On Sat, May 09, 2020 at 03:48:54AM +, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 08:47:19AM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> > On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 10:25:58PM +, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> > > On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 06:06:06PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> > > > On Thu, May 07, 2020
On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 08:47:19AM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 10:25:58PM +, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> > On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 06:06:06PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> > > On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 08:33:40PM +, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> > > > I *think* that a
On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 10:25:58PM +, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 06:06:06PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> > On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 08:33:40PM +, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> > > I *think* that a cmdline route to enable this would likely remove the
> > > need for the
On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 06:06:06PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 08:33:40PM +, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> > I *think* that a cmdline route to enable this would likely remove the
> > need for the kernel config for this. But even with Vlastimil's work
> > merged, I think
On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 08:33:40PM +, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 02:47:05PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> > On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 02:43:16PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> > > On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 06:22:57PM +, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> > > > On Thu, May 07, 2020
On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 02:47:05PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 02:43:16PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> > On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 06:22:57PM +, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> > > On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 02:06:31PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> > > > diff --git
On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 06:50:46PM +, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 02:06:31PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> > Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be
> > as a mean for assuring a security policy (in paranoid mode)
> > case where no single taint is
On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 02:06:31PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be
> as a mean for assuring a security policy (in paranoid mode)
> case where no single taint is allowed for the running system.
If used for this purpose then we must add a
On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 02:43:16PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 06:22:57PM +, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> > On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 02:06:31PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> > > diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> > > index 8a176d8727a3..b80ab660d727 100644
>
On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 06:22:57PM +, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 02:06:31PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> > diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> > index 8a176d8727a3..b80ab660d727 100644
> > --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> > +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> > @@ -1217,6
On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 02:06:31PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> index 8a176d8727a3..b80ab660d727 100644
> --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> @@ -1217,6 +1217,13 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
> .extra1
Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch
introduces a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to
provide a simple and generic way to stop execution and catch
a coredump when the kernel gets tainted by any given taint flag.
This is useful for debugging sessions as it avoids
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