Re: [PATCH v2] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto

Eric Biggers wrote: > but I skipped the big_key type because it was one of the more obscure key > types (and frankly I have no idea what, if anything, actually uses it) Kerberos can use it. David

Re: [PATCH v2] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto

Eric Biggers wrote: > but I skipped the big_key type because it was one of the more obscure key > types (and frankly I have no idea what, if anything, actually uses it) Kerberos can use it. David

Re: [PATCH v2] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto

On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 09:22:19PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > Hi Jason, > > On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 11:51:29PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > > issue now. And, some error paths forgot to zero out sensitive material, so > > this patch changes a kfree into a kzfree. > > There are other

Re: [PATCH v2] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto

On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 09:22:19PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > Hi Jason, > > On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 11:51:29PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > > issue now. And, some error paths forgot to zero out sensitive material, so > > this patch changes a kfree into a kzfree. > > There are other

Re: [PATCH v2] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto

Hi Jason, On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 11:51:29PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > issue now. And, some error paths forgot to zero out sensitive material, so > this patch changes a kfree into a kzfree. There are other places in big_key.c that should be doing kzfree() instead of kfree(). Sorry, I

Re: [PATCH v2] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto

Hi Jason, On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 11:51:29PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > issue now. And, some error paths forgot to zero out sensitive material, so > this patch changes a kfree into a kzfree. There are other places in big_key.c that should be doing kzfree() instead of kfree(). Sorry, I

[PATCH v2] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto

This started out as just replacing the use of crypto/rng with get_random_bytes, so that we wouldn't use bad randomness at boot time. But, upon looking further, it appears that there were even deeper underlying cryptographic problems, and that this seems to have been committed with very little

[PATCH v2] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto

This started out as just replacing the use of crypto/rng with get_random_bytes, so that we wouldn't use bad randomness at boot time. But, upon looking further, it appears that there were even deeper underlying cryptographic problems, and that this seems to have been committed with very little