Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table->de

2007-01-30 Thread Casey Schaufler
--- Christoph Hellwig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Mon, Jan 29, 2007 at 11:08:39AM -0800, Casey > Schaufler wrote: > > Alternativly you could move the SELinux specific > > bits out of /proc/self/attr into an equivalent > > /selinux/self/attr and avoid that /proc > dependency. > > Why? To

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table->de

2007-01-30 Thread Christoph Hellwig
On Mon, Jan 29, 2007 at 11:08:39AM -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote: > Alternativly you could move the SELinux specific > bits out of /proc/self/attr into an equivalent > /selinux/self/attr and avoid that /proc dependency. Why? procfs is essential for any kind of fullblown linux system, and the

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table->de

2007-01-30 Thread Russell Coker
On Tuesday 30 January 2007 05:43, Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > True, but a system that disables proc is likely a system with a custom > policy anyway, In practice we have to extensively customise policy long before getting to the non-proc stage of optimising for small hardware.

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table-de

2007-01-30 Thread Russell Coker
On Tuesday 30 January 2007 05:43, Stephen Smalley [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: True, but a system that disables proc is likely a system with a custom policy anyway, In practice we have to extensively customise policy long before getting to the non-proc stage of optimising for small hardware. The

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table-de

2007-01-30 Thread Christoph Hellwig
On Mon, Jan 29, 2007 at 11:08:39AM -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote: Alternativly you could move the SELinux specific bits out of /proc/self/attr into an equivalent /selinux/self/attr and avoid that /proc dependency. Why? procfs is essential for any kind of fullblown linux system, and the selinux

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table-de

2007-01-30 Thread Casey Schaufler
--- Christoph Hellwig [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Mon, Jan 29, 2007 at 11:08:39AM -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote: Alternativly you could move the SELinux specific bits out of /proc/self/attr into an equivalent /selinux/self/attr and avoid that /proc dependency. Why? To avoid the

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table->de

2007-01-29 Thread Stephen Smalley
On Mon, 2007-01-29 at 11:08 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote: > --- Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > True, but a system that disables proc is likely a > > system with a custom > > policy anyway, and dependency on proc is fairly > > basic to selinux these > > days (due to reliance on

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table->de

2007-01-29 Thread Stephen Smalley
On Mon, 2007-01-29 at 10:55 -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > > On Mon, 29 Jan 2007, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > > >> NAK. Mapping all sysctls to a single security label prevents any kind > >> of fine-grained security on sysctls, and current policies

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table->de

2007-01-29 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >> > If the ctl_table supplied more information about the functional purpose >> > and the security sensitivity of the sysctl, then we could leverage that >> > information instead, as long as we can at least derive the current >> > labelings from that

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table->de

2007-01-29 Thread Casey Schaufler
--- Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > True, but a system that disables proc is likely a > system with a custom > policy anyway, and dependency on proc is fairly > basic to selinux these > days (due to reliance on /proc/self/attr for process > attribute > manipulation in place of the

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table->de

2007-01-29 Thread Stephen Smalley
On Mon, 2007-01-29 at 10:43 -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > > On Sun, 2007-01-28 at 12:21 -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > >> With the sysctl cleanups sysctl is not really a part of proc > >> it just shows up there, and any path based approach

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table->de

2007-01-29 Thread Eric W. Biederman
James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > On Mon, 29 Jan 2007, Stephen Smalley wrote: > >> NAK. Mapping all sysctls to a single security label prevents any kind >> of fine-grained security on sysctls, and current policies already make >> use of the current distinctions to limit access to

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table->de

2007-01-29 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > On Sun, 2007-01-28 at 12:21 -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> With the sysctl cleanups sysctl is not really a part of proc >> it just shows up there, and any path based approach will not >> adequately describe the data as sysctl is essentially a >>

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table->de

2007-01-29 Thread James Morris
On Mon, 29 Jan 2007, Stephen Smalley wrote: > NAK. Mapping all sysctls to a single security label prevents any kind > of fine-grained security on sysctls, and current policies already make > use of the current distinctions to limit access to particular sets of > sysctls to particular processes.

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table->de

2007-01-29 Thread Stephen Smalley
On Sun, 2007-01-28 at 12:21 -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > With the sysctl cleanups sysctl is not really a part of proc > it just shows up there, and any path based approach will not > adequately describe the data as sysctl is essentially a > union mount underneath the covers. As designed this

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table-de

2007-01-29 Thread Stephen Smalley
On Sun, 2007-01-28 at 12:21 -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: With the sysctl cleanups sysctl is not really a part of proc it just shows up there, and any path based approach will not adequately describe the data as sysctl is essentially a union mount underneath the covers. As designed this

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table-de

2007-01-29 Thread James Morris
On Mon, 29 Jan 2007, Stephen Smalley wrote: NAK. Mapping all sysctls to a single security label prevents any kind of fine-grained security on sysctls, and current policies already make use of the current distinctions to limit access to particular sets of sysctls to particular processes. As

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table-de

2007-01-29 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Stephen Smalley [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: On Sun, 2007-01-28 at 12:21 -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: With the sysctl cleanups sysctl is not really a part of proc it just shows up there, and any path based approach will not adequately describe the data as sysctl is essentially a union mount

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table-de

2007-01-29 Thread Eric W. Biederman
James Morris [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: On Mon, 29 Jan 2007, Stephen Smalley wrote: NAK. Mapping all sysctls to a single security label prevents any kind of fine-grained security on sysctls, and current policies already make use of the current distinctions to limit access to particular sets

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table-de

2007-01-29 Thread Stephen Smalley
On Mon, 2007-01-29 at 10:43 -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: Stephen Smalley [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: On Sun, 2007-01-28 at 12:21 -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: With the sysctl cleanups sysctl is not really a part of proc it just shows up there, and any path based approach will not

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table-de

2007-01-29 Thread Casey Schaufler
--- Stephen Smalley [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: True, but a system that disables proc is likely a system with a custom policy anyway, and dependency on proc is fairly basic to selinux these days (due to reliance on /proc/self/attr for process attribute manipulation in place of the old

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table-de

2007-01-29 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Stephen Smalley [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: If the ctl_table supplied more information about the functional purpose and the security sensitivity of the sysctl, then we could leverage that information instead, as long as we can at least derive the current labelings from that information for

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table-de

2007-01-29 Thread Stephen Smalley
On Mon, 2007-01-29 at 10:55 -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: James Morris [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: On Mon, 29 Jan 2007, Stephen Smalley wrote: NAK. Mapping all sysctls to a single security label prevents any kind of fine-grained security on sysctls, and current policies already make

Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table-de

2007-01-29 Thread Stephen Smalley
On Mon, 2007-01-29 at 11:08 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote: --- Stephen Smalley [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: True, but a system that disables proc is likely a system with a custom policy anyway, and dependency on proc is fairly basic to selinux these days (due to reliance on /proc/self/attr

[PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table->de

2007-01-28 Thread Eric W. Biederman
With the sysctl cleanups sysctl is not really a part of proc it just shows up there, and any path based approach will not adequately describe the data as sysctl is essentially a union mount underneath the covers. As designed this mechanism is viewer dependent so trying to be path based gets even

[PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table-de

2007-01-28 Thread Eric W. Biederman
With the sysctl cleanups sysctl is not really a part of proc it just shows up there, and any path based approach will not adequately describe the data as sysctl is essentially a union mount underneath the covers. As designed this mechanism is viewer dependent so trying to be path based gets even