On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 05:08:48PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 08:08:55PM +, Woodhouse, David wrote:
> > On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 21:05 +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> > > >
> > > > From: David Woodhouse
On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 05:08:48PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 08:08:55PM +, Woodhouse, David wrote:
> > On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 21:05 +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> > > >
> > > > From: David Woodhouse
> >
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 08:08:55PM +, Woodhouse, David wrote:
> On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 21:05 +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> > >
> > > From: David Woodhouse
> > >
> > > We are impervious to the indirect branch
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 08:08:55PM +, Woodhouse, David wrote:
> On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 21:05 +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> > >
> > > From: David Woodhouse
> > >
> > > We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with
> > >
On Thu, 4 Jan 2018, Tim Chen wrote:
> #ifdef APM_ZERO_SEGS
> #define APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS \
> "pushl %%ds\n\t" \
> @@ -28,6 +30,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in,
> u32 ecx_in,
> u32 *eax, u32 *ebx, u32 *ecx,
>
On Thu, 4 Jan 2018, Tim Chen wrote:
> #ifdef APM_ZERO_SEGS
> #define APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS \
> "pushl %%ds\n\t" \
> @@ -28,6 +30,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in,
> u32 ecx_in,
> u32 *eax, u32 *ebx, u32 *ecx,
>
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
> b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
> index 28b0314..23b2804 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
> @@ -113,5 +113,42 @@ static inline
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
> b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
> index 28b0314..23b2804 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
> @@ -113,5 +113,42 @@ static inline
On 01/04/2018 12:51 PM, Yves-Alexis Perez wrote:
> On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 09:56 -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
>> @@ -44,6 +47,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in,
>> u32 ecx_in,
>> "=S" (*esi)
>> : "a" (func), "b" (ebx_in), "c" (ecx_in)
>>
On 01/04/2018 12:51 PM, Yves-Alexis Perez wrote:
> On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 09:56 -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
>> @@ -44,6 +47,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in,
>> u32 ecx_in,
>> "=S" (*esi)
>> : "a" (func), "b" (ebx_in), "c" (ecx_in)
>>
On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 09:56 -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> @@ -44,6 +47,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in,
> u32 ecx_in,
> "=S" (*esi)
> : "a" (func), "b" (ebx_in), "c" (ecx_in)
> : "memory", "cc");
> +
On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 09:56 -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> @@ -44,6 +47,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in,
> u32 ecx_in,
> "=S" (*esi)
> : "a" (func), "b" (ebx_in), "c" (ecx_in)
> : "memory", "cc");
> +
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:05:15PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> > From: David Woodhouse
> >
> > We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with retpoline
> > but firmware won't be, so we still
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:05:15PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> > From: David Woodhouse
> >
> > We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with retpoline
> > but firmware won't be, so we still need to set IBRS to
On 04/01/18 20:05, Greg KH wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
>> From: David Woodhouse
>>
>> We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with retpoline
>> but firmware won't be, so we still need to set IBRS to protect
>> firmware
On 04/01/18 20:05, Greg KH wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
>> From: David Woodhouse
>>
>> We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with retpoline
>> but firmware won't be, so we still need to set IBRS to protect
>> firmware code execution when
On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 21:05 +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> >
> > From: David Woodhouse
> >
> > We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with
> > retpoline
> > but firmware won't be, so we still need to set
On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 21:05 +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> >
> > From: David Woodhouse
> >
> > We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with
> > retpoline
> > but firmware won't be, so we still need to set IBRS to protect
>
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> From: David Woodhouse
>
> We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with retpoline
> but firmware won't be, so we still need to set IBRS to protect
> firmware code execution when calling into firmware
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> From: David Woodhouse
>
> We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with retpoline
> but firmware won't be, so we still need to set IBRS to protect
> firmware code execution when calling into firmware at runtime.
Wait,
On Thu, 4 Jan 2018 09:56:46 -0800
Tim Chen wrote:
> From: David Woodhouse
>
> We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with retpoline
> but firmware won't be, so we still need to set IBRS to protect
> firmware code execution
On Thu, 4 Jan 2018 09:56:46 -0800
Tim Chen wrote:
> From: David Woodhouse
>
> We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with retpoline
> but firmware won't be, so we still need to set IBRS to protect
> firmware code execution when calling into firmware at runtime.
If you are
From: David Woodhouse
We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with retpoline
but firmware won't be, so we still need to set IBRS to protect
firmware code execution when calling into firmware at runtime.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse
From: David Woodhouse
We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with retpoline
but firmware won't be, so we still need to set IBRS to protect
firmware code execution when calling into firmware at runtime.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen
---
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