On October 23, 2015 5:30:45 PM Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 2:22 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 2:07 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Oct 23, 2015 10:01 AM, "Kees Cook" wrote:
On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:19 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> I would argue that, if
On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 2:22 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 2:07 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Oct 23, 2015 10:01 AM, "Kees Cook" wrote:
>>>
>>> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:19 AM, Andy Lutomirski
>>> wrote:
>>> > I would argue that, if auditing is off, audit_seccomp shouldn't
On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 2:07 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Oct 23, 2015 10:01 AM, "Kees Cook" wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:19 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> > I would argue that, if auditing is off, audit_seccomp shouldn't do
>> > anything. After all, unlike e.g. selinux, seccomp is
On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 1:58 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 4:51 PM, Steve Grubb wrote:
>> On Friday, October 23, 2015 03:38:05 PM Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 1:01 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> > On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:19 AM, Andy Lutomirski
>> wrote:
>>> >> I
On Oct 23, 2015 10:01 AM, "Kees Cook" wrote:
>
> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:19 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > I would argue that, if auditing is off, audit_seccomp shouldn't do
> > anything. After all, unlike e.g. selinux, seccomp is not a systemwide
> > policy, and seccomp signals might be
On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 4:51 PM, Steve Grubb wrote:
> On Friday, October 23, 2015 03:38:05 PM Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 1:01 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> > On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:19 AM, Andy Lutomirski
> wrote:
>> >> I would argue that, if auditing is off, audit_seccomp
On Friday, October 23, 2015 03:38:05 PM Paul Moore wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 1:01 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:19 AM, Andy Lutomirski
wrote:
> >> I would argue that, if auditing is off, audit_seccomp shouldn't do
> >> anything. After all, unlike e.g. selinux,
On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 1:01 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:19 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> I would argue that, if auditing is off, audit_seccomp shouldn't do
>> anything. After all, unlike e.g. selinux, seccomp is not a systemwide
>> policy, and seccomp signals might be
On 15/10/23, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> I would argue that, if auditing is off, audit_seccomp shouldn't do
> anything. After all, unlike e.g. selinux, seccomp is not a systemwide
> policy, and seccomp signals might be ordinary behavior that's internal
> to the seccomp-using application. IOW, for
On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:19 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> I would argue that, if auditing is off, audit_seccomp shouldn't do
> anything. After all, unlike e.g. selinux, seccomp is not a systemwide
> policy, and seccomp signals might be ordinary behavior that's internal
> to the seccomp-using
I would argue that, if auditing is off, audit_seccomp shouldn't do
anything. After all, unlike e.g. selinux, seccomp is not a systemwide
policy, and seccomp signals might be ordinary behavior that's internal
to the seccomp-using application. IOW, for people with audit compiled
in and subscribed
I would argue that, if auditing is off, audit_seccomp shouldn't do
anything. After all, unlike e.g. selinux, seccomp is not a systemwide
policy, and seccomp signals might be ordinary behavior that's internal
to the seccomp-using application. IOW, for people with audit compiled
in and subscribed
On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:19 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> I would argue that, if auditing is off, audit_seccomp shouldn't do
> anything. After all, unlike e.g. selinux, seccomp is not a systemwide
> policy, and seccomp signals might be ordinary behavior that's internal
> to
On October 23, 2015 5:30:45 PM Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 2:22 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 2:07 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Oct 23, 2015 10:01 AM, "Kees Cook"
On 15/10/23, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> I would argue that, if auditing is off, audit_seccomp shouldn't do
> anything. After all, unlike e.g. selinux, seccomp is not a systemwide
> policy, and seccomp signals might be ordinary behavior that's internal
> to the seccomp-using application. IOW, for
On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 1:01 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:19 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> I would argue that, if auditing is off, audit_seccomp shouldn't do
>> anything. After all, unlike e.g. selinux, seccomp is not a systemwide
On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 1:58 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 4:51 PM, Steve Grubb wrote:
>> On Friday, October 23, 2015 03:38:05 PM Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 1:01 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> > On
On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 2:22 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 2:07 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Oct 23, 2015 10:01 AM, "Kees Cook" wrote:
>>>
>>> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:19 AM, Andy Lutomirski
On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 2:07 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Oct 23, 2015 10:01 AM, "Kees Cook" wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:19 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> > I would argue that, if auditing is off, audit_seccomp
On Friday, October 23, 2015 03:38:05 PM Paul Moore wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 1:01 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:19 AM, Andy Lutomirski
wrote:
> >> I would argue that, if auditing is off, audit_seccomp shouldn't do
> >>
On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 4:51 PM, Steve Grubb wrote:
> On Friday, October 23, 2015 03:38:05 PM Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 1:01 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> > On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:19 AM, Andy Lutomirski
> wrote:
>>
On Oct 23, 2015 10:01 AM, "Kees Cook" wrote:
>
> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:19 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > I would argue that, if auditing is off, audit_seccomp shouldn't do
> > anything. After all, unlike e.g. selinux, seccomp is not a systemwide
>
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