[PATCH v7 33/36] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
mapped encrypted then the VMA protection value is updated to remove the encryption bit. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/io.h |3 +++ arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 18 +- arch/x86/mm/pat.c |3 +++ 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions

[PATCH v7 26/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
Move the setting of the cpuinfo_x86.microcode field from amd_init() to early_amd_init() so that it is available earlier in the boot process. This avoids having to read MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL directly during early boot. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c |8 1

[PATCH v7 28/36] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
the AP to continue start up. Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h | 12 arch/x86/realmode/init.c |4 arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S | 24 3 files changed, 40

[PATCH v7 27/36] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
included in these physical addresses during configuration. The PTE entries created by the IOMMU should also include the encryption mask so that when the device behind the IOMMU performs a DMA, the DMA will be performed to encrypted memory. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c

[PATCH v7 25/36] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
, replacing the device with another device that can support 64-bit DMA, ignoring the message if the device isn't used much, etc. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- include/linux/dma-mapping.h | 11 +++ include/linux/mem_encrypt.h |8 lib/swiotlb.c |3 +++ 3

[PATCH v7 24/36] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/dma-mapping.h |5 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |5 +++ arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c | 11 +-- arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c|2 + arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c | 15 +- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c

[PATCH v7 22/36] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
mask range. Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h |3 ++ arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c| 62 + 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/x86/in

[PATCH v7 21/36] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
. Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 31 ++- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c index f3fa007..0254b78 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c +++ b

[PATCH v7 18/36] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
successfully. The pagetable mapping as well as the kernel are also added to the pagetable mapping as encrypted. All other EFI mappings are mapped decrypted (tables, etc.). Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 15 +++ 1 file

[PATCH v7 17/36] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
on to return a negative error value when no memmap entry is found. Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/ia64/kernel/efi.c |4 ++-- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c |6 +++--- include/linux/efi.h |2 +- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 dele

[PATCH v7 16/36] efi: Add an EFI table address match function

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
Add a function that will determine if a supplied physical address matches the address of an EFI table. Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 33 + include/linux/efi.h|7 +++ 2 files changed

[PATCH v7 15/36] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
Add a function that will return the E820 type associated with an address range. Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/e820/api.h |2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/e820.c | 26 +++--- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 3

[PATCH v7 14/36] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of the initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed properly. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |6 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h |3 ++ arch/x86/kernel/head64.c

[PATCH v7 11/36] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
native version of read_cr3_pa(), so create native_read_cr3_pa(). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h |3 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h |5 + 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor

[PATCH v7 12/36] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
s that the hardware will never give the core a dirty line with this memtype. Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/Kconfig |4 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h| 13 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h |8 ++ a

[PATCH v7 13/36] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
initrd will have been loaded by the boot loader and will not be encrypted, but the memory that it resides in is marked as encrypted). Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 10 + arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 76

[PATCH v7 06/36] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +/* + * AMD Memory Encryption Support + * + * Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. + * + * Author: Tom Lendacky + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License vers

[PATCH v7 09/36] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
Create a pgd_pfn() macro similar to the p[um]d_pfn() macros and then use the p[gum]d_pfn() macros in the p[gum]d_page() macros instead of duplicating the code. Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 16 +--- 1 file changed, 9

[PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
routines depending on CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |8 +++ arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 33 +- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 39 ++-- arch/x86/mm

[PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
have the encryption bit set. So only use the phys_to_virt() function if SME is not active Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c |7 +-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm

[PATCH v7 04/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
. Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h |2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 13 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c|1 + 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+) diff

[PATCH v7 01/36] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
Create a Documentation entry to describe the AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) feature and add documentation for the mem_encrypt= kernel parameter. Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 Documentation/x86/amd

[PATCH v7 02/36] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
For processors that support PAT, set the write-protect cache mode (_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP) entry to the actual write-protect value (x05). Acked-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/mm/pat.c |6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch

Re: [PATCH tip/sched/core] mm/early_ioremap: Adjust early_ioremap system_state check

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/16/2017 8:03 AM, Tom Lendacky wrote: On 6/16/2017 5:58 AM, Thomas Gleixner wrote: On Wed, 14 Jun 2017, Tom Lendacky wrote: A recent change added a new system_state value, SYSTEM_SCHEDULING, which exposed a warning issued by early_ioreamp() when the system_state was not SYSTEM_BOOTING

