Re: [PATCH v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

2018-05-19 Thread Gustavo A. R. Silva
On 05/19/2018 02:04 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: Greg, I've been talking with Dan Williams (intel) about this kind of issues [1] and it seems my original assumptions are correct. Hence, this patch is not useful and, in order to actually prevent speculation here we would need to pass the

Re: [PATCH v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

2018-05-19 Thread Gustavo A. R. Silva
On 05/19/2018 02:04 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: Greg, I've been talking with Dan Williams (intel) about this kind of issues [1] and it seems my original assumptions are correct. Hence, this patch is not useful and, in order to actually prevent speculation here we would need to pass the

Re: [PATCH v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

2018-05-19 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 05:27:22PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote: > > > On 05/18/2018 11:06 AM, Shuah Khan wrote: > > On 05/18/2018 07:47 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > > On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 03:16:28PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote: > > > > pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by

Re: [PATCH v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

2018-05-19 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 05:27:22PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote: > > > On 05/18/2018 11:06 AM, Shuah Khan wrote: > > On 05/18/2018 07:47 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > > On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 03:16:28PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote: > > > > pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by

Re: [PATCH v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

2018-05-18 Thread Gustavo A. R. Silva
On 05/18/2018 11:06 AM, Shuah Khan wrote: On 05/18/2018 07:47 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 03:16:28PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote: pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1

Re: [PATCH v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

2018-05-18 Thread Gustavo A. R. Silva
On 05/18/2018 11:06 AM, Shuah Khan wrote: On 05/18/2018 07:47 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 03:16:28PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote: pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1

Re: [PATCH v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

2018-05-18 Thread Shuah Khan
On 05/18/2018 07:47 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 03:16:28PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote: >> pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to >> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. >> >> This issue was detected with

Re: [PATCH v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

2018-05-18 Thread Shuah Khan
On 05/18/2018 07:47 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 03:16:28PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote: >> pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to >> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. >> >> This issue was detected with

Re: [PATCH v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

2018-05-18 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 03:16:28PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote: > pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to > a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. > > This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: > drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:238

Re: [PATCH v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

2018-05-18 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 03:16:28PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote: > pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to > a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. > > This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: > drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:238