On Wed, 9 Oct 2019, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 10/9/2019 3:14 PM, James Morris wrote:
> > On Wed, 9 Oct 2019, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >
> >> Please consider making the perf_alloc security blob maintained
> >> by the infrastructure rather than the indivi
on't need the extra code & complexity. Stacking should only
cover what's concretely required by in-tree users.
--
James Morris
return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
Please avoid unrelated whitespace changes.
--
James Morris
ectionable.
>
> So it's merged now.
Thanks.
Matthew has agreed to maintain this code now that it's merged.
Matthew: please submit a maintainer entry for this.
--
James Morris
at SafeSetID is shipping in ChromeOS -- this was
part of the rationale for merging it.
--
James Morris
Hi Linus,
This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from Matthew
Garrett, David Howells and others.
>From the original description:
This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature, intended
to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel. When
On Tue, 10 Sep 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> Constify some arrays and fix an #ifdef that I typoed.
>
Applied to
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git
next-lockdown
and next-testing
--
James Morris
On Mon, 9 Sep 2019, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>
> On 06/09/2019 21:03, James Morris wrote:
> > On Fri, 6 Sep 2019, Jeff Layton wrote:
> >
> >> The fact that open and openat didn't vet unknown flags is really a bug.
> >>
> >> Too late to fix it no
en you could
have IMA measure/appraise all files with +x. I suspect this could get
messy in terms of unwanted files being included, and the MAY_OPENEXEC flag
has cleaner semantics.
--
James Morris
There's little need to continue these sorts of
> hacks.
>
> New open flags really have no place in the old syscalls, IMO.
Agree here. It's unfortunate but a reality and Linus will reject any such
changes which break existing userspace.
--
James Morris
On Mon, 19 Aug 2019, Stephen Rothwell wrote:
> > > 2.20.1
>
> I am still applying that patch ...
>
Matthew folded it into commit e6b1db98cf4d54d9ea59cfcc195f70dc946fdd38.
--
James Morris
ing the oops in tracefs.
Applied to
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git
next-lockdown
and next-testing
Thanks!
--
James Morris
On Tue, 13 Aug 2019, James Morris wrote:
> On Mon, 12 Aug 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote:
>
> > On Fri, Aug 9, 2019 at 11:08 PM James Morris wrote:
> > > Please verify and test, as I had to make a few minor fixups for my v5.2
> > > base.
> >
> > Thanks J
On Mon, 12 Aug 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 9, 2019 at 11:08 PM James Morris wrote:
> > Please verify and test, as I had to make a few minor fixups for my v5.2
> > base.
>
> Thanks James - there's a few small fixups required, would you like
> those as sepa
minor fixups for my v5.2
base.
--
James Morris
be mentioned in the CONFIG_MODULE_SIG Kconfig
> help?
I agree and yes mention it in the help. A respin of just this patch is
fine.
--
James Morris
er than that:
>
> Acked-by: Jessica Yu
>
Matthew: no need to respin the patchset just for this.
--
James Morris
ecurity/lockdown/lockdown.c
> index 07a49667f234..065432f9e218 100644
> --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ static char
> *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
> [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modified ACPI tables",
> [LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage",
> [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO",
> + [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters",
> [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
> [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
> };
>
--
James Morris
/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
> LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL,
> LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS,
> LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE,
> + LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS,
> LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
> LOCKDOWN_KCORE,
> LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,
> diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> index e43c9d001e49..37ef46320ef4 100644
> --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ static char
> *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
> [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO",
> [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters",
> [LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio",
> + [LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access",
> [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
> [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
> [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
>
--
James Morris
), so it's
more than just inspired. Could you include more information in the
description about what's been ported from PaX to SARA?
--
James Morris
pr_crit("impossible to initialize creds.\n");
> + goto error;
> + }
> +
> +int __init sara_data_init(void)
> +{
> + security_add_hooks(data_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(data_hooks), "sara");
> + return 0;
> +}
This can't fail so make it return void and simplify the caller.
--
James Morris
is is an issue.
Also in the description, please explain the issues with read and write
notifications and why a simple 'read' permission is not adequate.