Re: [PATCH tip/sched/core] mm/early_ioremap: Adjust early_ioremap system_state check

2017-06-16 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/16/2017 5:58 AM, Thomas Gleixner wrote: On Wed, 14 Jun 2017, Tom Lendacky wrote: A recent change added a new system_state value, SYSTEM_SCHEDULING, which exposed a warning issued by early_ioreamp() when the system_state was not SYSTEM_BOOTING. Since early_ioremap() can be called when the

Re: [PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME

2017-06-15 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/15/2017 5:03 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 02:18:27PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: Provide support so that kexec can be used to boot a kernel when SME is enabled. Support is needed to allocate pages for kexec without encryption. This is needed in order to be able to

Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption

2017-06-15 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/15/2017 10:33 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Thu, Jun 15, 2017 at 09:59:45AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: Actually the detection routine, amd_iommu_detect(), is part of the IOMMU_INIT_FINISH macro support which is called early through mm_init() from start_kernel() and that routine is called

Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption

2017-06-15 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/15/2017 4:41 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 03:40:28PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: I was trying to keep all the logic for it here in the SME related files rather than put it in the iommu code itself. But it is easy enough to move if you think it's worth it. Yes p

Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME

2017-06-15 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/15/2017 4:08 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 02:49:02PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: I guess I don't need the sme_active() check since the second part of the if statement can only ever be true if SME is active (since mask is unsigned). ... and you can define sme_me

Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption

2017-06-14 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/14/2017 12:42 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 02:17:45PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: The IOMMU is programmed with physical addresses for the various tables and buffers that are used to communicate between the device and the driver. When the driver allocates this memory it

Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME

2017-06-14 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/14/2017 11:50 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 02:17:32PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: Add warnings to let the user know when bounce buffers are being used for DMA when SME is active. Since the bounce buffers are not in encrypted memory, these notifications are to allow

Re: [PATCH v6 24/34] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support

2017-06-14 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/14/2017 11:45 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 02:17:21PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: Since DMA addresses will effectively look like 48-bit addresses when the memory encryption mask is set, SWIOTLB is needed if the DMA mask of the device performing the DMA does not support

[PATCH tip/sched/core] mm/early_ioremap: Adjust early_ioremap system_state check

2017-06-14 Thread Tom Lendacky
system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING to system_state >= SYSTEM_RUNNING. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- mm/early_ioremap.c |2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/early_ioremap.c b/mm/early_ioremap.c index 6d5717b..57540de 100644 --- a/mm/early_ioremap.c +++ b

Re: [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data

2017-06-14 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/14/2017 11:07 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 02:16:43PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: The SMP MP-table is built by UEFI and placed in memory in a decrypted state. These tables are accessed using a mix of early_memremap(), early_memunmap(), phys_to_virt() and virt_to_phys

Re: [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active

2017-06-14 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/14/2017 11:24 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 02:17:09PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: When Secure Memory Encryption is enabled, the trampoline area must not be encrypted. A CPU running in real mode will not be able to decrypt memory that has been encrypted because it will

Re: [PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly

2017-06-12 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/10/2017 11:01 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 02:15:39PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: The boot data and command line data are present in memory in a decrypted state and are copied early in the boot process. The early page fault support will map these areas as encrypted

Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3

2017-06-09 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/9/2017 1:46 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 3:38 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: On 6/8/2017 1:05 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 12:14 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: The cr3 register entry can contain the SME encryption bit that indicates the PGD is encrypted

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3

2017-06-09 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/9/2017 1:43 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: On 06/09/2017 02:36 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: On 6/8/2017 5:01 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote: On 08/06/2017 22:17, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: On 06/08/2017 05:02 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: On 6/8/2017 3:51 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: What may be needed is making

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3

2017-06-09 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/8/2017 5:01 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote: On 08/06/2017 22:17, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: On 06/08/2017 05:02 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: On 6/8/2017 3:51 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: What may be needed is making sure X86_FEATURE_SME is not set for PV guests. And that may be something that Xen will

Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME

2017-06-08 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/8/2017 2:58 AM, Christoph Hellwig wrote: On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 02:17:32PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: Add warnings to let the user know when bounce buffers are being used for DMA when SME is active. Since the bounce buffers are not in encrypted memory, these notifications are to allow

Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3

2017-06-08 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/8/2017 1:05 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 12:14 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: The cr3 register entry can contain the SME encryption bit that indicates the PGD is encrypted. The encryption bit should not be used when creating a virtual address for the PGD table. Create a

Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME

2017-06-08 Thread Tom Lendacky
://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Tom-Lendacky/x86-Secure-Memory-Encryption-AMD/20170608-104147 config: sparc-defconfig (attached as .config) compiler: sparc-linux-gcc (GCC) 6.2.0 reproduce: wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/01org/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross

Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3

2017-06-08 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/8/2017 3:51 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: What may be needed is making sure X86_FEATURE_SME is not set for PV guests. And that may be something that Xen will need to control through either CPUID or MSR support for the PV guests. Only on newer versions of Xen. On earlier versions (2-3 y

Re: [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2017-06-08 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/7/2017 9:40 PM, Nick Sarnie wrote: On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 3:13 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: This patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Memory Encryption (SME) feature. SME can be used to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted through the page tables. A page of memory

Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption

2017-06-08 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/7/2017 9:38 PM, Nick Sarnie wrote: On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 3:17 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: The IOMMU is programmed with physical addresses for the various tables and buffers that are used to communicate between the device and the driver. When the driver allocates this memory it is encrypted

Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3

2017-06-08 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/7/2017 5:06 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: On 06/07/2017 03:14 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: The cr3 register entry can contain the SME encryption bit that indicates the PGD is encrypted. The encryption bit should not be used when creating a virtual address for the PGD table. Create a new function

[PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
encryption mask so that the data can be successfully accessed when SME is active. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c | 98 - 1 file changed, 70 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c b/arch/x86/kernel

[PATCH v6 04/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h |2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 13 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c|1 + 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm

[PATCH v6 09/34] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
Create a pgd_pfn() macro similar to the p[um]d_pfn() macros and then use the p[gum]d_pfn() macros in the p[gum]d_page() macros instead of duplicating the code. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 16 +--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions

[PATCH v6 07/34] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
have the encryption bit set. So only use the phys_to_virt() function if SME is not active Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c |7 +-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c index bbc558b..2a0fa89

[PATCH v6 12/34] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
s that the hardware will never give the core a dirty line with this memtype. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/Kconfig |4 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h| 13 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h |8 ++ arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c

[PATCH v6 13/34] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
initrd will have been loaded by the boot loader and will not be encrypted, but the memory that it resides in is marked as encrypted). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 15 +++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 76

[PATCH v6 18/34] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
successfully. The pagetable mapping as well as the kernel are also added to the pagetable mapping as encrypted. All other EFI mappings are mapped decrypted (tables, etc.). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 15 +++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4

[PATCH v6 21/34] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 31 ++- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c index 34ed59d..99cda55 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c

[PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 11 +++ mm/early_ioremap.c |2 +- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c index a163a90..195ba29 100644 --- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c +++ b/arch

[PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
included in these physical addresses during configuration. The PTE entries created by the IOMMU should also include the encryption mask so that when the device behind the IOMMU performs a DMA, the DMA will be performed to encrypted memory. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm

[PATCH v6 27/34] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
the AP to continue start up. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h | 12 arch/x86/realmode/init.c |4 arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S | 24 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86

[PATCH v6 32/34] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
Add the support to encrypt the kernel in-place. This is done by creating new page mappings for the kernel - a decrypted write-protected mapping and an encrypted mapping. The kernel is encrypted by copying it through a temporary buffer. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm

[PATCH v6 33/34] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
Add a cmdline_find_option() function to look for cmdline options that take arguments. The argument is returned in a supplied buffer and the argument length (regardless of whether it fits in the supplied buffer) is returned, with -1 indicating not found. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86

[PATCH v6 34/34] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S |1 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 93 +++-- 2 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S index 1fe944b..660bf8e 100644

[PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
encryption bit. This can cause random memory corruption when caches are flushed depending on which cacheline is written last. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/init.h |1 + arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h |8 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h

[PATCH v6 31/34] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
mapped encrypted then the VMA protection value is updated to remove the encryption bit. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/io.h |3 +++ arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 18 +- arch/x86/mm/pat.c |3 +++ 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions

