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Chris Wright wrote:
> * John Richard Moser ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
>
>>Yes, mkdtemp() and mkstemp().
>>
>>Of course we can't always rely on programmers to get it right, so the
>>idea here is to make sure we ask broken code to behave nicely, and
* John Richard Moser ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
> Yes, mkdtemp() and mkstemp().
>
> Of course we can't always rely on programmers to get it right, so the
> idea here is to make sure we ask broken code to behave nicely, and stab
> it in the face if it doesn't. Please try to examine this in that
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Chris Wright wrote:
> * John Richard Moser ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
>
>>I've yet to see this break anything on Ubuntu or Gentoo; Brad Spengler
>>claims this breaks nothing on Debian. On the other hand, this could
>>potentially squash the second
On Mon, 07 Feb 2005 23:00:33 +0100, Lorenzo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Hern=E1ndez_?=
=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Garc=EDa-Hierro?= said:
> A sysctl can be a good option, creating a CTL_SECURITY and then
> registering stuff under it, but this requires to have the kernel hackers
> agree with implementing a new security
El lun, 07-02-2005 a las 16:45 -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] escribió:
> On Mon, 07 Feb 2005 20:34:33 +0100, Lorenzo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Hern=E1ndez_?=
> =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Garc=EDa-Hierro?= said:
>
> > But It's better to give users a "secure-by-default" status, at least on
> > those parts that don't affect
On Mon, 07 Feb 2005 20:34:33 +0100, Lorenzo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Hern=E1ndez_?=
=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Garc=EDa-Hierro?= said:
> But It's better to give users a "secure-by-default" status, at least on
> those parts that don't affect negatively the stability or the
> performance itself.
It's still policy, and
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Chris Wright wrote:
> * Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
>
>>This patch adds two checks to do_follow_link() and sys_link(), for
>>prevent users to follow (untrusted) symlinks owned by other users in
>>world-writable +t
* John Richard Moser ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
> I've yet to see this break anything on Ubuntu or Gentoo; Brad Spengler
> claims this breaks nothing on Debian. On the other hand, this could
> potentially squash the second most prevalent security bug.
Yes I know, I've worked on distro with it as
* Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
> About what things it can break, I haven't noticed any issue on it (at
> least regarding grSecurity or OpenWall), but of course I would
> appreciate a lot any information on them, so, I could report to the
> developers that are
El lun, 07-02-2005 a las 11:12 -0800, Chris Wright escribió:
> * Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
> > This patch adds two checks to do_follow_link() and sys_link(), for
> > prevent users to follow (untrusted) symlinks owned by other users in
> > world-writable +t
El lun, 07-02-2005 a las 14:14 -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] escribió:
> On Mon, 07 Feb 2005 19:57:06 +0100, Lorenzo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Hern=E1ndez_?=
> =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Garc=EDa-Hierro?= said:
>
> > This patch adds two checks to do_follow_link() and sys_link(), for
> > prevent users to follow (untrusted)
On Mon, 07 Feb 2005 19:57:06 +0100, Lorenzo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Hern=E1ndez_?=
=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Garc=EDa-Hierro?= said:
> This patch adds two checks to do_follow_link() and sys_link(), for
> prevent users to follow (untrusted) symlinks owned by other users in
> world-writable +t directories (i.e.
* Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
> This patch adds two checks to do_follow_link() and sys_link(), for
> prevent users to follow (untrusted) symlinks owned by other users in
> world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of the
> symlink is the owner of
* Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
This patch adds two checks to do_follow_link() and sys_link(), for
prevent users to follow (untrusted) symlinks owned by other users in
world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of the
symlink is the owner of the
On Mon, 07 Feb 2005 19:57:06 +0100, Lorenzo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Hern=E1ndez_?=
=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Garc=EDa-Hierro?= said:
This patch adds two checks to do_follow_link() and sys_link(), for
prevent users to follow (untrusted) symlinks owned by other users in
world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp),
El lun, 07-02-2005 a las 14:14 -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] escribió:
On Mon, 07 Feb 2005 19:57:06 +0100, Lorenzo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Hern=E1ndez_?=
=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Garc=EDa-Hierro?= said:
This patch adds two checks to do_follow_link() and sys_link(), for
prevent users to follow (untrusted)
El lun, 07-02-2005 a las 11:12 -0800, Chris Wright escribió:
* Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
This patch adds two checks to do_follow_link() and sys_link(), for
prevent users to follow (untrusted) symlinks owned by other users in
world-writable +t directories
* Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
About what things it can break, I haven't noticed any issue on it (at
least regarding grSecurity or OpenWall), but of course I would
appreciate a lot any information on them, so, I could report to the
developers that are currently
* John Richard Moser ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
I've yet to see this break anything on Ubuntu or Gentoo; Brad Spengler
claims this breaks nothing on Debian. On the other hand, this could
potentially squash the second most prevalent security bug.
Yes I know, I've worked on distro with it as
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Hash: SHA1
Chris Wright wrote:
* Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
This patch adds two checks to do_follow_link() and sys_link(), for
prevent users to follow (untrusted) symlinks owned by other users in
world-writable +t directories
On Mon, 07 Feb 2005 20:34:33 +0100, Lorenzo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Hern=E1ndez_?=
=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Garc=EDa-Hierro?= said:
But It's better to give users a secure-by-default status, at least on
those parts that don't affect negatively the stability or the
performance itself.
It's still policy, and
El lun, 07-02-2005 a las 16:45 -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] escribió:
On Mon, 07 Feb 2005 20:34:33 +0100, Lorenzo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Hern=E1ndez_?=
=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Garc=EDa-Hierro?= said:
But It's better to give users a secure-by-default status, at least on
those parts that don't affect negatively
On Mon, 07 Feb 2005 23:00:33 +0100, Lorenzo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Hern=E1ndez_?=
=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Garc=EDa-Hierro?= said:
A sysctl can be a good option, creating a CTL_SECURITY and then
registering stuff under it, but this requires to have the kernel hackers
agree with implementing a new security
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Chris Wright wrote:
* John Richard Moser ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
I've yet to see this break anything on Ubuntu or Gentoo; Brad Spengler
claims this breaks nothing on Debian. On the other hand, this could
potentially squash the second most
* John Richard Moser ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
Yes, mkdtemp() and mkstemp().
Of course we can't always rely on programmers to get it right, so the
idea here is to make sure we ask broken code to behave nicely, and stab
it in the face if it doesn't. Please try to examine this in that scope.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Chris Wright wrote:
* John Richard Moser ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
Yes, mkdtemp() and mkstemp().
Of course we can't always rely on programmers to get it right, so the
idea here is to make sure we ask broken code to behave nicely, and stab
it in
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