On 4/15/19 5:34 PM, Takashi Iwai wrote:
> On Mon, 15 Apr 2019 21:35:17 +0200,
> Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
>>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> Friendly ping:
>>
>> Who can take this?
>
> All platforms that support ISA boards are so old and they don't suffer
> from Spectre at all.
>
Oh okay.
I'll take
On Mon, 15 Apr 2019 21:35:17 +0200,
Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
>
> Hi all,
>
> Friendly ping:
>
> Who can take this?
All platforms that support ISA boards are so old and they don't suffer
from Spectre at all.
thanks,
Takashi
>
> Thanks
> --
> Gustavo
>
> On 3/26/19 1:32 PM, Gustavo A.
Hi all,
Friendly ping:
Who can take this?
Thanks
--
Gustavo
On 3/26/19 1:32 PM, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> header->number and i are indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading
> to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>
> This issue was detected with the
header->number and i are indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading
to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c:792 wavefront_send_patch() warn:
potential spectre issue
On 12/20/18 11:35 AM, Takashi Iwai wrote:
Well, no, my question is whether it makes sense to patch the code path
for such ISA drivers. Spectre seems applicable since the model around
2006 or so, and ISA slot has been already dead for very long time.
And yet with this minor board... I bet
On Thu, 20 Dec 2018 18:13:31 +0100,
Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
>
> On 12/20/18 2:11 AM, Takashi Iwai wrote:
> > On Thu, 20 Dec 2018 00:31:43 +0100,
> > Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> >>
> >> header->number is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading
> >> to a potential exploitation of
On 12/20/18 2:11 AM, Takashi Iwai wrote:
On Thu, 20 Dec 2018 00:31:43 +0100,
Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
header->number is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading
to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of
On Thu, 20 Dec 2018 00:31:43 +0100,
Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
>
> header->number is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading
> to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>
>
header->number is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading
to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c:792 wavefront_send_patch() warn:
potential spectre issue
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