On 10/19/20 10:53 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>> SGX1 CPUs take an erratum on the #PF behavior, e.g. "KBW90 Violation of
>>> Intel
>>> SGX Access-Control Requirements Produce #GP Instead of #PF".
>>>
>>>
On Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 10:48:35AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 10/19/20 10:38 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> >>> +static inline bool encls_failed(int ret)
> >>> +{
> >>> + int epcm_trapnr;
> >>> +
> >>> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX2))
> >>> + epcm_trapnr = X86_TRAP_PF;
> >>> +
On 10/19/20 10:38 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>> +static inline bool encls_failed(int ret)
>>> +{
>>> + int epcm_trapnr;
>>> +
>>> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX2))
>>> + epcm_trapnr = X86_TRAP_PF;
>>> + else
>>> + epcm_trapnr = X86_TRAP_GP;
>> So, the SDM makes
On Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 07:30:32AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 10/2/20 9:50 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > +/**
> > + * encls_failed() - Check if an ENCLS leaf function failed
> > + * @ret: the return value of an ENCLS leaf function call
> > + *
> > + * Check if an ENCLS leaf function failed.
On 10/2/20 9:50 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> +/**
> + * encls_failed() - Check if an ENCLS leaf function failed
> + * @ret: the return value of an ENCLS leaf function call
> + *
> + * Check if an ENCLS leaf function failed. This happens when the leaf
> function
> + * causes a fault that is
ENCLS is a ring 0 instruction, which contains a set of leaf functions for
managing an enclave. Enclaves are measured and signed software entities,
which are protected by asserting the outside memory accesses and memory
encryption.
Add a two-layer macro system along with an encoding scheme to
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