By default, EVM maintains the same behavior as before hooks were moved
outside the LSM infrastructure. When EVM returns -EPERM, callers stop their
execution and return the error to user space.
This patch introduces a new mode, called ignore, that changes the return
value of the pre hooks from -EPERM to -EAGAIN. It also modifies the callers
of pre and post hooks to continue the execution if -EAGAIN is returned. The
error is then handled by the post hooks.
The only error that is not ignored is when user space is trying to modify a
portable signature. Once that signature has been validated with the current
values of metadata, there is no valid reason to change them.
>From user space perspective, operations on corrupted metadata are
successfully performed but post hooks didn't update the HMAC. At the next
IMA verification, when evm_verifyxattr() is called, corruption will be
detected and access will be denied.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sa...@huawei.com>
---
fs/attr.c | 2 +-
fs/xattr.c | 4 ++--
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------
3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 6ce60e1eba34..6370e2f3704d 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr *
attr, struct inode **de
if (error)
return error;
evm_error = evm_inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
- if (evm_error)
+ if (evm_error && evm_error != -EAGAIN)
return evm_error;
error = try_break_deleg(inode, delegated_inode);
if (error)
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index b1fd2aa481a8..73f0f3cd6c45 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const
void *value,
goto out;
evm_error = evm_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
- if (evm_error) {
+ if (evm_error && evm_error != -EAGAIN) {
error = evm_error;
goto out;
}
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
goto out;
evm_error = evm_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
- if (evm_error) {
+ if (evm_error && evm_error != -EAGAIN) {
error = evm_error;
goto out;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index ca9eaef7058b..ef09caa3bbcf 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -54,11 +54,13 @@ static struct xattr_list evm_config_default_xattrnames[] = {
LIST_HEAD(evm_config_xattrnames);
-static int evm_fixmode;
+static int evm_fixmode, evm_ignoremode __ro_after_init;
static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str)
{
if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
evm_fixmode = 1;
+ if (strncmp(str, "ignore", 6) == 0)
+ evm_ignoremode = 1;
return 0;
}
__setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode);
@@ -311,6 +313,7 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const
char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
enum integrity_status evm_status;
+ int rc = -EPERM;
if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
@@ -345,12 +348,17 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const
char *xattr_name,
-EPERM, 0);
}
out:
- if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
+ if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
+ if (evm_ignoremode && evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)
+ rc = -EAGAIN;
+
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA,
d_backing_inode(dentry),
dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
- -EPERM, 0);
- return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
+ rc, 0);
+ }
+
+ return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : rc;
}
/**
@@ -482,6 +490,7 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr
*attr)
{
unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
enum integrity_status evm_status;
+ int rc = -EPERM;
/* Policy permits modification of the protected attrs even though
* there's no HMAC key loaded
@@ -495,10 +504,12 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr
*attr)
if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
(evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
return 0;
+ if (evm_ignoremode && evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)
+ rc = -EAGAIN;
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry),
dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
- integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0);
- return -EPERM;
+ integrity_status_msg[evm_status], rc, 0);
+ return rc;
}
/**
--
2.17.1
