On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 01:06:43PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 21, 2017 at 06:05:09PM +0100, Dave Martin wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 05:01:21PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > This series adds support for the ARMv8.3 pointer authentication extension.
>
> > > Open questions
>
On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 01:06:43PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 21, 2017 at 06:05:09PM +0100, Dave Martin wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 05:01:21PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > This series adds support for the ARMv8.3 pointer authentication extension.
>
> > > Open questions
>
Hi,
On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 12:32:10PM +0100, Yao Qi wrote:
> On 19/07/17 17:01, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > If authentication fails, bits are set in the pointer such that it is
> > guaranteed to cause a fault if used.
>
> How does user space know the fault is caused by authentication fail?
Hi,
On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 12:32:10PM +0100, Yao Qi wrote:
> On 19/07/17 17:01, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > If authentication fails, bits are set in the pointer such that it is
> > guaranteed to cause a fault if used.
>
> How does user space know the fault is caused by authentication fail?
> > * Should the kernel remove PACs when unwinding user stacks?
> >
> > This is simple to do, but it's arguably placing a policy in the kernel as
> > to
> > what we expect user stacks to look like. Regardless, userspace will have
> > to
> > perform this when unwinding with DWARF.
>>
>> Not
> > * Should the kernel remove PACs when unwinding user stacks?
> >
> > This is simple to do, but it's arguably placing a policy in the kernel as
> > to
> > what we expect user stacks to look like. Regardless, userspace will have
> > to
> > perform this when unwinding with DWARF.
>>
>> Not
On Fri, Jul 21, 2017 at 06:05:09PM +0100, Dave Martin wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 05:01:21PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > This series adds support for the ARMv8.3 pointer authentication extension.
> > Open questions
> > ==
> >
> > * Should keys be per-thread rather than
On Fri, Jul 21, 2017 at 06:05:09PM +0100, Dave Martin wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 05:01:21PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > This series adds support for the ARMv8.3 pointer authentication extension.
> > Open questions
> > ==
> >
> > * Should keys be per-thread rather than
On 19/07/17 17:01, Mark Rutland wrote:
If authentication fails, bits are set in the pointer such that it is guaranteed
to cause a fault if used.
How does user space know the fault is caused by authentication fail?
When GDB is debugging a program, and it failed in pointer
authentication, I
On 19/07/17 17:01, Mark Rutland wrote:
If authentication fails, bits are set in the pointer such that it is guaranteed
to cause a fault if used.
How does user space know the fault is caused by authentication fail?
When GDB is debugging a program, and it failed in pointer
authentication, I
On 19/07/17 17:01, Mark Rutland wrote:
* Should the kernel remove PACs when unwinding user stacks?
This is simple to do, but it's arguably placing a policy in the kernel as to
what we expect user stacks to look like. Regardless, userspace will have to
perform this when unwinding with
On 19/07/17 17:01, Mark Rutland wrote:
* Should the kernel remove PACs when unwinding user stacks?
This is simple to do, but it's arguably placing a policy in the kernel as to
what we expect user stacks to look like. Regardless, userspace will have to
perform this when unwinding with
On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 05:01:21PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> This series adds support for the ARMv8.3 pointer authentication extension.
>
> Since RFC [1]:
> * Make the KVM context switch (semi-lazy)
> * Rebase to v4.13-rc1
> * Improve pointer authentication documentation
> * Add hwcap
On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 05:01:21PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> This series adds support for the ARMv8.3 pointer authentication extension.
>
> Since RFC [1]:
> * Make the KVM context switch (semi-lazy)
> * Rebase to v4.13-rc1
> * Improve pointer authentication documentation
> * Add hwcap
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