[PATCH v6 29/34] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
tables. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 12 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h |2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 35 ++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c |3

[PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
Add warnings to let the user know when bounce buffers are being used for DMA when SME is active. Since the bounce buffers are not in encrypted memory, these notifications are to allow the user to determine some appropriate action - if necessary. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include

[PATCH v6 28/34] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
Since video memory needs to be accessed decrypted, be sure that the memory encryption mask is not set for the video ranges. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/vga.h | 14 +- arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c |2 ++ drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem.c|2

[PATCH v6 24/34] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/dma-mapping.h |5 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |5 +++ arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c | 11 +-- arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c|2 + arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c | 15 -- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c

[PATCH v6 22/34] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
mask range. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h |3 ++ arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c| 62 + 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h index ea

[PATCH v6 16/34] efi: Add an EFI table address match function

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
Add a function that will determine if a supplied physical address matches the address of an EFI table. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 33 + include/linux/efi.h|7 +++ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+) diff --git a

[PATCH v6 17/34] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
on to return a negative error value when no memmap entry is found. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/ia64/kernel/efi.c |4 ++-- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c |6 +++--- include/linux/efi.h |2 +- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/ia64/k

[PATCH v6 19/34] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
remapping, ioremap_cache() will be used instead, which will provide a decrypted mapping of the boot related data. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/io.h |4 + arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 179 + include/linux/io.h|2

[PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of the initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed properly. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 11 + arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h |3 + arch/x86/kernel/head64.c

[PATCH v6 15/34] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
Add a function that will return the E820 type associated with an address range. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/e820/api.h |2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/e820.c | 26 +++--- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86

[PATCH v6 11/34] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
encryption mask so that user-space allocations will automatically have the encryption mask applied. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/pagetable.c |7 + arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h|7 + arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 25

[PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
function is then used where a virtual address of the PGD needs to be created/used from the cr3 register. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h |9 + arch/x86/kernel/head64.c |2 +- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 10 +- arch/x86

[PATCH v6 05/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
When System Memory Encryption (SME) is enabled, the physical address space is reduced. Adjust the x86_phys_bits value to reflect this reduction. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 10 +++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86

[PATCH v6 08/34] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
routines depending on CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 61 - arch/x86/mm/Makefile |4 +-- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 26 +++ 3 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 5 deletions

[PATCH v6 06/34] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
Add support for Secure Memory Encryption (SME). This initial support provides a Kconfig entry to build the SME support into the kernel and defines the memory encryption mask that will be used in subsequent patches to mark pages as encrypted. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/Kconfig

[PATCH v6 02/34] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
For processors that support PAT, set the write-protect cache mode (_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP) entry to the actual write-protect value (x05). Acked-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/mm/pat.c |6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch

[PATCH v6 03/34] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
being mapped decrypted vs encrypted. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/dmi.h |8 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c |6 +++--- arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c | 34 +++--- arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c | 28 ++-- arch

[PATCH v6 01/34] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
Create a Documentation entry to describe the AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) feature and add documentation for the mem_encrypt= kernel parameter. Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 Documentation/x86/amd

[PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2017-06-07 Thread Tom Lendacky
reduction of physical address size of the processor. It is possible that BIOS could have configured resources resources into a range that will now not be addressable. To prevent this, rely on BIOS to set the SYSCFG[MEME] bit and only then enable memory encryption support in the ke

Re: [PATCH] amd-xgbe: use PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER in xgbe_map_rx_buffer

2017-06-02 Thread Tom Lendacky
Hocko Acked-by: Tom Lendacky --- drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-desc.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-desc.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-desc.c index b3bc87fe3764..0a98c369df20 100644 --- a/drivers

Re: strange PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER usage in xgbe_map_rx_buffer

2017-06-02 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/2/2017 9:43 AM, Michal Hocko wrote: On Fri 02-06-17 09:20:54, Tom Lendacky wrote: On 5/31/2017 11:04 AM, Michal Hocko wrote: Hi Tom, Hi Michal, I have stumbled over the following construct in xgbe_map_rx_buffer order = max_t(int, PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER - 1, 0); which looks

Re: strange PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER usage in xgbe_map_rx_buffer

