Re: [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection

2018-10-19 Thread Peter Zijlstra
On Fri, Oct 19, 2018 at 09:43:35AM -0700, Tim Chen wrote: > On 10/19/2018 12:57 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > > On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 10:59:28AM -0700, Tim Chen wrote: > >> Application to application exploit is in general difficult due to address > >> space layout randomization in applications and

Re: [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection

2018-10-19 Thread Tim Chen
On 10/19/2018 12:57 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 10:59:28AM -0700, Tim Chen wrote: >> Application to application exploit is in general difficult due to address >> space layout randomization in applications and the need to know an > > Does the BTB attack on KASLR not work for

Re: [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection

2018-10-19 Thread Peter Zijlstra
On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 10:59:28AM -0700, Tim Chen wrote: > Application to application exploit is in general difficult due to address > space layout randomization in applications and the need to know an Does the BTB attack on KASLR not work for userspace?

[Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection

2018-10-17 Thread Tim Chen
Thanks to the valuable feedback from Thomas, Ingo and other reviewers to the second version of this patchset. The patches are now broken down into smaller functional changes and should make them clearer and easier to review and merge. One major change is that STIBP is not needed when enhanced IBRS