--
James Morris
Please pull these minor fixes for capabilities:
o Update the commoncap.c code to utilize XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN,
from Carmeli tamir.
o Make the capability hooks static, from Yue Haibing.
---
The following changes since commit e93c9c99a629c61837d5a7fc2120cd2b6c70dbdd:
Linux 5.1
it
next-lsm
Thanks!
--
James Morris
On Sat, 6 Jul 2019, Salvatore Mesoraca wrote:
> S.A.R.A. (S.A.R.A. is Another Recursive Acronym) is a stacked Linux
Please make this just SARA. Nobody wants to read or type S.A.R.A.
--
James Morris
o take over lockdown decisions once it has initialized (including
> policy load), and to be able to access state that is currently private to the
> lockdown module, like the level.
Why not utilize stacking (restrictively), similarly to capabilities?
--
James Morris
king user
> policies that are based on LSMs that offer excessively fine
> granularity.
Can you give an example of how the details might change?
> I'd be more comfortable if the LSM only got to see "confidentiality"
> or "integrity".
These are not sufficient for creating a useful policy for the SELinux
case.
--
James Morris
chset description and had not looked at
V33 yet.
This is looking good.
--
James Morris
ot;all or nothing" choices which may prevent deployment due
to a user needing to allow (presumably controlled or mitigated) exceptions
to the policy.
--
James Morris
o inline __integrity_init_keyring(),
> a warning is issued.
>
> Fix this by adding the missing __init annotation.
>
> Fixes: 9dc92c45177ab70e ("integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring")
> Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven
Reviewed-by: James Morris
--
James Morris
On Sat, 15 Jun 2019, Lubashev, Igor wrote:
> > On Friday, June 14, 2019, James Morris wrote:
> Unfortunately, perf is using uid==0 and euid==0 as a "capability bits".
>
>
> In tools/perf/util/evsel.c:
> static bool perf_event_can_profile_kernel(void)
&
ther
thing to consider when trying to reason about this.
Have you considered the example security configuration in
Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst ?
What are some other examples of programs that could utilize this scheme?
--
James Morris
.
>
> I will update man pages, if this patch is deemed a good idea.
>
> Igor Lubashev (1):
> security: add SECURE_KEEP_FSUID to preserve fsuid/fsgid across execve
>
> include/uapi/linux/securebits.h | 10 +-
> security/commoncap.c | 9 +++--
> 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
>
--
James Morris
by: Prakhar Srivastava
> ---
> kernel/kexec_file.c | 9 ++---
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Reviewed-by: James Morris
--
James Morris
'
>
> Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava
> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu
Reviewed-by: James Morris
--
James Morris
a_event_data event_data = {.iint = iint };
Minor nit: looks like this could be simplified to:
struct integrity_iint_cache iint = {};
struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = };
which also saves the later memset. 'hash' can also be initialized with '=
{}'.
--
James Morris
| 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Thanks!
Applied to
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git
next-lsm
--
James Morris
On Fri, 31 May 2019, David Howells wrote:
> Should this go via Al's tree, James's tree, Casey's tree or directly to Linus?
If it's specific to one LSM (as this is), via Casey, who can decide to
forward to Al or Linus.
--
James Morris
On Wed, 29 May 2019, David Howells wrote:
> Hi James,
>
> Here are some miscellaneous keyrings fixes and improvements intended for
> the next merge window, if you could pull them please.
>
Linus has asked for security subsystem PRs to go directly to him.
--
James Morris
and not all the daemon's pending auth keys.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells
Reviewed-by: James Morris
--
James Morris
ef_to_ptr(from_ref),
> +key_ref_to_ptr(to_ref), flags);
> +
> + key_ref_put(to_ref);
> +error3:
> + key_ref_put(from_ref);
> +error2:
> + key_ref_put(key_ref);
> +error:
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
--
James Morris
On Wed, 22 May 2019, David Howells wrote:
> Make __key_link_begin() handle lockdep nesting for the implementation of
> key_move() where we have to lock two keyrings.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells
Reviewed-by: James Morris
--
James Morris
On Wed, 22 May 2019, David Howells wrote:
> Break bits out of key_unlink() into helper functions so that they can be
> used in implementing key_move().
