On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 01:02:56PM -0400, Rich Felker wrote:
> Would you be happy with a pair of patches where the first blocks chmod
> of symlinks in chmod_common and the second adds the syscall with
> flags? I think this is a clearly understandable fix, but it does
> eliminate the ability to *fix
From: Rich Felker
> Sent: 10 September 2020 15:24
...
> index 9af548fb841b..570a21f4d81e 100644
> --- a/fs/open.c
> +++ b/fs/open.c
> @@ -610,15 +610,30 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fchmod, unsigned int, fd, umode_t, mode)
> return err;
> }
>
> -static int do_fchmodat(int dfd, const char __user *file
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 04:18:28PM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 10:23:37AM -0400, Rich Felker wrote:
>
> > It was determined (see glibc issue #14578 and commit a492b1e5ef) that,
> > on some filesystems, performing chmod on the link itself produces a
> > change in the inode's acc
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 10:23:37AM -0400, Rich Felker wrote:
> POSIX defines fchmodat as having a 4th argument, flags, that can be
> AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW. Support for changing the access mode of symbolic
> links is optional (EOPNOTSUPP allowed if not supported), but this flag
> is important even on
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 05:42:34PM +0100, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 12:39:50PM -0400, Rich Felker wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 05:20:59PM +0100, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> > > On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 10:23:37AM -0400, Rich Felker wrote:
> > > > userspace emulation don
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 12:39:50PM -0400, Rich Felker wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 05:20:59PM +0100, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 10:23:37AM -0400, Rich Felker wrote:
> > > userspace emulation done in libc implementations. No change is made to
> > > the underlying chmod_
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 05:20:59PM +0100, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 10:23:37AM -0400, Rich Felker wrote:
> > userspace emulation done in libc implementations. No change is made to
> > the underlying chmod_common(), so it's still possible to attempt
> > changes via procfs, i
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 06:16:15PM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 10:23:37AM -0400, Rich Felker wrote:
> > POSIX defines fchmodat as having a 4th argument, flags, that can be
> > AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW. Support for changing the access mode of symbolic
> > links is optional (EOPNOTSUPP
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 10:23:37AM -0400, Rich Felker wrote:
> userspace emulation done in libc implementations. No change is made to
> the underlying chmod_common(), so it's still possible to attempt
> changes via procfs, if desired.
And that is the goddamn problem. We need to fix that _first_.
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 10:23:37AM -0400, Rich Felker wrote:
> It was determined (see glibc issue #14578 and commit a492b1e5ef) that,
> on some filesystems, performing chmod on the link itself produces a
> change in the inode's access mode, but returns an EOPNOTSUPP error.
Which filesystem types
POSIX defines fchmodat as having a 4th argument, flags, that can be
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW. Support for changing the access mode of symbolic
links is optional (EOPNOTSUPP allowed if not supported), but this flag
is important even on systems where symlinks do not have access modes,
since it's the only
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