On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 04:33:13PM -0700, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Wed, 2017-11-01 at 10:16 +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > Cool, thanks Joe I'll keep this in mind for when we get to %pa.
>
> fyi: There are more of these misuses of 0x%pa now:
>
> $ git grep -E -n "0[xX]%pa[dp]?\b"
>
On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 04:33:13PM -0700, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Wed, 2017-11-01 at 10:16 +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > Cool, thanks Joe I'll keep this in mind for when we get to %pa.
>
> fyi: There are more of these misuses of 0x%pa now:
>
> $ git grep -E -n "0[xX]%pa[dp]?\b"
>
On (11/02/17 21:14), Tobin C. Harding wrote:
[..]
> I can put my email address if there is not a better option.
sounds good.
> > hm... just a huge pile of if's
> >
> > if (is_vmalloc_addr(addr))
> > do_hashing(addr);
> > else if (__module_address(addr))
> >
On (11/02/17 21:14), Tobin C. Harding wrote:
[..]
> I can put my email address if there is not a better option.
sounds good.
> > hm... just a huge pile of if's
> >
> > if (is_vmalloc_addr(addr))
> > do_hashing(addr);
> > else if (__module_address(addr))
> >
..@hellion.org.uk>; Catalin
> Marinas
> <catalin.mari...@arm.com>; Will Deacon <wilal.dea...@arm.com>; Steven
> Rostedt <rost...@goodmis.org>; Chris Fries <cfr...@google.com>; Dave
> Weinstein <olo...@google.com>; Daniel Micay <danielmi...@gmail.com>; Dja
y ; Djalal
> Harouni ; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Subject: Re: [PATCH V8 0/2] printk: hash addresses printed with %p
>
> On Thu, Nov 02, 2017 at 05:23:44PM +0900, Sergey Senozhatsky wrote:
> > On (11/01/17 10:35), Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > [..]
> > > Yes. The qu
On Thu, Nov 02, 2017 at 05:23:44PM +0900, Sergey Senozhatsky wrote:
> On (11/01/17 10:35), Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> [..]
> > Yes. The question has been raised will we be here again in 6 years time
> > trying to fix all the uses of %x. And there are already 29K uses of
> > %[xX] in tree, which of
On Thu, Nov 02, 2017 at 05:23:44PM +0900, Sergey Senozhatsky wrote:
> On (11/01/17 10:35), Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> [..]
> > Yes. The question has been raised will we be here again in 6 years time
> > trying to fix all the uses of %x. And there are already 29K uses of
> > %[xX] in tree, which of
On (11/01/17 10:35), Tobin C. Harding wrote:
[..]
> Yes. The question has been raised will we be here again in 6 years time
> trying to fix all the uses of %x. And there are already 29K uses of
> %[xX] in tree, which of these are leaking addresses? This is why Linus'
> has commented that really
On (11/01/17 10:35), Tobin C. Harding wrote:
[..]
> Yes. The question has been raised will we be here again in 6 years time
> trying to fix all the uses of %x. And there are already 29K uses of
> %[xX] in tree, which of these are leaking addresses? This is why Linus'
> has commented that really
On Fri, Oct 27, 2017 at 10:33:01PM +0900, Sergey Senozhatsky wrote:
> On (10/26/17 13:53), Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > Currently there are many places in the kernel where addresses are being
> > printed using an unadorned %p. Kernel pointers should be printed using
> > %pK allowing some control
On Fri, Oct 27, 2017 at 10:33:01PM +0900, Sergey Senozhatsky wrote:
> On (10/26/17 13:53), Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > Currently there are many places in the kernel where addresses are being
> > printed using an unadorned %p. Kernel pointers should be printed using
> > %pK allowing some control
On Wed, 2017-11-01 at 10:16 +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 07:08:48PM -0700, Joe Perches wrote:
> > On Tue, 2017-10-31 at 09:33 +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > > On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 03:03:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 7:53 PM, Tobin
On Wed, 2017-11-01 at 10:16 +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 07:08:48PM -0700, Joe Perches wrote:
> > On Tue, 2017-10-31 at 09:33 +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > > On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 03:03:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 7:53 PM, Tobin
On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 07:08:48PM -0700, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Tue, 2017-10-31 at 09:33 +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 03:03:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 7:53 PM, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > > > Here is the behaviour that
On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 07:08:48PM -0700, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Tue, 2017-10-31 at 09:33 +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 03:03:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 7:53 PM, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > > > Here is the behaviour that this set
On Tue, 2017-10-31 at 09:33 +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 03:03:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 7:53 PM, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > > Here is the behaviour that this set implements.
> > >
> > > For kpt_restrict==0
> > >
> > >
On Tue, 2017-10-31 at 09:33 +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 03:03:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 7:53 PM, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > > Here is the behaviour that this set implements.
> > >
> > > For kpt_restrict==0
> > >
> > > Randomness not
On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 03:03:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 7:53 PM, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > Here is the behaviour that this set implements.
> >
> > For kpt_restrict==0
> >
> > Randomness not ready:
> > printed with %p: (pointer)
On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 03:03:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 7:53 PM, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > Here is the behaviour that this set implements.
> >
> > For kpt_restrict==0
> >
> > Randomness not ready:
> > printed with %p: (pointer) # NOTE: with
On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 7:53 PM, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> Here is the behaviour that this set implements.
>
> For kpt_restrict==0
>
> Randomness not ready:
> printed with %p: (pointer) # NOTE: with padding
> Valid pointer:
> printed with %pK:
On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 7:53 PM, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> Here is the behaviour that this set implements.
>
> For kpt_restrict==0
>
> Randomness not ready:
> printed with %p: (pointer) # NOTE: with padding
> Valid pointer:
> printed with %pK:
On (10/26/17 13:53), Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> Currently there are many places in the kernel where addresses are being
> printed using an unadorned %p. Kernel pointers should be printed using
> %pK allowing some control via the kptr_restrict sysctl. Exposing
> addresses gives attackers sensitive
On (10/26/17 13:53), Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> Currently there are many places in the kernel where addresses are being
> printed using an unadorned %p. Kernel pointers should be printed using
> %pK allowing some control via the kptr_restrict sysctl. Exposing
> addresses gives attackers sensitive
Currently there are many places in the kernel where addresses are being
printed using an unadorned %p. Kernel pointers should be printed using
%pK allowing some control via the kptr_restrict sysctl. Exposing
addresses gives attackers sensitive information about the kernel layout
in memory.
We can
Currently there are many places in the kernel where addresses are being
printed using an unadorned %p. Kernel pointers should be printed using
%pK allowing some control via the kptr_restrict sysctl. Exposing
addresses gives attackers sensitive information about the kernel layout
in memory.
We can
26 matches
Mail list logo