On 19/05/2020 04:23, Aleksa Sarai wrote:
> On 2020-05-15, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 04:43:37PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
>>> * Kees Cook:
>>>
On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 10:43:34AM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Kees Cook:
>
>> Maybe I've missed some earlier
On 2020-05-15, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 04:43:37PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
> > * Kees Cook:
> >
> > > On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 10:43:34AM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
> > >> * Kees Cook:
> > >>
> > >> > Maybe I've missed some earlier discussion that ruled this out, but I
>
* Kees Cook:
> I think I misunderstood what you meant (Mickaël got me sorted out
> now). If O_EXEC is already meant to be "EXEC and _not_ READ nor WRITE",
> then yes, this new flag can't be O_EXEC. I was reading the glibc
> documentation (which treats it as a permission bit flag, not POSIX,
>
On 15/05/2020 17:46, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 01:04:08PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>
>> On 15/05/2020 10:01, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 09:16:13PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
On 14/05/2020 18:10, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Thu, May 14, 2020 at
On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 04:43:37PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Kees Cook:
>
> > On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 10:43:34AM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
> >> * Kees Cook:
> >>
> >> > Maybe I've missed some earlier discussion that ruled this out, but I
> >> > couldn't find it: let's just add O_EXEC
On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 01:04:08PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>
> On 15/05/2020 10:01, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 09:16:13PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> >> On 14/05/2020 18:10, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> >>> On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 11:45 AM Kees Cook wrote:
> So, it
* Kees Cook:
> On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 10:43:34AM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
>> * Kees Cook:
>>
>> > Maybe I've missed some earlier discussion that ruled this out, but I
>> > couldn't find it: let's just add O_EXEC and be done with it. It actually
>> > makes the execve() path more like
On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 10:43:34AM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Kees Cook:
>
> > Maybe I've missed some earlier discussion that ruled this out, but I
> > couldn't find it: let's just add O_EXEC and be done with it. It actually
> > makes the execve() path more like openat2() and is much
On 15/05/2020 10:01, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 09:16:13PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> On 14/05/2020 18:10, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>> On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 11:45 AM Kees Cook wrote:
So, it looks like adding FMODE_EXEC into f_flags in do_open() is needed in
* Kees Cook:
> Maybe I've missed some earlier discussion that ruled this out, but I
> couldn't find it: let's just add O_EXEC and be done with it. It actually
> makes the execve() path more like openat2() and is much cleaner after
> a little refactoring. Here are the results, though I haven't
On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 09:16:13PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> On 14/05/2020 18:10, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 11:45 AM Kees Cook wrote:
> >> So, it looks like adding FMODE_EXEC into f_flags in do_open() is needed in
> >> addition to injecting MAY_EXEC into acc_mode in
On 2020/05/06 0:31, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> The goal of this patch series is to enable to control script execution
> with interpreters help. A new O_MAYEXEC flag, usable through
> openat2(2), is added to enable userspace script interpreter to delegate
> to the kernel (and thus the system security
On 14/05/2020 01:27, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 11:37:16AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 11:33 AM Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>>
>>> Enable to forbid access to files open with O_MAYEXEC. Thanks to the
>>> noexec option from the underlying VFS mount, or to
On 14/05/2020 18:10, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 11:45 AM Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 08:22:01AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>> On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 11:05 PM Kees Cook wrote:
On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 04:27:39PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 11:45 AM Kees Cook wrote:
>
> On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 08:22:01AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 11:05 PM Kees Cook wrote:
> > >
> > > On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 04:27:39PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > > Like, couldn't just the entire thing just
On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 10:41 AM Kees Cook wrote:
>
> On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 08:22:01AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 11:05 PM Kees Cook wrote:
> > >
> > > On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 04:27:39PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > > Like, couldn't just the entire thing just
On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 08:22:01AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 11:05 PM Kees Cook wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 04:27:39PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > Like, couldn't just the entire thing just be:
> > >
> > > diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> > > index
On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 08:22:01AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 11:05 PM Kees Cook wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 04:27:39PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > Like, couldn't just the entire thing just be:
> > >
> > > diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> > > index
On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 11:05 PM Kees Cook wrote:
>
> On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 04:27:39PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > Like, couldn't just the entire thing just be:
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> > index a320371899cf..0ab18e19f5da 100644
> > --- a/fs/namei.c
> > +++ b/fs/namei.c
> >
From: Kees Cook
> Sent: 14 May 2020 04:05
> On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 04:27:39PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > Like, couldn't just the entire thing just be:
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> > index a320371899cf..0ab18e19f5da 100644
> > --- a/fs/namei.c
> > +++ b/fs/namei.c
> > @@ -2849,6
On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 04:27:39PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Like, couldn't just the entire thing just be:
>
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index a320371899cf..0ab18e19f5da 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -2849,6 +2849,13 @@ static int may_open(const struct path *path,
On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 11:37:16AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 11:33 AM Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> >
> > Enable to forbid access to files open with O_MAYEXEC. Thanks to the
> > noexec option from the underlying VFS mount, or to the file execute
> > permission, userspace
On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 11:33 AM Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>
> Enable to forbid access to files open with O_MAYEXEC. Thanks to the
> noexec option from the underlying VFS mount, or to the file execute
> permission, userspace can enforce these execution policies. This may
> allow script interpreters
On 12/05/2020 23:48, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 05:31:53PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> Enable to forbid access to files open with O_MAYEXEC. Thanks to the
>> noexec option from the underlying VFS mount, or to the file execute
>> permission, userspace can enforce these
On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 05:31:53PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Enable to forbid access to files open with O_MAYEXEC. Thanks to the
> noexec option from the underlying VFS mount, or to the file execute
> permission, userspace can enforce these execution policies. This may
> allow script
On 5/5/20 9:55 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>
>
> On 05/05/2020 17:44, Randy Dunlap wrote:
>> On 5/5/20 8:31 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
>>> index cd3cc7da3a55..d8fac9240d14 100644
>>> --- a/security/Kconfig
>>> +++ b/security/Kconfig
>>> @@ -230,6
On 05/05/2020 17:44, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> On 5/5/20 8:31 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
>> index cd3cc7da3a55..d8fac9240d14 100644
>> --- a/security/Kconfig
>> +++ b/security/Kconfig
>> @@ -230,6 +230,32 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
>>
On 5/5/20 8:31 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index cd3cc7da3a55..d8fac9240d14 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -230,6 +230,32 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
> If you wish for all usermode helper programs to
Enable to forbid access to files open with O_MAYEXEC. Thanks to the
noexec option from the underlying VFS mount, or to the file execute
permission, userspace can enforce these execution policies. This may
allow script interpreters to check execution permission before reading
commands from a
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