On 1/29/2021 12:46 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 12:33:43PM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
In that case is there any reason to keep the "depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL"?
Probably not. I haven't heard of the AMD implementation being somehow
different from Intel's.
Ok, I will
On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 12:33:43PM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> In that case is there any reason to keep the "depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL"?
Probably not. I haven't heard of the AMD implementation being somehow
different from Intel's.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
On 1/29/21 11:58 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> Did any CPUs ever get released that have this? If so, name them. If
>> not, time to change this to 2021, I think.
> Zen 3 :)
In that case is there any reason to keep the "depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL"?
On 1/29/2021 11:42 AM, Dave Hansen wrote:
On 1/27/21 1:25 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
+ help
+ Control-flow protection is a hardware security hardening feature
+ that detects function-return address or jump target changes by
+ malicious code.
It's not really one
> On Jan 29, 2021, at 11:42 AM, Dave Hansen wrote:
>
> On 1/27/21 1:25 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>> +help
>> + Control-flow protection is a hardware security hardening feature
>> + that detects function-return address or jump target changes by
>> + malicious code.
>
> It's
On 1/27/21 1:25 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> + help
> + Control-flow protection is a hardware security hardening feature
> + that detects function-return address or jump target changes by
> + malicious code.
It's not really one feature. I also think it's not worth talking about
Shadow Stack provides protection against function return address
corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has
CONFIG_X86_CET enabled, and the application is built for the feature.
This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it is enabled, legacy
non-Shadow
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