Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)

On 15/03/2021 22:17, Kees Cook wrote: > On Thu, Mar 11, 2021 at 11:52:42AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote: >> [...] >> This change may not impact systems relying on other permission models >> than POSIX capabilities (e.g. Tomoyo). Being able to use chroot(2) on >> such systems may require to update

Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)

On Thu, Mar 11, 2021 at 11:52:42AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > [...] > This change may not impact systems relying on other permission models > than POSIX capabilities (e.g. Tomoyo). Being able to use chroot(2) on > such systems may require to update their security policies. > > Only the chroot

[PATCH v3 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)

From: Mickaël Salaün Being able to easily change root directories enable to ease some development workflow and can be used as a tool to strengthen unprivileged security sandboxes. chroot(2) is not an access-control mechanism per se, but it can be used to limit the absolute view of the filesystem