Re: [PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama

2012-09-02 Thread Jiri Kosina
On Fri, 31 Aug 2012, Kees Cook wrote: > Given that several distros use (or want to use) Yama, I think that's > reason enough for this. I think it's important for us to take a > practical approach here, and having the big LSMs each hook Yama instead > of doing this in a single global place will

Re: [PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama

2012-09-02 Thread Jiri Kosina
On Fri, 31 Aug 2012, Kees Cook wrote: Given that several distros use (or want to use) Yama, I think that's reason enough for this. I think it's important for us to take a practical approach here, and having the big LSMs each hook Yama instead of doing this in a single global place will

Re: [PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama

2012-08-31 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Kees Cook writes: > On Fri, Aug 31, 2012 at 8:31 PM, Eric W. Biederman > wrote: >> Eric Paris writes: >> >>> On Fri, Aug 31, 2012 at 4:59 PM, Eric W. Biederman >>> wrote: >>> >> Having taken the time now to vet Yama ugh. Having Yama enabled if >> simply compiled in breaks using gdb to attach

Re: [PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama

2012-08-31 Thread Kees Cook
On Fri, Aug 31, 2012 at 8:31 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > Eric Paris writes: > >> On Fri, Aug 31, 2012 at 4:59 PM, Eric W. Biederman >> wrote: >> >>> From a overal kernel maintenance and use perspective the unconditional >>> enablement is a pain. >>> >>> We long ago established the principle

Re: [PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama

2012-08-31 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Eric Paris writes: > On Fri, Aug 31, 2012 at 4:59 PM, Eric W. Biederman > wrote: > >> From a overal kernel maintenance and use perspective the unconditional >> enablement is a pain. >> >> We long ago established the principle that compiling additional code >> into the kernel should not change

Re: [PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama

2012-08-31 Thread Eric Paris
On Fri, Aug 31, 2012 at 4:59 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > From a overal kernel maintenance and use perspective the unconditional > enablement is a pain. > > We long ago established the principle that compiling additional code > into the kernel should not change the semenatics of the kernel. >

Re: [PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama

2012-08-31 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Eric Paris writes: > On Fri, Aug 31, 2012 at 2:39 PM, Alan Cox wrote: >> On Fri, 31 Aug 2012 14:31:26 -0700 >> Kees Cook wrote: >> >>> Unconditionally call Yama, no matter what LSM module is selected. > >> Not a good plan. What happens when everyone decides to stack every module >> by

Re: [PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama

2012-08-31 Thread Eric Paris
On Fri, Aug 31, 2012 at 2:39 PM, Alan Cox wrote: > On Fri, 31 Aug 2012 14:31:26 -0700 > Kees Cook wrote: > >> Unconditionally call Yama, no matter what LSM module is selected. > Not a good plan. What happens when everyone decides to stack every module > by ifdeffing in the kernel - mayhem. I'm

Re: [PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama

2012-08-31 Thread Alan Cox
On Fri, 31 Aug 2012 14:31:26 -0700 Kees Cook wrote: > Unconditionally call Yama, no matter what LSM module is selected. > > Ubuntu and Chrome OS already carry patches to do this, and Fedora has > voiced interest in doing this as well. Instead of having everyone carry > these patches, just

[PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama

2012-08-31 Thread Kees Cook
Unconditionally call Yama, no matter what LSM module is selected. Ubuntu and Chrome OS already carry patches to do this, and Fedora has voiced interest in doing this as well. Instead of having everyone carry these patches, just switch Yama to being unconditional when compiled into the kernel.

[PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama

2012-08-31 Thread Kees Cook
Unconditionally call Yama, no matter what LSM module is selected. Ubuntu and Chrome OS already carry patches to do this, and Fedora has voiced interest in doing this as well. Instead of having everyone carry these patches, just switch Yama to being unconditional when compiled into the kernel.

Re: [PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama

2012-08-31 Thread Alan Cox
On Fri, 31 Aug 2012 14:31:26 -0700 Kees Cook keesc...@chromium.org wrote: Unconditionally call Yama, no matter what LSM module is selected. Ubuntu and Chrome OS already carry patches to do this, and Fedora has voiced interest in doing this as well. Instead of having everyone carry these

Re: [PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama

2012-08-31 Thread Eric Paris
On Fri, Aug 31, 2012 at 2:39 PM, Alan Cox a...@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk wrote: On Fri, 31 Aug 2012 14:31:26 -0700 Kees Cook keesc...@chromium.org wrote: Unconditionally call Yama, no matter what LSM module is selected. Not a good plan. What happens when everyone decides to stack every module by

Re: [PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama

2012-08-31 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Eric Paris epa...@parisplace.org writes: On Fri, Aug 31, 2012 at 2:39 PM, Alan Cox a...@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk wrote: On Fri, 31 Aug 2012 14:31:26 -0700 Kees Cook keesc...@chromium.org wrote: Unconditionally call Yama, no matter what LSM module is selected. Not a good plan. What happens when

Re: [PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama

2012-08-31 Thread Eric Paris
On Fri, Aug 31, 2012 at 4:59 PM, Eric W. Biederman ebied...@xmission.com wrote: From a overal kernel maintenance and use perspective the unconditional enablement is a pain. We long ago established the principle that compiling additional code into the kernel should not change the semenatics

Re: [PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama

2012-08-31 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Eric Paris epa...@parisplace.org writes: On Fri, Aug 31, 2012 at 4:59 PM, Eric W. Biederman ebied...@xmission.com wrote: From a overal kernel maintenance and use perspective the unconditional enablement is a pain. We long ago established the principle that compiling additional code into

Re: [PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama

2012-08-31 Thread Kees Cook
On Fri, Aug 31, 2012 at 8:31 PM, Eric W. Biederman ebied...@xmission.com wrote: Eric Paris epa...@parisplace.org writes: On Fri, Aug 31, 2012 at 4:59 PM, Eric W. Biederman ebied...@xmission.com wrote: From a overal kernel maintenance and use perspective the unconditional enablement is a

Re: [PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama

2012-08-31 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Kees Cook keesc...@chromium.org writes: On Fri, Aug 31, 2012 at 8:31 PM, Eric W. Biederman ebied...@xmission.com wrote: Eric Paris epa...@parisplace.org writes: On Fri, Aug 31, 2012 at 4:59 PM, Eric W. Biederman ebied...@xmission.com wrote: Having taken the time now to vet Yama ugh.