2017-06-02 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 5/31/2017 11:04 AM, Michal Hocko wrote: Hi Tom, Hi Michal, I have stumbled over the following construct in xgbe_map_rx_buffer order = max_t(int, PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER - 1, 0); which looks quite suspicious. Why does it PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER - 1? And why do you depend on PAGE_ALL

Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption

2017-05-31 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 5/31/2017 3:49 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Tue, May 30, 2017 at 10:37:03AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: I can define the command line option and the "on" and "off" values as character buffers in the function and initialize them on a per character basis (using a static st

Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place

2017-05-31 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 5/31/2017 4:51 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Tue, May 30, 2017 at 11:39:07AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: Yes, it's from objtool: arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.o: warning: objtool: .text+0xd2: return instruction outside of a callable function Oh, well, let's make it a global symbol

Re: [PATCH v5 26/32] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings

2017-05-30 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 5/16/2017 12:35 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 04:20:56PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: Since video memory needs to be accessed decrypted, be sure that the memory encryption mask is not set for the video ranges. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/include/asm/vga.h

Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear

2017-05-30 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 5/26/2017 11:35 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Fri, May 26, 2017 at 11:22:36AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: In addition to the same issue as efi.memmap.phys_map, efi_phys has the __initdata attribute so it will be released/freed which will cause problems in checks performed afterwards. Sounds

Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME

2017-05-30 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 5/25/2017 11:17 PM, Xunlei Pang wrote: On 04/19/2017 at 05:21 AM, Tom Lendacky wrote: Provide support so that kexec can be used to boot a kernel when SME is enabled. Support is needed to allocate pages for kexec without encryption. This is needed in order to be able to reboot in the kernel

Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear

2017-05-30 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 5/21/2017 2:16 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 03:50:32PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: The "worker" function would be doing the loop through the setup data, but since the setup data is mapped inside the loop I can't do the __init calling the non-init function

Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place

2017-05-30 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 5/26/2017 11:25 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Thu, May 25, 2017 at 05:24:27PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: I guess I could do that, but this will probably only end up clearing a single PGD entry anyway since it's highly doubtful the address range would cross a 512GB boundary. Or yo

Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption

2017-05-30 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 5/19/2017 3:16 PM, Josh Poimboeuf wrote: On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 01:30:05PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote: it is called so early. I can get past it by adding: CFLAGS_mem_encrypt.o := $(nostackp) in the arch/x86/mm/Makefile, but that obviously eliminates the support for the whole file. Would

Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption

2017-05-30 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 5/19/2017 6:30 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 01:56:13PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: On 4/18/2017 4:22 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: Add support to check if SME has been enabled and if memory encryption should be activated (checking of command line option based on the

Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption

2017-05-30 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 5/30/2017 9:55 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Tue, May 30, 2017 at 09:38:36AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: >> In this case we're running identity mapped and the "on" constant ends up >> as kernel address (0x81...) which results in a segfault. > >

Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption

2017-05-30 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 5/19/2017 6:27 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 04:22:23PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: Add support to check if SME has been enabled and if memory encryption should be activated (checking of command line option based on the configuration of the default state). If memory

Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear

2017-05-26 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 5/18/2017 2:50 PM, Matt Fleming wrote: On Mon, 15 May, at 08:35:17PM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 04:19:21PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: + paddr = boot_params.efi_info.efi_memmap_hi; + paddr <<= 32; +

Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption

2017-05-26 Thread Tom Lendacky
, 2017 at 04:22:12PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: Add sysfs support for SME so that user-space utilities (kdump, etc.) can determine if SME is active. But why do user-space tools need to know that? I mean, when we load the kdump kernel, we do it with the first kernel, with the kexec_load() syscall

Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place

2017-05-25 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 5/18/2017 7:46 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 04:21:49PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: Add the support to encrypt the kernel in-place. This is done by creating new page mappings for the kernel - a decrypted write-protected mapping and an encrypted mapping. The kernel is

Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME

2017-05-19 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 5/19/2017 4:28 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 04:07:24PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: As long as those never change from static inline everything will be fine. I can change it, but I really like how it explicitly indicates I know what you want to do. But you&#x

Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME

2017-05-19 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 5/19/2017 3:58 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 03:45:28PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: Actually there is. The above will result in data in the cache because halt() turns into a function call if CONFIG_PARAVIRT is defined (refer to the comment above where do_wbinvd_halt is

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