Re: [PATCH 1/4] SROP mitigation: Architecture independent code for signal canaries

2014-05-19 Thread Andy Lutomirski
On 05/15/2014 02:09 PM, Erik Bosman wrote: > > Architecture independent code for signal canaries > > Add support for canary values in user-space signal frames. These canaries > function much like stack canaries/cookies, making it harder for an attacker to > fake a call to {rt_,}sigreturn() > >

Re: [PATCH 1/4] SROP mitigation: Architecture independent code for signal canaries

2014-05-19 Thread Andy Lutomirski
On 05/15/2014 02:09 PM, Erik Bosman wrote: Architecture independent code for signal canaries Add support for canary values in user-space signal frames. These canaries function much like stack canaries/cookies, making it harder for an attacker to fake a call to {rt_,}sigreturn() This

[PATCH 1/4] SROP mitigation: Architecture independent code for signal canaries

2014-05-15 Thread Erik Bosman
Architecture independent code for signal canaries Add support for canary values in user-space signal frames. These canaries function much like stack canaries/cookies, making it harder for an attacker to fake a call to {rt_,}sigreturn() This patch deals with architecture independent changes

[PATCH 1/4] SROP mitigation: Architecture independent code for signal canaries

2014-05-15 Thread Erik Bosman
Architecture independent code for signal canaries Add support for canary values in user-space signal frames. These canaries function much like stack canaries/cookies, making it harder for an attacker to fake a call to {rt_,}sigreturn() This patch deals with architecture independent changes