Re: [PATCH] prctl: fix validation of an address

> > The kernel makes the decision on what is valid via security_mmap_addr(). > Assuming there are no security fears of an untrusted application > tricking some priviledged application to set up these maps the answer is > just calling security_mmap_addr() instead of doing if(addr < > mmap_min_addr)

Re: [PATCH] prctl: fix validation of an address

The kernel makes the decision on what is valid via security_mmap_addr(). Assuming there are no security fears of an untrusted application tricking some priviledged application to set up these maps the answer is just calling security_mmap_addr() instead of doing if(addr mmap_min_addr) return

Re: [PATCH] prctl: fix validation of an address

Quoting Cyrill Gorcunov (gorcu...@openvz.org): > > The kernel makes the decision on what is valid via security_mmap_addr(). > > Assuming there are no security fears of an untrusted application > > tricking some priviledged application to set up these maps the answer is > > just calling

Re: [PATCH] prctl: fix validation of an address

On Mon, Dec 31, 2012 at 10:20:47AM -0500, Eric Paris wrote: > > Is there anything which prevents an unpriv application from changing > mm.mm_start_code and mm.mm_end_code in the image, thus taking advantage > of the privileged restore code to bypass the mmap_min_addr > restrictions? Well, you

Re: [PATCH] prctl: fix validation of an address

On Mon, 2012-12-31 at 19:13 +0400, Cyrill Gorcunov wrote: > On Mon, Dec 31, 2012 at 09:27:14AM -0500, Eric Paris wrote: > > On Mon, 2012-12-31 at 14:14 +0400, Andrew Vagin wrote: > > > On Sun, Dec 30, 2012 at 05:03:07PM -0500, Eric Paris wrote: > > > > On Sat, 2012-12-29 at 15:00 +0400, Andrey

Re: [PATCH] prctl: fix validation of an address

On Mon, Dec 31, 2012 at 09:27:14AM -0500, Eric Paris wrote: > On Mon, 2012-12-31 at 14:14 +0400, Andrew Vagin wrote: > > On Sun, Dec 30, 2012 at 05:03:07PM -0500, Eric Paris wrote: > > > On Sat, 2012-12-29 at 15:00 +0400, Andrey Vagin wrote: > > > > The address should be bigger than

Re: [PATCH] prctl: fix validation of an address

On Mon, 2012-12-31 at 14:14 +0400, Andrew Vagin wrote: > On Sun, Dec 30, 2012 at 05:03:07PM -0500, Eric Paris wrote: > > On Sat, 2012-12-29 at 15:00 +0400, Andrey Vagin wrote: > > > The address should be bigger than dac_mmap_min_addr, because > > > a process with CAP_RAWIO can map a vma bellow

Re: [PATCH] prctl: fix validation of an address

On Sun, Dec 30, 2012 at 05:03:07PM -0500, Eric Paris wrote: > On Sat, 2012-12-29 at 15:00 +0400, Andrey Vagin wrote: > > The address should be bigger than dac_mmap_min_addr, because > > a process with CAP_RAWIO can map a vma bellow mmap_min_addr. > > NAK Currently prctl(PR_SET_MM_*, addr, )

Re: [PATCH] prctl: fix validation of an address

On Sun, Dec 30, 2012 at 05:03:07PM -0500, Eric Paris wrote: On Sat, 2012-12-29 at 15:00 +0400, Andrey Vagin wrote: The address should be bigger than dac_mmap_min_addr, because a process with CAP_RAWIO can map a vma bellow mmap_min_addr. NAK Currently prctl(PR_SET_MM_*, addr, ) returns

Re: [PATCH] prctl: fix validation of an address

On Mon, 2012-12-31 at 14:14 +0400, Andrew Vagin wrote: On Sun, Dec 30, 2012 at 05:03:07PM -0500, Eric Paris wrote: On Sat, 2012-12-29 at 15:00 +0400, Andrey Vagin wrote: The address should be bigger than dac_mmap_min_addr, because a process with CAP_RAWIO can map a vma bellow

Re: [PATCH] prctl: fix validation of an address

On Mon, Dec 31, 2012 at 09:27:14AM -0500, Eric Paris wrote: On Mon, 2012-12-31 at 14:14 +0400, Andrew Vagin wrote: On Sun, Dec 30, 2012 at 05:03:07PM -0500, Eric Paris wrote: On Sat, 2012-12-29 at 15:00 +0400, Andrey Vagin wrote: The address should be bigger than dac_mmap_min_addr,

Re: [PATCH] prctl: fix validation of an address

On Mon, 2012-12-31 at 19:13 +0400, Cyrill Gorcunov wrote: On Mon, Dec 31, 2012 at 09:27:14AM -0500, Eric Paris wrote: On Mon, 2012-12-31 at 14:14 +0400, Andrew Vagin wrote: On Sun, Dec 30, 2012 at 05:03:07PM -0500, Eric Paris wrote: On Sat, 2012-12-29 at 15:00 +0400, Andrey Vagin wrote:

Re: [PATCH] prctl: fix validation of an address

On Mon, Dec 31, 2012 at 10:20:47AM -0500, Eric Paris wrote: Is there anything which prevents an unpriv application from changing mm.mm_start_code and mm.mm_end_code in the image, thus taking advantage of the privileged restore code to bypass the mmap_min_addr restrictions? Well, you can

Re: [PATCH] prctl: fix validation of an address

Quoting Cyrill Gorcunov (gorcu...@openvz.org): The kernel makes the decision on what is valid via security_mmap_addr(). Assuming there are no security fears of an untrusted application tricking some priviledged application to set up these maps the answer is just calling

Re: [PATCH] prctl: fix validation of an address

On Sat, 2012-12-29 at 15:00 +0400, Andrey Vagin wrote: > The address should be bigger than dac_mmap_min_addr, because > a process with CAP_RAWIO can map a vma bellow mmap_min_addr. NAK This doesn't make any sense. dac_mmap_min_addr should ONLY be used in security/min_addr.c and

Re: [PATCH] prctl: fix validation of an address

On Sat, 2012-12-29 at 15:00 +0400, Andrey Vagin wrote: The address should be bigger than dac_mmap_min_addr, because a process with CAP_RAWIO can map a vma bellow mmap_min_addr. NAK This doesn't make any sense. dac_mmap_min_addr should ONLY be used in security/min_addr.c and

[PATCH] prctl: fix validation of an address

The address should be bigger than dac_mmap_min_addr, because a process with CAP_RAWIO can map a vma bellow mmap_min_addr. Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov Cc: Serge Hallyn Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Eric Paris Cc: James Morris Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin ---

[PATCH] prctl: fix validation of an address

The address should be bigger than dac_mmap_min_addr, because a process with CAP_RAWIO can map a vma bellow mmap_min_addr. Cc: Andrew Morton a...@linux-foundation.org Cc: Kees Cook keesc...@chromium.org Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov gorcu...@openvz.org Cc: Serge Hallyn serge.hal...@canonical.com Cc: Eric W.