Re: [PATCH 5/6] bluetooth/smp: use constant time memory comparison for secret values

2017-06-10 Thread Marcel Holtmann
Hi Jason, > This file is filled with complex cryptography. Thus, the comparisons of > MACs and secret keys and curve points and so forth should not add timing > attacks, which could either result in a direct forgery, or, given the > complexity, some other type of attack. > > Signed-off-by: Jason

Re: [PATCH 5/6] bluetooth/smp: use constant time memory comparison for secret values

2017-06-10 Thread Marcel Holtmann
Hi Jason, > This file is filled with complex cryptography. Thus, the comparisons of > MACs and secret keys and curve points and so forth should not add timing > attacks, which could either result in a direct forgery, or, given the > complexity, some other type of attack. > > Signed-off-by: Jason

[PATCH 5/6] bluetooth/smp: use constant time memory comparison for secret values

2017-06-09 Thread Jason A. Donenfeld
This file is filled with complex cryptography. Thus, the comparisons of MACs and secret keys and curve points and so forth should not add timing attacks, which could either result in a direct forgery, or, given the complexity, some other type of attack. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld

[PATCH 5/6] bluetooth/smp: use constant time memory comparison for secret values

2017-06-09 Thread Jason A. Donenfeld
This file is filled with complex cryptography. Thus, the comparisons of MACs and secret keys and curve points and so forth should not add timing attacks, which could either result in a direct forgery, or, given the complexity, some other type of attack. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Cc: