On Sat, May 03, 2014 at 09:33:24AM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
> Open file description locks have been merged into the Linux kernel for
> v3.15. Add the appropriate command-value definitions and an update to
> the manual that describes their usage.
>
> ChangeLog:
>
> 2014-04-24 Jeff Layton
>
On Sat, May 03, 2014 at 09:33:24AM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
Open file description locks have been merged into the Linux kernel for
v3.15. Add the appropriate command-value definitions and an update to
the manual that describes their usage.
ChangeLog:
2014-04-24 Jeff Layton
On Tue, Aug 06, 2013 at 08:56:00PM -0400, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> On Tue, 2013-08-06 at 20:45 -0400, Steven Rostedt wrote:
>
> > [3.387362] short jumps: 106
> > [3.390277] long jumps: 330
> >
> > Thus, approximately 25%. Not bad.
>
> Also, where these happen to be is probably even more
On Tue, Aug 06, 2013 at 08:56:00PM -0400, Steven Rostedt wrote:
On Tue, 2013-08-06 at 20:45 -0400, Steven Rostedt wrote:
[3.387362] short jumps: 106
[3.390277] long jumps: 330
Thus, approximately 25%. Not bad.
Also, where these happen to be is probably even more important
On Sat, Dec 15, 2012 at 07:30:20PM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
>
> What I would do instead is use an AES-based cryptographic random
> number generator. That is, at boot time, grab enough randomness to
> for an AES key, and then use that key to create a cryptographic random
> number generator by
On Sat, Dec 15, 2012 at 11:59:46PM +0100, Stephan Müller wrote:
> Am 15.12.2012 20:15, schrieb Ondřej Bílka:
> >Why not use nonblocking pool and seed nonblocking pool only with half of
> >collected entropy to get /dev/random in almost all practical scenarios
> >nonb
On Sat, Dec 15, 2012 at 11:59:46PM +0100, Stephan Müller wrote:
Am 15.12.2012 20:15, schrieb Ondřej Bílka:
Why not use nonblocking pool and seed nonblocking pool only with half of
collected entropy to get /dev/random in almost all practical scenarios
nonblocking?
I would not recommend
On Sat, Dec 15, 2012 at 07:30:20PM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
What I would do instead is use an AES-based cryptographic random
number generator. That is, at boot time, grab enough randomness to
for an AES key, and then use that key to create a cryptographic random
number generator by
Why not use nonblocking pool and seed nonblocking pool only with half of
collected entropy to get /dev/random in almost all practical scenarios
nonblocking?
On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 08:44:36AM +0100, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> On 13.12.2012 01:43:21, +0100, Andrew Morton
> wrote:
>
> Hi Andrew,
>
Why not use nonblocking pool and seed nonblocking pool only with half of
collected entropy to get /dev/random in almost all practical scenarios
nonblocking?
On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 08:44:36AM +0100, Stephan Mueller wrote:
On 13.12.2012 01:43:21, +0100, Andrew Morton
a...@linux-foundation.org
On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 01:08:26PM +1100, NeilBrown wrote:
> On Wed, 12 Dec 2012 03:03:54 +0100 Ondřej Bílka wrote:
>
> > I consider to speed-up /dev/urandom on recent intel processors by
> > using hardware aes. Same for accelerated aes crypto.
> >
> > Would
On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 01:08:26PM +1100, NeilBrown wrote:
On Wed, 12 Dec 2012 03:03:54 +0100 Ondřej Bílka nel...@seznam.cz wrote:
I consider to speed-up /dev/urandom on recent intel processors by
using hardware aes. Same for accelerated aes crypto.
Would you accept a patch if I wrote
I consider to speed-up /dev/urandom on recent intel processors by
using hardware aes. Same for accelerated aes crypto.
Would you accept a patch if I wrote it?
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I consider to speed-up /dev/urandom on recent intel processors by
using hardware aes. Same for accelerated aes crypto.
Would you accept a patch if I wrote it?
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the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org
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