On Wed, 2019-07-31 at 14:52 -0400, Doug Ledford wrote:
> On Wed, 2019-07-31 at 12:52 -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> > This is insufficient. The speculation windows are large:
> >
> > "Speculative execution on modern CPUs can run several
> > hundred instructions ahead." [1]
> >
> > [
On Wed, 2019-07-31 at 12:52 -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> This is insufficient. The speculation windows are large:
>
> "Speculative execution on modern CPUs can run several
> hundred instructions ahead." [1]
>
> [1] https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf
Thanks, I'll take a look at
On 7/31/19 9:52 AM, Doug Ledford wrote:
>
> I'm not sure this is the best fix for this. However, here is where I
> get to admit that I largely ignored the whole Spectre V1 thing, so I'm
> not sure I completely understand the vulnerability and the limits to
> that. But, looking at the functio
On Tue, 2019-07-30 at 21:39 -0700, Luck, Tony wrote:
> Some processors may mispredict an array bounds check and
> speculatively access memory that they should not. With
> a user supplied array index we like to play things safe
> by masking the value with the array size before it is
> used as an ind
Some processors may mispredict an array bounds check and
speculatively access memory that they should not. With
a user supplied array index we like to play things safe
by masking the value with the array size before it is
used as an index.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck
---
V2: Mask the index *AFTER
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