On Thu, Oct 03, 2013 at 08:12:44AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
So please first get consensus on this fundamental design question before
spreading your solution to more areas.
Check file_ns_capable() added in commit 935d8aabd4331 by Linus
Add file_ns_capable() helper function for open-time
* Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
Regardless, glibc uses /proc/self/maps, which would be fine here, right?
I did not touch /proc/self/maps and others, but I'm planning to fix them
if this solution is accepted.
I'll do the same thing as in /proc/*/stat for maps, let it be 0444,
* Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
* You can't do it for /proc/*/stat otherwise you will break userspace
ps..., ps must access /proc/1/stat etc... so the proposed solution
will work without any side effect.
The thing is, returning -EINVAL is not the only way to reject access to
On Thu, Oct 03, 2013 at 08:12:44AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
* Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
Regardless, glibc uses /proc/self/maps, which would be fine here, right?
I did not touch /proc/self/maps and others, but I'm planning to fix them
if this solution is accepted.
On Thu, Oct 03, 2013 at 08:22:56AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
* Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
* You can't do it for /proc/*/stat otherwise you will break userspace
ps..., ps must access /proc/1/stat etc... so the proposed solution
will work without any side effect.
The
* Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
On Thu, Oct 03, 2013 at 08:22:56AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
* Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
* You can't do it for /proc/*/stat otherwise you will break userspace
ps..., ps must access /proc/1/stat etc... so the proposed
On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 1:29 PM, Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
On Thu, Oct 03, 2013 at 08:12:44AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
* Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
Regardless, glibc uses /proc/self/maps, which would be fine here, right?
I did not touch /proc/self/maps and
On Thu, Oct 03, 2013 at 04:15:43PM +0100, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 1:29 PM, Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
On Thu, Oct 03, 2013 at 08:12:44AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
Now procfs might be special, as by its nature of a pseudofilesystem it's
far more atomic than
On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 4:40 PM, Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
On Thu, Oct 03, 2013 at 04:15:43PM +0100, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 1:29 PM, Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
On Thu, Oct 03, 2013 at 08:12:44AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
Now procfs might be
(Andy sorry for the delay, real life...)
On Thu, Oct 03, 2013 at 04:50:54PM +0100, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 4:40 PM, Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
On Thu, Oct 03, 2013 at 04:15:43PM +0100, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 1:29 PM, Djalal Harouni
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 11:07 AM, Kees Cook keesc...@chromium.org wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 11:00 AM, Andy Lutomirski l...@amacapital.net wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 10:48 AM, Kees Cook keesc...@chromium.org wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 9:51 AM, Andy Lutomirski l...@amacapital.net
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 06:40:41PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On 10/01/2013 01:26 PM, Djalal Harouni wrote:
/proc/pid/* entries varies at runtime, appropriate permission checks
need to happen during each system call.
Currently some of these sensitive entries are protected by
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 3:37 PM, Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 06:40:41PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On 10/01/2013 01:26 PM, Djalal Harouni wrote:
/proc/pid/* entries varies at runtime, appropriate permission checks
need to happen during each system call.
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 9:51 AM, Andy Lutomirski l...@amacapital.net wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 3:37 PM, Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 06:40:41PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On 10/01/2013 01:26 PM, Djalal Harouni wrote:
/proc/pid/* entries varies at
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 10:48 AM, Kees Cook keesc...@chromium.org wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 9:51 AM, Andy Lutomirski l...@amacapital.net wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 3:37 PM, Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 06:40:41PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 11:00 AM, Andy Lutomirski l...@amacapital.net wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 10:48 AM, Kees Cook keesc...@chromium.org wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 9:51 AM, Andy Lutomirski l...@amacapital.net wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 3:37 PM, Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 05:51:15PM +0100, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 3:37 PM, Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 06:40:41PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On 10/01/2013 01:26 PM, Djalal Harouni wrote:
/proc/pid/* entries varies at runtime,
On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 10:48:55AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 9:51 AM, Andy Lutomirski l...@amacapital.net wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 3:37 PM, Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 06:40:41PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On 10/01/2013 01:26
On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 11:00:26AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 10:48 AM, Kees Cook keesc...@chromium.org wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 9:51 AM, Andy Lutomirski l...@amacapital.net wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 3:37 PM, Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
On Tue,
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 11:22 AM, Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 10:48:55AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 9:51 AM, Andy Lutomirski l...@amacapital.net wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 3:37 PM, Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
On Tue, Oct
On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 07:26:43PM +0100, Djalal Harouni wrote:
On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 11:00:26AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 10:48 AM, Kees Cook keesc...@chromium.org wrote:
I think revoking the fd would be great. Does that mechanism exist?
There's this thing
On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 11:35:45AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 11:22 AM, Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 10:48:55AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 9:51 AM, Andy Lutomirski l...@amacapital.net
wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 11:48 AM, Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 11:35:45AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 11:22 AM, Djalal Harouni tix...@opendz.org wrote:
On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 10:48:55AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 9:51
/proc/pid/* entries varies at runtime, appropriate permission checks
need to happen during each system call.
Currently some of these sensitive entries are protected by performing
the ptrace_may_access() check. However even with that the /proc file
descriptors can be passed to a more privileged
On 10/01/2013 01:26 PM, Djalal Harouni wrote:
/proc/pid/* entries varies at runtime, appropriate permission checks
need to happen during each system call.
Currently some of these sensitive entries are protected by performing
the ptrace_may_access() check. However even with that the /proc
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