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells
Reviewed-by: James Morris
--
James Morris
avid Howells
Reviewed-by: James Morris
--
James Morris
On Wed, 22 May 2019, David Howells wrote:
> Fix some kdoc argument description mismatches reported by sparse and give
> keyring_restrict() a description.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells
> cc: Mat Martineau
Reviewed-by: James Morris
--
James Morris
r.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells
Reviewed-by: James Morris
--
James Morris
s are registered for the hooks, possibly by having the
lockdown LSM gate this and update the securityfs lockdown node with
something like "lsm:smack".
--
James Morris
value for the subject and then apply policy as needed (e.g. allow or deny
these).
> So I guess my proposal is: use LSM, but make the hook very coarse
> grained: int security_violate_confidentiality(const struct cred *) and
> int security_violate_integrity(const struct cred *).
Perhaps security_kernel_unlock_*
--
James Morris
On Tue, 21 May 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> + int (*locked_down)(const char *where, enum lockdown_level level);
> +static int lockdown_is_locked_down(const char *what, enum lockdown_level
> level)
I'm guessing 'what' is the best option here.
--
James Morris
make it easier to write policy in other LSMs, but
> does this broadly look like you were imagining?
This looks promising!
An LSM could also potentially implement its own policy for the hook.
--
James Morris
On Wed, 15 May 2019, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 3:46 PM James Morris wrote:
> >
> > You could try user.sigstruct, which does not require any privs.
> >
>
> I don't think I understand your proposal. What file would this
> attribute be on? Wh
to set up a loose policy where
> anyone can load whatever enclave they want. That's what would happen
> in my proposal if there was no LSM loaded or of the LSM policy didn't
> restrict what .sigstruct files were acceptable.
>
You could try user.sigstruct, which does not require any privs.
--
James Morris
seful to prevent enclaves from
> contain RWX segments.
>
> So my question is: what, if anything, should change to make this work better?
Would it be possible to provide multiple fds (perhaps via a pseudo fs
interface) which can be mapped to different types of VMAs?
--
James Morris
On Tue, 14 May 2019, James Morris wrote:
> On Sat, 11 May 2019, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > So now these have been very recently rebased (on top of a random
> > merge-window "tree of the day" version) instead of having multiple
> > merges.
> >
> > That
lso need to be guided in, as part of a community effort.
--
James Morris
On Sat, 11 May 2019, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 6:09 PM James Morris wrote:
> >
> > These patches include fixes to enable fuzz testing, and a fix for
> > calculating whether a filesystem is user-modifiable.
>
> So now these have been ve
Please pull.
These patches include fixes to enable fuzz testing, and a fix for
calculating whether a filesystem is user-modifiable.
The following changes since commit 1fb3b526df3bd7647e7854915ae6b22299408baf:
Merge tag 'docs-5.2a' of git://git.lwn.net/linux (2019-05-10 13:24:53 -0400)
are
On Thu, 9 May 2019, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 10:23 AM James Morris wrote:
> >
> > Bugfixes and new selftests for v5.1 features (partial reads in /dev/tpm0).
>
> What the heck is going on?
>
> I got all of these long ago in the "TPM fixes&
r/next-smack
into next-smack (2019-05-06 20:24:51 -0700)
Casey Schaufler (3):
Smack: Create smack_rule cache to optimize memory usage
Smack: Fix IPv6 handling of 0 secmark
Smack: Fix kbuild reported build
700)
----
James Morris (1):
Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-20190329' of
git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmdd into next-tpm
Jarkko Sakkinen (2):
KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM
tpm: turn on TPM on suspend for TPM 1.x
Tade
/git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into
next-integrity (2019-04-12 15:20:23 -0700)
--------
James Morris (1):
Merge branch 'next-integrity-for-james' of
git://git.kernel.org/.../zohar/linux-integrity into next-i
documentation for the audit_* hooks
LSM: fix documentation for the msg_queue_* hooks
LSM: fix documentation for the sem_* hooks
LSM: fix documentation for the shm_* hooks
LSM: lsm_hooks.h: fix documentation format
James Morris (2):
Merge tag 'v5.1-rc2' into next-general
On Thu, 2 May 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Thu, May 2, 2019 at 2:07 PM James Morris wrote:
> > One possible direction is to (as previously mentioned) assign IDs to each
> > callsite and be able to check this ID against a simple policy array
> > (allow/deny). The d
ckdown callsites as they don't have to
be enabled by the user.
