Re: Stop breaking the CSRNG

2019-10-06 Thread Pavel Machek
On Wed 2019-10-02 23:36:55, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote: > On Wed, Oct 02, 2019 at 06:55:33PM +0200, Kurt Roeckx wrote: > > > > But it seems people are now thinking about breaking getrandom() too, > > to let it return data when it's not initialized by default. Please > > don't. > > "It's complicated"

Re: Stop breaking the CSRNG

2019-10-03 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On Wed, Oct 02, 2019 at 11:36:55PM -0400, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote: > On Wed, Oct 02, 2019 at 06:55:33PM +0200, Kurt Roeckx wrote: > > > > But it seems people are now thinking about breaking getrandom() too, > > to let it return data when it's not initialized by default. Please > > don't. > >

Re: Stop breaking the CSRNG

2019-10-03 Thread Adam Borowski
On Thu, Oct 03, 2019 at 10:13:39AM +, David Laight wrote: > From: Kurt Roeckx > > Sent: 02 October 2019 17:56 > > As OpenSSL, we want cryptograhic secure random numbers. Before > > getrandom(), Linux never provided a good API for that, both > > /dev/random and /dev/urandom have problems.

RE: Stop breaking the CSRNG

2019-10-03 Thread David Laight
From: Kurt Roeckx > Sent: 02 October 2019 17:56 > As OpenSSL, we want cryptograhic secure random numbers. Before > getrandom(), Linux never provided a good API for that, both > /dev/random and /dev/urandom have problems. getrandom() fixed > that, so we switched to it were available. The

Re: Stop breaking the CSRNG

2019-10-02 Thread Theodore Y. Ts'o
On Wed, Oct 02, 2019 at 06:55:33PM +0200, Kurt Roeckx wrote: > > But it seems people are now thinking about breaking getrandom() too, > to let it return data when it's not initialized by default. Please > don't. "It's complicated" The problem is that whether a CRNG can be considered secure is a

Stop breaking the CSRNG

2019-10-02 Thread Kurt Roeckx
Hi, As OpenSSL, we want cryptograhic secure random numbers. Before getrandom(), Linux never provided a good API for that, both /dev/random and /dev/urandom have problems. getrandom() fixed that, so we switched to it were available. It was possible to combine /dev/random and /dev/urandom, and get