nla_data() is now aligned on a 64-bit area.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel
---
include/net/netlink.h | 8 +---
include/net/nl802154.h| 6 ++
net/ieee802154/nl802154.c | 13 -
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git
All current callers of in_userns pass current_user_ns as the
first argument. Simplify by replacing in_userns with
current_in_userns which checks whether current_user_ns is in the
namespace supplied as an argument.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee
Acked-by: James Morris
nla_data() is now aligned on a 64-bit area.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel
---
include/net/netlink.h | 8 +---
include/net/nl802154.h| 6 ++
net/ieee802154/nl802154.c | 13 -
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/netlink.h
All current callers of in_userns pass current_user_ns as the
first argument. Simplify by replacing in_userns with
current_in_userns which checks whether current_user_ns is in the
namespace supplied as an argument.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
---
Expand the check in should_remove_suid() to keep privileges for
CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns rather than init_user_ns.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
---
fs/inode.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
A privileged user in s_user_ns will generally have the ability to
manipulate the backing store and insert security.* xattrs into
the filesystem directly. Therefore the kernel must be prepared to
handle these xattrs from unprivileged mounts, and it makes little
sense for commoncap to prevent
Expand the check in should_remove_suid() to keep privileges for
CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns rather than init_user_ns.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
---
fs/inode.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
index
A privileged user in s_user_ns will generally have the ability to
manipulate the backing store and insert security.* xattrs into
the filesystem directly. Therefore the kernel must be prepared to
handle these xattrs from unprivileged mounts, and it makes little
sense for commoncap to prevent
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi
---
fs/fuse/inode.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/fuse/inode.c b/fs/fuse/inode.c
index 0a771145d853..254f1944ee98 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/inode.c
+++
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi
---
fs/fuse/inode.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/fuse/inode.c b/fs/fuse/inode.c
index 0a771145d853..254f1944ee98 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/inode.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/inode.c
@@ -1199,7 +1199,7 @@ static
From: Pavel Tikhomirov
We probably need to fix superblock leak in patch (v4 "fs: Add user
namesapace member to struct super_block"):
Imagine posible code path in sget_userns: we iterate through
type->fs_supers and do not find suitable sb, we drop sb_lock to
allocate s
From: Pavel Tikhomirov
We probably need to fix superblock leak in patch (v4 "fs: Add user
namesapace member to struct super_block"):
Imagine posible code path in sget_userns: we iterate through
type->fs_supers and do not find suitable sb, we drop sb_lock to
allocate s and go to retry. After we
ids in on-disk ACLs should be converted to s_user_ns instead of
init_user_ns as is done now. This introduces the possibility for
id mappings to fail, and when this happens syscalls will return
EOVERFLOW.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
ids in on-disk ACLs should be converted to s_user_ns instead of
init_user_ns as is done now. This introduces the possibility for
id mappings to fail, and when this happens syscalls will return
EOVERFLOW.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
---
fs/posix_acl.c |
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