Thoughts?
--
James Morris
sed for data, and memory used for code and control
>flow.
Might be better to start with Rust.
--
James Morris
e DMARC, you're expected to have DKIM working for spam
> purposes. On the other hand, if you don't advertise DMARC, google will
> probably still bin all your email as spam.
Working on it.
--
James Morris
ot;v=DMARC1;p=none;pct=100;rua=mailto:jamor...@microsoft.com;
We don't have DKIM set up yet.
--
James Morris
s Cook
Acked-by: James Morris
--
James Morris
On Wed, 24 Apr 2019, Kees Cook wrote:
> Some seccomp flags will become exclusive, so the selftest needs to
> be adjusted to mask those out and test them individually for the "all
> flags" tests.
>
> Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org # v5.0+
> Signed-off-by: Kees Co
ked-by: Kees Cook
>
> James, this can go in for v5.2 -- no rush.
>
Applied to
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git
next-general
--
James Morris
filter(filter);
> > if (IS_ERR(prepared))
> > @@ -1302,7 +1315,7 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int
> > flags,
> > mutex_unlock(>signal->cred_guard_mutex);
> > out_put_fd:
> > if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER) {
> > - if (ret < 0) {
> > + if (ret) {
> > listener_f->private_data = NULL;
> > fput(listener_f);
> > put_unused_fd(listener);
> > --
> > 2.19.1
> >
>
> -Kees
>
>
--
James Morris
NULL, NULL);
> + if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) {
> + ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
> + VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
> +
{"lsm", _ops, 0444},
> #endif
> {""}
> };
>
> and to hell with that call of securityfs_create_file() and all its
> failure handling...
Thanks for the review. Reverted.
--
James Morris
On Wed, 27 Mar 2019, Mukesh Ojha wrote:
> Sparse complains yama_task_prctl can be static. Fix it by making
> it static.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mukesh Ojha
Applied to
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git
next-general
--
James Morris
r_filesystem(_type);
> + sysfs_remove_mount_point(kernel_kobj, "security");
> + return PTR_ERR(lsm_dentry);
> + }
> #endif
> return 0;
> }
>
--
James Morris
smp_store_release() for writers to
> prevent memory ordering issues.
>
> Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings
> unless they're accessed")
> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn
Applied to
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/l
ers that use __rcu.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn
Applied to
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git
next-general
--
James Morris
morris/linux-security.git
next-general
--
James Morris
t; userspace regression reported by David.
> > > ---
> > > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 49 -
> > > 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > This looks good to me. Thanks a lot! If this makes v5.1, I will leave
> > the apparmor-detection in dbus-broker as it is, unless someone asks me
> > to parse 0/1 as well?
> >
> > I cannot judge whether the apparmor_initialized check is correct, but
> > for the parameter parsing:
> >
> > Reviewed-by: David Rheinsberg
>
> Thanks!
>
> James, are you able to take this for v5.1 fixes?
Actually, JJ usually submits directly to Linus.
--
James Morris
t; userspace regression reported by David.
> > > ---
> > > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 49 -
> > > 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > This looks good to me. Thanks a lot! If this makes v5.1, I will leave
> > the apparmor-detection in dbus-broker as it is, unless someone asks me
> > to parse 0/1 as well?
> >
> > I cannot judge whether the apparmor_initialized check is correct, but
> > for the parameter parsing:
> >
> > Reviewed-by: David Rheinsberg
>
> Thanks!
>
> James, are you able to take this for v5.1 fixes?
Sure.
--
James Morris
Please pull these TPM fixes, from Jarkko:
"These are critical fixes for v5.1. Contains also couple of new selftests
for v5.1 features (partial reads in /dev/tpm0)."
---
The following changes since commit fd008d1a7a204695f0e5e003af16448bb9c34b7b:
Merge branch 'linus' of
Please pull these fixes for v5.1.
The following changes since commit 8c7ae38d1ce12a0eaeba655df8562552b3596c7f:
afs: Fix StoreData op marshalling (2019-03-28 08:54:20 -0700)
are available in the Git repository at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git
inux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git
next-tpm
--
James Morris
/20190326230841.87834-1-ja...@google.com
Link:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1553673018-19234-1-git-send-email-mo...@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: James Morris
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 57cc60722dd3..efac68556b45 100644
cept when selected by CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO? (I worry
> the latter will lead to less testing of the stacking.)
Kees, send me your final patch as soon as it's ready.
--
James Morris
On Thu, 28 Mar 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 8:15 PM James Morris wrote:
> > OTOH, this seems like a combination of mechanism and policy. The 3 modes
> > are a help here, but I wonder if they may be too coarse grained still,
> > e.g. if someone want
't care :)
Why do you think it's crazy?
--
James Morris
paratedly.
Applied to
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git
next-general
Thanks!
--
James Morris
ill looking for the patch that restores the various
> CONFIG_DEFAULT_ kconfig options to be merged.
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/2bf23acd-22c4-a260-7648-845887a40...@i-love.sakura.ne.jp/
>
> since commit 70b62c25665f636c9f6c700b26af7df296b0887e dropped them somehow.
AFAICT we don't have a finalized version of the patch yet.
Kees?
--
James Morris
gt; return 0;
> }
>
Good catch, but you should propagate the error returned from
securityfs_create_file().
--
James Morris
On Fri, 8 Mar 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 3:00 PM James Morris wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, 6 Mar 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> >
> > > From: David Howells
> > >
> > > If the kernel is locked down, require that all module
fying kernel modules.
--
James Morris
jmorris/linux-security.git
next-tpm
for you to fetch changes up to 5da10728037afea6743b76afddfdc9950cd711b3:
Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-20190213' of
git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmdd into next-tpm (2019-02-13
12:01:00 -0800)
------
to module keyring (2018-12-17 14:09:39 -0800)
Dave Howells (2):
efi: Add EFI signature data types
efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser
Eric Richter (1):
x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86
James
urity blob
Gustavo A. R. Silva (1):
security: mark expected switch fall-throughs and add a missing break
James Morris (3):
Merge tag 'v5.0-rc1' into next-general
Merge tag 'blob-stacking-security-next' of
https://git.kernel.org/.../kees/linux into next-general
Merge tag
kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git
next-general
--
James Morris
ment may fall through
> [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/apparmor/domain.c:569:6: warning: this statement may fall through
> [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>
Applied to
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git
next-general
--
James Morris
uot;, args[0].from,
> >>> entry->fowner_op);
> >>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> >>> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> >>> index 43752002c222..513b457ae900 100644
> >>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> >>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> >>> @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct
> >>> seq_file *m,
> >>> /* skip ':' and '\0' */
> >>> buf_ptr += 2;
> >>> buflen -= buf_ptr - field_data->data;
> >>> + /* fall through */
> >>> case DATA_FMT_DIGEST:
> >>> case DATA_FMT_HEX:
> >>> if (!buflen)
> >>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> >>> index 587dc06eba33..5c1613519d5a 100644
> >>> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> >>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> >>> @@ -3380,13 +3380,12 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry
> >>> *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
> >>>*/
> >>> final = _known_star;
> >>> /*
> >>> - * Fall through.
> >>> - *
> >>>* If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
> >>>* but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
> >>>* to set mount options simulate setting the
> >>>* superblock default.
> >>>*/
> >>> + /* Fall through */
> >>> default:
> >>> /*
> >>>* This isn't an understood special case.
> >>
>
--
James Morris
'ing there is not very significant, which means that most of
> the time the TPM traffic is just noise on that list.
Sounds about right, there used to be more security folk on LSM and not as
many on the TPM list, but the new integrity list works well for TPM now.
--
James Morris
ot all, arches had a load-word instruction.
>
> Do you want to send me a patch for that? I'd rather not alter this patch at
> this point. I can pass the additional patch to James for the next merge
> window.
Should this first one go into -rc?
--
James Morris
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